In the Chinese Communist Party’s political calendar, the Fourth Plenum—the fourth full meeting of each Central Committee—has often been more than a policy discussion.
Officially, these sessions are meant to “formulate major decisions.” In practice, they have repeatedly become moments of political upheaval.
Because each Fourth Plenum occurs two or three years into a new leadership term, when internal alignments are settled but still malleable, it offers the perfect stage for power readjustment.
Chinese political observers even have a phrase for it: “the Fourth Plenum Curse.”
Whenever it strikes, the Party’s power deck is reshuffled.
Success
You are now signed up for our newsletter
Success
Check your email to complete sign up
A historical pattern of upheaval
1954 – The Gao Gang–Rao Shushi Affair
The Seventh Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum became the first major post-revolutionary power struggle. With Mao Zedong ill, Liu Shaoqi presided over the meeting and consolidated his position as de facto second-in-command. Gao Gang later committed suicide, and Rao Shushi was expelled from the Party—an early lesson in the fragility of loyalty.
1979 – Deng Xiaoping’s Return
At the Eleventh Fourth Plenum, Deng Xiaoping staged his political comeback. He dismantled Hua Guofeng’s “Two Whatevers” policy, sidelined conservatives, and reasserted control over both the Party and the military. The reform era began with this calculated reversal.
1989 – After Tiananmen
The Thirteenth Fourth Plenum, held just weeks after the Tiananmen crackdown, sealed Zhao Ziyang’s political fate and elevated Jiang Zemin to General Secretary. The reshuffle averted an institutional split but entrenched the Party’s hardline turn.
1994 – Jiang’s Consolidation
The Fourteenth Fourth Plenum formally enshrined Jiang Zemin as the “core” of the leadership, confirming his dominance after the turbulence of the early 1990s.
1999 – Hu Jintao’s Rise
The Fifteenth Fourth Plenum promoted Hu Jintao to vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, naming him as China’s next leader—a clear signal of succession planning.
2004 – The Jiang–Hu Transition
At the Sixteenth Fourth Plenum, Jiang Zemin finally relinquished his CMC chairmanship, completing the long-delayed transfer of military power to Hu Jintao. Analysts later described it as a “negotiated coup” that ended years of dual rule between Jiang and Hu.
2014 – The Anti-Corruption Era
Before the Eighteenth Fourth Plenum, the Party announced a formal investigation into former security czar Zhou Yongkang, breaking the long-standing rule that Politburo Standing Committee members were untouchable. Xi Jinping used the moment to consolidate control through his anti-corruption campaign.
2019 – A Delayed Gathering
The Nineteenth Fourth Plenum was postponed for nearly twenty months amid trade tensions with the U.S., unrest in Hong Kong, and slowing domestic growth—signals of deep internal disagreement, according to outside observers.
The four ‘curses’ of the Fourth Plenum
Political analysts often describe four recurring “curses” behind these turning points:
- Factional Curse –
Rival blocs—Jiang’s Shanghai faction, the Communist Youth League, and Xi’s loyalists—rarely coexist peacefully. Each plenum exposes the shifting balance of power. - Military Curse –
Whoever controls the gun controls the Party. Disputes over military leadership—especially within the Central Military Commission—have historically driven purges and promotions alike. - Anti-Corruption Curse –
Every anti-graft drive doubles as a purge. While framed as moral cleansing, it consistently restructures political hierarchies and generates new resentment within the elite. - Patronage Curse –
Behind every ideological battle lies a web of patronage. Positions, contracts, and influence are traded like chips in an endless game of elite negotiation.
Together, these patterns form the “structural DNA” of the Communist Party’s self-preservation—and self-destruction—cycle.
2025: The curse returns
The upcoming 20th Fourth Plenum, set for Oct. 20–23, 2025, will discuss China’s 2026–2030 economic plan amid a stagnant property market, weak domestic demand, and tense global trade.
Yet political observers say the real agenda lies elsewhere: the military purge announced just two days before the meeting, when nine top generals—including CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong and Political Work Department head Miao Hua—were expelled.
The coincidence has revived speculation that the “Fourth Plenum Curse” is alive and well, as Xi Jinping faces the greatest internal challenge of his rule.
A system built on uncertainty
Each Fourth Plenum reveals the same paradox: the CCP’s need for control amid constant uncertainty. Whether this session ends in realignment or rupture, the pattern remains—the Party adapts through crisis and maintains power by managing instability.
Fact Box: Key Historical Fourth Plenums
| Year | Event | Political Outcome |
| 1954 | Gao Gang–Rao Shushi purge | Liu Shaoqi consolidates power |
| 1979 | Deng Xiaoping’s comeback | Reform era begins |
| 1989 | Post-Tiananmen reshuffle | Jiang Zemin elevated |
| 1994 | Fourteenth Plenum | Jiang formally becomes “core” |
| 1999 | Fifteenth Plenum | Hu Jintao named successor |
| 2004 | Sixteenth Plenum | Jiang transfers military power |
| 2014 | Eighteenth Plenum | Xi’s anti-corruption purge expands |
| 2019 | Nineteenth Plenum | Delayed amid internal rifts |
| 2025 | Twentieth Plenum | Military purge overshadows agenda |
