As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prepares for its Fourth Plenary Session, fierce internal struggles have broken out among senior provincial officials, triggering a wave of high-level personnel reshuffles across the Party and government system. Leaked reports suggest that the upcoming plenum will deliberate on three potential “upper, middle, and lower” succession plans — each involving one of the three most rumored contenders for Xi Jinping’s position.
Shandong clique’s Sun Shaocheng removed as Inner Mongolia party chief
On Sept. 30, Wang Weizhong replaced Sun Shaocheng as the CCP Party Secretary of Inner Mongolia. Wang, 63, hails from Shuozhou, Shanxi Province. He previously served as Vice Minister of Science and Technology, Party Secretary of Taiyuan, and later as Party Secretary of Shenzhen. In 2022, he was appointed Governor of Guangdong Province and is a current member of the CCP’s 20th Central Committee.
Officially, Sun Shaocheng’s removal was attributed to age, but exiled former Inner Mongolia official Du Wen claimed on X (formerly Twitter) that the move was tied to the downfall of former regional Chairwoman Wang Lixia, who allegedly implicated Sun during her investigation. According to Du, Sun’s son frequently appeared in Inner Mongolia for business and political activities after Sun took office and maintained close ties with Wang Lixia’s son. They were reportedly involved in multiple sectors — from infrastructure projects and personnel appointments to mining operations.
Du added that Sun may soon face a formal investigation by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), though he could first be given a nominal post in the National People’s Congress to “cool off” before prosecution — a fate he described as “grim.”
Commentator Tang Jingyuan noted that Sun, a native of Shandong, is considered part of the so-called “Shandong clique,” associated with First Lady Peng Liyuan’s political circle. If Sun indeed faces investigation, Tang said, “it may signal that even Peng Liyuan can no longer protect her own allies.”
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Is Wang Weizhong linked to Hu Jintao’s faction?
Also on Sept. 30, the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee announced that Meng Fanli had been appointed Party Secretary of the provincial government — a position that typically precedes promotion to governor.
Meng, 60, is a native of Linyi, Shandong Province. He spent most of his career in Shandong, serving as Director of the Department of Commerce, Mayor and Party Secretary of Yantai, and later Mayor of Qingdao. In 2020, he was transferred to Inner Mongolia as a Party Standing Committee member and Party Secretary of Baotou. In 2022, he became Deputy Party Secretary of Guangdong and Party Secretary of Shenzhen. Like Wang Weizhong, Meng is a member of the CCP’s 20th Central Committee.
Wang Weizhong’s appointment as Inner Mongolia’s new Party Secretary has reignited debate over factional loyalties within the CCP. Although Wang graduated from Tsinghua University — often regarded as the breeding ground for Xi Jinping’s loyalists — analysts caution against assuming he belongs to Xi’s “Tsinghua faction.”
Commentator Tang Jingyuan noted that Wang’s background points instead to ties with former CCP leader Hu Jintao’s camp.
“Wang Weizhong graduated from Tsinghua’s Department of Hydraulic Engineering and spent much of his career in the Ministry of Water Resources — traditionally Hu Jintao’s power base,” Tang said. “So despite his Tsinghua credentials, Wang is not part of Xi’s inner circle.”
Independent political analyst Cai Shenkun wrote on X that Wang was reluctant to leave Guangdong, where he had established strong influence as provincial governor. Guangdong Party Secretary Huang Kunming reportedly also wanted him to stay. However, Cai said, Meng Fanli “worked hard behind the scenes to secure the governorship,” ultimately succeeding in his bid for the post.
Leadership changes in Liaoning and Jiangsu signal further reshuffles
In another major personnel move on Sept. 30, Beijing announced the replacement of Hao Peng, 65, as Party Secretary of Liaoning Province. Hao, a native of Fengxiang, Shaanxi, previously served as Deputy Party Secretary and Executive Vice Chairman of Tibet, Deputy Party Secretary and Governor of Qinghai, Chairman of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), and later as Liaoning Party Secretary.
He was succeeded by Xu Kunlin, who will take over as Liaoning’s new Party Secretary — marking yet another high-level reshuffle just weeks before the pivotal Fourth Plenary Session, where the balance of power among China’s top factions may further shift.
As the Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP approaches, high-level provincial leadership reshuffles have accelerated, reflecting a broader power realignment at the top. Reports indicate that the session may include three contingency plans, reportedly targeting three key potential successors: Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua, and Chen Jining.
Key provincial leadership changes:
- Jiangsu Province: Xu Kunlin, 60, a native of Yongchun, Fujian, and former vice secretary of the National Development and Reform Commission, former Vice Mayor of Shanghai, and former Suzhou Party Secretary, succeeded Hao Peng as Party Secretary of Liaoning. Meanwhile, Liu Xiaotao, 55, from Guangdong, was appointed Jiangsu Provincial Government Party Secretary. Liu has held leadership roles across Guangdong and Zhejiang, including mayoral and Party Secretary positions, and recently served as Suzhou Party Secretary.
- Inner Mongolia: Wang Weizhong replaced Sun Shaocheng as Party Secretary. Analysts note that despite Wang’s Tsinghua University background, he is aligned with Hu Jintao’s faction rather than Xi Jinping’s.
Decline of Xi-aligned officials, rise of non-Xi cadres
Senior media analyst Wang Jian noted the recent fall of Liu Jianchao, a close Xi aide, contrasted with the appointment of Liu Haixing as head of the CCP’s United Front Department.
“Even if Liu Haixing is not a core member of Xi’s inner circle, his appointment ensures Xi retains influence over the department,” Wang said.
Tang Jingyuan added that Liu Haixing, a career diplomat who previously had no ties with Xi, is a technocratic appointee without overt factional affiliation. Tang observed an ongoing trend: Xi-aligned officials are increasingly removed, while non-Xi figures are being promoted.
The ‘upper, middle, lower’ contingency plans
Political commentator Xiaoshuojia reported that sources indicated the anti-Xi faction has prepared three contingency plans for the plenary session:
- Upper Plan: A direct replacement scenario with Wang Yang supplanting Xi, Hu Chunhua replacing Li Qiang as Premier, and Wang Yang assuming chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC), supported by Zhang Youxia as First Vice Chairman and Liu Chunhua and Liu Zhenli as additional vice chairmen.
- Middle Plan: A compromise transitional arrangement keeping Xi in office while promoting Hu Chunhua and Zhang Youxia to the CMC, establishing Hu as the de facto successor for the 21st Party Congress. The Politburo Standing Committee expands from seven to nine members.
- Lower Plan: A minimum-risk compromise, adding Hu Chunhua and Chen Jining to the Standing Committee, establishing the next-generation leadership for the 21st Party Congress. Hu and Liu Zhenli become vice chairmen of the CMC, with Xi retaining a nominal military chairmanship.
Xiaoshuojia emphasized that these plans reflect the current political stalemate: Xi remains reluctant to cede power, and only the military appears capable of pushing proposals forward.
Xi’s fourth term ambitions
Senior journalist Wang Jian observed that post-Beidaihe maneuvers signal Xi’s determination to secure a fourth term at the 21st Party Congress.
“Xi needs demonstrable achievements and mobilizing political campaigns to maintain Party loyalty,” Wang said.
Former navy staff officer Yao Cheng noted that while speculation about Xi stepping down is rampant online, there are no visible signs of resignation. He said the plenary session remains firmly under Xi’s control, with a supportive Politburo Standing Committee majority.“Xi will not resign voluntarily; he will maintain power until the very last moment, fully aware of the consequences of losing it.”
