As the Fourth Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is scheduled to be held in Beijing from Oct. 20 to 23, China’s political developments are once again drawing international attention. This year’s session is centered on drafting the regime’s 15th Five-Year Plan for national economic and social development, a move seen as an attempt to address the mounting downward pressure on the Chinese economy.
However, under the weight of an increasingly dire domestic and international economic climate, speculation and controversy surrounding Xi Jinping’s leadership have continued to escalate. Chinese political commentator Wen Zhao compared Xi to Qing Dynasty official Ye Mingchen, dubbing him the “General Secretary of the Six Nos,” referring to Xi’s rigid posture in crisis — refusing to listen, step down, change course, admit fault, take responsibility, or let go of power.
Another analyst, Tang Jingyuan, pointed out what he described as the biggest weakness among the Party’s elder leaders being fully exposed, suggesting that Xi may now be preparing for a desperate counteroffensive. Military leaders like Zhang Youxia, Tang said, may have no choice but to follow Xi down a narrowing political path.Observers note that the upcoming Fourth Plenum could mark a critical turning point for China’s political and economic future, and will test whether Xi Jinping’s narrative of “miracle governance” can still hold.
Plenum background: Two “economic miracles” mask deeper troubles
According to a communiqué from the CCP Politburo meeting on Sept. 29, the Fourth Plenary Session will review a draft of the 15th Five-Year Plan, highlighting what it called two major “miracles” under Xi Jinping’s leadership: rapid economic growth and long-term social stability. The phrase quickly sparked debate.
In a recent program, commentator Wen Zhao noted that the “miracle” rhetoric sounds ironic—almost as if it acknowledges that fast economic growth and lasting social stability are fundamentally difficult to achieve together, yet credit is still forcibly given to Xi. “What about Japan’s 30 years of rapid growth?” Wen asked rhetorically. “If the Party says it’s a miracle, then it’s a miracle.” He interpreted the language as a sign that Xi is expected to receive high praise at the Plenum, while also revealing the Party’s helpless response to the current economic slump.
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Over the past year, China’s economy has faced multiple headwinds. The property market remains in a prolonged slump. The much-publicized “May 20 housing stimulus” launched last year has effectively failed, and even the traditional sales peak in “Golden September and Silver October” has faded from developers’ vocabulary—now mentioned only by state media.
Wen Zhao argues that China’s real estate ecosystem has fundamentally shifted. Both investment and consumption—the twin engines of economic growth—have stalled, and traditional monetary and fiscal tools have lost their effectiveness. The rescue measures introduced by the People’s Bank of China and the Ministry of Finance in September 2024 failed to spur growth. “If rescue efforts don’t work, what’s left—return to the pre-reform era?” Wen remarked. “But that road is a dead end too.”
He pointed out that from 2022 to 2023, Xi promoted several “back-to-the-past” pilot programs such as the revival of state-run supply cooperatives, communal canteens, and encouraging youth to move to the countryside. All have ended in failure. Since 2024, such efforts have largely been abandoned. “Every direction is closing in on Xi,” Wen said. “How can he continue steering the ship?”
Commentator Tang Jingyuan, approaching from a political angle, observed that in the run-up to the Fourth Plenum, the previous flood of high-level political leaks has quieted significantly—a sign, he says, that the clock is ticking. Tang believes Xi has in effect already lost power, particularly over the military. Yet senior Party elders hesitate to launch an open coup, wary of leaving a historical record of seizing power.
He emphasized that the anti-Xi faction hopes to orchestrate a legal and orderly transition, possibly through Xi stepping down due to health reasons, or simply maintaining the status quo until the 21st Party Congress. But this very hesitation, Tang warns, is being exploited by Xi, who may be preparing a last-ditch counteroffensive.
The ‘General Secretary of Six Nos’: Historical parallels and real-world deadlock
Commentator Wen Zhao drew a historical analogy by comparing Xi Jinping to Qing Dynasty official Ye Mingchen, the governor of Guangdong and Guangxi during the Second Opium War. Ye was known for his infamous “Six Nos” strategy: No fight, no peace, no defense, no death, no surrender, no retreat. Ultimately, he was captured by British forces. Wen argues that Xi embodies a modern version of this “Six Nos” philosophy as the CCP’s “General Secretary of Six Nos”:
- No fight (hesitates to launch military action against Taiwan),
- No peace (refuses to yield to the U.S.),
- No defense (unwilling to isolate China from the West),
- No death (refuses to give up CCP rule in favor of democracy),
- No surrender (won’t de-escalate crises at the cost of appearing weak),
- No retreat (won’t relinquish power to others).
This strategy, Wen says, allows Xi to remain passive amid the crisis, doing little yet avoiding collapse—for now.
Wen elaborated on the case of Ye Mingchen, who did nothing meaningful in the face of British naval superiority. Styling himself as the “Suwu of the Sea” (a symbol of unyielding loyalty), Ye eventually died in British captivity in Calcutta. Each of Ye’s decisions, Wen argued, reflected a dead end in the Qing political system: fighting meant certain defeat; seeking peace would invite scorn from hardliners; defensive actions risked escalation; and death, surrender, or retreat would compromise his moral or legal standing. Similarly, Xi’s current path reflects the limits of both the system and his imagination.
Wen further warned that Ye’s “strategic patience” was based on the false assumption that the British could not sustain a long-term occupation. Yet following the end of the Crimean War and the suppression of the Indian Rebellion, Britain doubled down on its efforts—resulting in Ye’s ultimate downfall. Today, Xi’s so-called “miracle of stability,” Wen suggested, may also be nothing more than a deceptive calm before the storm. With China now facing compounded economic crises, Wen concluded that the “Six Nos” approach may ultimately prove to be the fastest path to collapse.
Meanwhile, commentator Tang Jingyuan argued that while Xi may lack competence in governance, he is adept at political maneuvering. Xi is leveraging the senior Party elders’ obsession with preserving Party unity to avoid being overthrown without a fight. According to Tang, any formal removal of Xi during the Plenum would require a vote by the Central Committee—but over 70% of the current Committee members were handpicked by Xi during the 20th Party Congress, creating unpredictability.
Though Party elders have reportedly been working behind the scenes to secure defections from Xi loyalists, some members of Xi’s faction may still harbor personal ambitions or hesitations, Tang noted.
Tang Jingyuan also acknowledged that China’s economic indicators have breached critical thresholds, yet Xi Jinping appears firmly focused on shaping the next five-year agenda. He questioned whether the Communist Party can continue to ignore economic realities, recalling that China’s reform era in the 1980s was born out of severe economic distress during the Mao years. Mao himself had to compromise twice—stepping back from power in 1962 and allowing Deng Xiaoping’s political return in 1973. Likewise, the Soviet Union only initiated reform after its own economic collapse.
Tang warned that while the surface may appear calm, the signs of an impending storm are unmistakable. “Before a tsunami, the sea withdraws,” he said, urging observers not to place too much faith in unverified rumors—but also not to lose rational judgment amid uncertainty.
Military role and risks: Zhang Youxia faces a no-win path
Tang Jingyuan highlighted the delicate position of General Zhang Youxia, who currently holds control over the military and is seen by party elders as a key force for stability. However, his situation is fraught with peril. On one hand, party elders could sacrifice Zhang’s personal safety in order to preserve the Party. On the other, Zhang faces a bleak future if Xi Jinping remains in power—he is slated to retire at the 21st Party Congress in two years, and risks being purged during a potential political reckoning.
According to Tang, Zhang cannot afford to wait two years for change. His only viable path may be to ensure Xi Jinping is removed at the Fourth Plenum and permanently sidelined. If Xi refuses to resign and the elders decide to maintain the status quo, Zhang’s safety would likely be compromised. Tang argues that Zhang must prepare an independent contingency plan—potentially using his command of the military to stabilize the situation, or even making a bold move to remove Xi and then declare the military politically neutral.
This, Tang added, would only provide temporary relief. The root problem lies in the Communist Party’s control of the armed forces. Long-term stability, he said, would require disbanding the CCP and transitioning to a nationalized military that no longer answers to political factions.
Commentator Wen Zhao echoed the sentiment indirectly, suggesting that Xi’s “Six Nos” strategy mirrors the complacent fatalism of Qing official Ye Mingchen—an illusion of survival in the face of inevitable change. Just as shifting international dynamics once upended the Qing dynasty, China’s economic and social tensions will eventually catch up. Whether the population, currently not fully aware of their declining living standards, will continue to accept hardship—or push back—remains to be seen.
Four scenarios for the fourth plenum
In the lead-up to the Fourth Plenary Session, Beijing has shown noticeable shifts in foreign policy—dialing down “wolf warrior” diplomacy and signaling potential concessions to the United States. Commentator Tang Jingyuan noted that Beijing recently introduced a new “K visa,” which may be aimed at attracting talent from countries like India and Russia to offset its shrinking demographic dividend. However, he also warned it could be a veiled attempt to exploit overseas Chinese financially.
Wen Zhao argued that the regime’s continued dismissal of economic realities risks repeating the mistakes of the Mao era. Ignoring systemic distress, he warned, could deepen the crisis.
Analysts foresee three possible outcomes from the Fourth Plenum:
- Maintain the status quo until the 21st Party Congress in 2027;
- Xi Jinping steps down as General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission now, and relinquishes the presidency during the National People’s Congress next year;
- A full purge of Xi, stripping him of all positions under emergency political circumstances.
Among these, the second scenario is seen as the most likely. Tang emphasized that Zhang Youxia remains the pivotal figure, and that the depth of his understanding—and the choices he makes—could determine China’s immediate political direction.
