By Yin Hua, Vision Times
Three days after the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Fourth Plenum wrapped up on Oct. 24, a political firestorm has gripped Chinese-language media around the world. In an interview with veteran journalist Fang Fei, Cai Xia, a former professor with the CCP’s Central Party School, revealed that top military officials — Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) He Weidong and CMC member Miao Hua, director of the Political Work Department — allegedly conspired in the Tianjin–Langfang area to form an independent “division-level unit with deputy corps-level authority,” a private armed force operating outside all established command systems.
According to Cai, the unit was created to respond to so-called “emergency situations.” Former PLA Navy lieutenant colonel Yao Cheng, now based in the U.S., responded on his program, affirming that Cai’s information is “entirely credible,” though he argued that “the term ‘private army’ is not militarily precise.” Overseas commentator Lao Deng later added that the unit was under the Special Operations Bureau of the CMC Political Work Department, a small but highly equipped deputy corps-level force. He said it was personally dismantled by General Zhang Youxia in an expanded CMC meeting.
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Political commentator Wu Jianmin offered yet another perspective, claiming the unit originated as the Security and Protection Bureau under the CMC Evaluation Committee, first formed after the 2018 military reforms to serve as a special guard unit for Peng Liyuan, Xi Jinping’s wife. Wu said the force was later transformed by Miao and He, becoming “a double-edged sword — one side protecting Xi, the other capable of turning against Zhang Youxia.”
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Taken together, these overlapping accounts suggest a far-reaching internal power struggle in the CCP’s military hierarchy — one that may explain why nine PLA generals were purged just ahead of the Fourth Plenum.
A ‘detached, deputy corps-level’ unit
Cai Xia told Fang Fei she had received reliable intelligence, including the fact that, “He Weidong and others conspired in the Tianjin–Langfang area to establish a force… not subordinate to any military branch or theater command. This is a private army… structured as a division-level unit with deputy corps-level authority. The main leadership has now been placed under investigation.”
She speculated that the unit’s purpose was to “protect Xi Jinping in an emergency,” though she emphasized that it was “certainly not directly ordered by Xi.” The revelation quickly spread across platforms like X and YouTube, sparking heated debate around three questions:
- How could such a unit exist undetected?
- Was Xi aware of it?
- And was it created to protect the leader — or to overthrow him?
‘A temporary command structure’
With three decades of experience in naval command, Yao explained that the formations we’re seeing unfold within the CCP’s top ranks are often temporary task forces assembled from multiple military units to handle specific missions, including:
- Organizational Form: Teams are drawn from different service branches — Rocket Force, Marines, Air Force, and logistics — to form ad hoc “command coordination centers.”
- Location: Command meetings may occur in southern China or Langfang, but there is no pre-stationed standing force.
- Hierarchy: Leadership must be “deputy corps-level or above” to maintain authority over mixed units.
- Funding: “A few million yuan is nothing,” Yao said, noting that operational funds are drawn from existing logistics budgets.
- Historical Parallel: He compared it to Lin Biao’s “small fleet” — a framework with immense strategic value but no permanent troops.
“Such temporary command structures occur dozens of times a year in the PLA,” said Yao. “Cai’s intelligence source is far higher than ours. If she dares to speak out, she must have iron-clad evidence.”
Political tools at play
Wu reconstructed the sequence linking Cai, Yao, and Lao Deng’s accounts as follows:
- 2018: The CMC creates the Security and Protection Bureau under the Evaluation Committee to provide “exclusive protection” for Peng Liyuan during officer evaluations.
- Later: Miao Hua and He Weidong restructured it using personnel from the 31st Army’s Fujian–Shandong Special Forces, allegedly to carry out “special missions, including eliminating Li Keqiang.”
- March 2025: During the National People’s Congress, Yao Cheng hinted that “Wang Huning and others from Shandong” were coordinating an operation. He Weidong was detained on March 11, the day the meeting closed.
- April 24: The CMC publicly condemned “factionalism and clique-building” within the armed forces.
- Three days before the Fourth Plenum: He Weidong was expelled from both the Party and the military.
- During the Plenum: Thirty-one Central Committee members were absent; three seats in the meeting hall sat empty with untouched teacups — a visual symbol of sudden removal.
“Xi Jinping knows perfectly well about the unit but pretends to be deaf and blind,” said Wu, adding, “The force is actually controlled by Peng Liyuan, with Miao and He merely executing orders. Once exposed, Xi can blame them as traitors who misled the emperor.”
He added, “Li Keqiang’s unnatural death—no one in the world believes it was natural. Only this kind of special force could execute such a task, unseen by the public.”
A preemptive strike
International commentator Lao Deng claimed the unit was known as the “Special Ops Team” under the CMC Political Work Department, formed without Zhang Youxia’s approval. When the Intelligence Department discovered it, General Liu Zhengli reported it to Zhang, who then called an emergency CMC meeting and disbanded the unit on the spot.
This move provided the “hard evidence” used to purge Miao and He for allegedly “bypassing the CMC and forming an unauthorized armed force.” Lao Deng’s version aligns with Yao Cheng’s interpretation—except for differences in geographic detail, which he attributed to “varying intelligence levels.”
Wu Jianmin said Zhang Youxia later confronted Xi directly by leveraging his alliance with new CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin and Defense Minister Dong Jun’s evidence of corruption in Miao Hua’s promotions. According to Wu, “Zhang Youxia asked Xi to his face: ‘Whom does the Langfang unit truly protect? The Chairman — or someone else? Could Miao and He use it like Wang Dongxing did when he arrested the Gang of Four?’”
Wu added that Xi “was speechless and unable to justify himself.” Yao Cheng corroborated that Zhang had long anticipated danger: “Zhang Youxia isn’t naive. During the Two Sessions, he moved three brigades of the 38th Army into Beijing, and before Beidaihe, deployed the 82nd Special Operations Brigade. He even stayed in the special forces barracks himself; he knew someone wanted him dead.”
The result, according to Wu was that, “Zhang struck first; Xi deflected blame; Miao and He took the fall. Peng Liyuan was terrified. Xu Qiliang died leaving no testimony.”
The collapse of Xi’s military bloc
On the eve of the Fourth Plenum, nine top generals were expelled from both the Party and the military and handed to military courts, including He Weidong, Miao Hua, and Zhong Shaojun, Xi’s longtime aide and former political commissar of the National Defense University. “In the group photo of the 2024 Third Plenum, two full rows of military leaders stood behind Xi,” Yao noted. “A year later, only one remains — Air Force Political Commissar Guo Puxiao. Xi’s entire faction in the military has collapsed.”
Wu added, “This wasn’t Xi cutting off his own limbs. These men were his pillars of control. But with undeniable evidence on the table, he had no choice but to sacrifice them.”
Though analysts differ on the interpretation of a “private army,” they agree on the following:
- Terminology: Yao Cheng clarified that “private army” could mislead people into thinking it was a standing 10,000-man force rather than a temporary command unit.
- Logistics: Wu rebutted critics’ doubts: “Who supplied logistics? The CMC did and no one else could interfere. Once an order is issued, soldiers move; their original units don’t question it.”
- Xi’s Knowledge: Wu argued Xi was aware and complicit, leaving himself a way to deny involvement or knowledge of the private armies later on. Yao countered, “Xi would never dismiss two vice chairmen without absolute proof.”
During the Fourth Plenum, 31 Central Committee members and 18 alternates were absent. Observers noted three empty seats with teacups untouched, suggesting a purposeful and sudden exclusion. State TV showed an 8-second shot of Zhang Youxia, appearing relaxed and detached. “Zhang’s posture said it all: ‘Do whatever you like; it doesn’t concern me,'” noted Yao.
A double edged sword
He Weidong, once seen as Xi’s loyal enforcer, now faces prosecution. Zhang Youxia, a powerful “Red Second Generation” figure, remains the CMC’s first vice chairman and effectively controls the military apparatus. “The Langfang unit was a double-edged sword,” said Wu Jianmin. “Zhang’s decisive counterattack was the true checkmate.”
While some media figures have questioned Cai Xia’s revelations, Yao warned against dismissing them outright: “Those unfamiliar with the military shouldn’t hastily cry ‘rumor.’ Cai’s intelligence level is far above ours. If she dares to speak, she must have the proof.”
Wu also cautioned that Xi’s control may now be largely symbolic, noting that the Central Guard Bureau reports to the General Office, not the CMC, and that the People’s Armed Police remains fragmented under multiple authorities. “Zhang may continue purges and tighten control. Xi holds the titles — but no longer the army,” said Wu.
All three analysts agreed on one point: Cai Xia’s core facts are credible, even if her military phrasing was somewhat imprecise. The Langfang or southern unit likely existed, evolved from a CMC guard structure, and was later used as a political weapon. Xi may have tolerated it — until Zhang Youxia turned the tables.
“Everyone has their own interpretations,” Yao noted, adding, “But clear errors must be corrected. Professor Cai’s intelligence tier is far above ours. We can discuss; but not mislead.”
Editorial note: Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Vision Times.
