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Hu Haifeng’s Media Surge Signals Return of Party Elders; Zhang Youxia on High Alert

Hu Jintao’s son dominates state media ahead of the Fourth Plenum, as rumors swirl of reshuffles and military tension among Party elders
Published: October 14, 2025
Hu Haifeng attends a State Council press conference on Oct. 10, 2025, as part of the “14th Five-Year Plan” policy briefing series. (Image: Online Screenshot)

By Li Jingyao, Vision Times

The recent high-profile appearances of Hu Haifeng, son of former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Hu Jintao, have set off waves of speculation in Beijing. Now, netizens are pointing out that the CCP’s state media’s unusually prominent coverage of him — a clear break from long-standing propaganda norms — has drawn attention from political analysts. Many observers believe the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee could usher in sweeping personnel changes.

Some even suggest Hu Haifeng could be elevated to the Central Committee or directly into the Politburo, signaling that the Party’s senior factions still “hold power over the situation.”

RELATED: Zhang Youxia Warns of ‘Armed Conflict’ if Xi Refuses to Step Down

Hu Haifeng outshines his superiors

On Oct. 10, the State Council Information Office held a press conference titled “High-Quality Fulfillment of the 14th Five-Year Plan.” Attendees included Minister of Civil Affairs Lu Zhiyuan and Vice Ministers Li Changguan, Liu Zhenguo, and Hu Haifeng.

In an unusual twist, Hu dominated headlines in China’s tightly-controlled media — overshadowing his superiors entirely. Major state-run outlets, including “China News Service,” “National Business Daily,” “Beijing Daily,” and the “Chang’an Street Observer,” highlighted Hu’s remarks while omitting or downplaying the minister’s.

For example, “National Business Daily” placed Hu’s comments before those of Minister Lu, while “China News Service” went one step further by naming only Hu Haifeng and leaving out all other senior officials. Such treatment, observers note, is virtually unprecedented in Party media — and it is deliberate.

Xi’s political ‘wounds’

U.S.-based political commentator Chen Pokong argued on his YouTube channel that current leader Xi Jinping’s forcible removal of Hu Jintao from the 20th Party Congress in 2022 remains a permanent political wound. Another was the political sidelining of former premier Li Keqiang.

According to Chen, Hu Haifeng’s sudden prominence carries three distinct political meanings:

1. A gesture of appeasement

“The first possibility,” Chen said, “is that Xi — whether passively or deliberately — is offering an explanation, a symbolic act meant to appease Hu Jintao.”

By allowing Hu’s son to reappear in public view, Xi may be trying to ease tensions that linger from Hu Jintao’s 2022 humiliating ousting. The gesture, though limited, signals Xi’s awareness of the damage that episode inflicted within the Party.

2. Tactical compromise

Chen believes Xi may be sensing crisis as the Fourth Plenum approaches. To stabilize the political atmosphere, Xi could be striking a short-term compromise with Hu Jintao by keeping appearances of unity while maintaining real control until the 21st Party Congress.

“As part of the exchange,” Chen explained, “Xi might agree to promote Hu Jintao’s son, Hu Haifeng. This could be a cunning political calculation — a way for Xi to appear conciliatory without yielding actual control.”

3. A prelude to staffing reshuffle

Chen added that a major leadership reshuffle could be imminent. Citing Hong Kong media, he noted that the Central Committee is already discussing adjustments, and Hu Haifeng could be among the new appointees.

“The move would serve multiple purposes,” said Chen. “It would calm the Party elders, restore symbolic balance, and allow Xi to buy time — all without altering the system’s core of personal rule.”

Rumors of missing generals

Meanwhile, Hong Kong outlets have reported a large-scale personnel shake-up. Dozens of Xi’s trusted officials and generals have vanished from public view, with 46 Central Committee members reportedly removed since the 20th Party Congress. “The vacancies need to be filled,” said Chen, adding, “and Hu Haifeng could be among the replacements — perhaps even leapfrogging into the Politburo.”

If that happens, he noted, Hu could join the next generation of Party elites born in the 1970s, alongside Hu Chunhua, Chen Jining, and Ding Xuexiang.

“Hu Haifeng is not just a weathervane of elite politics,” said Chen. “He’s the barometer of the power struggle — and of the Fourth Plenum itself.”

From bureaucratic showmanship to political symbolism

Political columnist JinTao PaiAn observed that Hu Haifeng’s performance at the Ministry of Civil Affairs was “meticulously staged.” For instance, he used slogans like “Four Emphases” and “Four Enhancements” — all formulaic phrases echoing Xi’s “Four Confidences.” JinTao argued the policy content was secondary; the real goal was to demonstrate Hu’s readiness for higher office.

According to JinTao, Hu could be promoted to a provincial-level post as early as 2026, though he is unlikely to surpass Minister Lu Zhiyuan, currently the youngest minister among the State Council’s 26 departments.

“This was less about policy than performance,” JinTao wrote. “Hu Haifeng is rehearsing for his next act.”

Elders still ‘control the game’

Current affairs commentator Li Linyi noted that Hu Haifeng’s prominence over his superiors reflects the residual influence of Hu Jintao’s old Youth League faction. “The Youth League camp has not disappeared,” said Li, adding, “Xi remains wary of their network.”

Analyst Tang Jingyuan told Vision Times that Hu Haifeng’s media exposure represents a “coordinated signal” from Party elders as the Fourth Plenum nears. “These repeated breaches of Party-media discipline show the elders’ hand,” Tang said. “By elevating Hu Haifeng in state coverage, they’re really elevating Hu Jintao — a message that the old guard still has a say.”

He described it as a reassurance message to mid-level Party officials: “It’s a way of saying: Don’t panic — the elders still hold the overall situation.”

Zhang Youxia on high alert

Tang also unveiled that Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), has been maintaining a “wartime posture” amid growing instability. Zhang reportedly spends his days at the Bayi Building (PLA headquarters) and nights at the Western Hills wartime command center, a setup Tang described as “living in a state of readiness, sleeping beside his sword.”

“Zhang Youxia doesn’t dare bet everything on the elders,” said Tang. “He knows Hu Jintao and others are focused on saving the Party and projecting unity — so he must prepare for the worst.”