By Li Deyan
After Zhang Youxia, a former vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), the Communist Party’s highest military authority, and Liu Zhenli, chief of the PLA’s Joint Staff Department, were taken down, the Chinese Communist Party’s official military newspaper published four separate articles attacking the two senior officers. At first glance, the coverage appeared to escalate step by step. A closer, line-by-line reading, however, reveals the opposite: the political ferocity of the attacks—especially those directed at Zhang—steadily diminished.
At the same time, a single, seemingly incidental phrase buried in the final article offers a rare clue to the real cause behind the earlier downfall of He Weidong, then a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and a key executor of Xi Jinping’s authority inside the military. Together, the signals expose the mechanics of a failed purge—and a counterstrike—within the uppermost ranks of the People’s Liberation Army.
Four commentaries, a shrinking blade
Beginning on Jan. 31, 2026, the CCP’s military daily—PLA Daily, the armed forces’ authoritative propaganda outlet—ran commentator articles for three consecutive days criticizing Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. If one includes the editorial published on the night of Jan. 24, shortly after both men were removed, the paper issued four pieces addressing the case.
Read casually, the sequence suggests mounting pressure. Read carefully, it tells a different story. With each successive article, the political weight of the accusations—particularly those aimed at Zhang Youxia—was quietly reduced.
Success
You are now signed up for our newsletter
Success
Check your email to complete sign up
The pattern was analyzed by Tang Jingyuan, a U.S.-based overseas Chinese political commentator known for tracking elite CCP power struggles. He noted that the Jan. 24 editorial employed the harshest language. It listed five instances of “serious” wrongdoing, all framed as political crimes: seriously betraying the trust of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission; seriously undermining the chairman responsibility system; seriously weakening the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and damaging the Party’s governing foundation; seriously harming the authority and image of the CMC leadership; and seriously undermining unity and morale across the armed forces, inflicting grave damage on political construction, the military ecosystem, and combat readiness, with extremely negative consequences for the Party, the state, and the military.
Tang argued that these formulations were thinly veiled. Replace “the Party Central Committee” and “the CMC leadership” with Xi Jinping, China’s top leader and commander-in-chief, and the accusation becomes explicit. At its core, Xi was charging Zhang Youxia with sidelining him and hollowing out his authority inside the military.
Political charges quietly withdrawn
On Jan. 31, the military daily published a commentator article titled Strengthening Confidence in the Certain Victory of Anti-Corruption and Military Strengthening. Compared with the Jan. 24 editorial, the shift was immediate. None of the five “serious” political crimes were repeated.
The article still declared that “corrupt elements such as Zhang Youxia will be forever nailed to the pillar of historical shame,” and it opened with calls to “purge toxic legacies,” signaling that Zhang’s network within the PLA would remain under scrutiny. But the political indictment itself had been unmistakably scaled back.
Tang observed that the article reflected Xi’s urgency to lock the Zhang and Liu cases into settled verdicts and to extend accountability downward through the ranks. Even so, the rhetorical downgrade was clear. On a ten-point scale, Tang rated the Jan. 31 piece at about seven—down from a full ten on Jan. 24.
On Feb.1, the military daily ran another commentator article, Continuously Deepening Political Rectification and Advancing the Fight Against Corruption. Zhang Youxia was mentioned only once. The article’s focus shifted almost entirely to generic anti-corruption themes, while references to “purging toxic legacies” were pushed to the second-to-last paragraph.
Placement mattered. As Tang noted, relegating Zhang to the margins signaled another retreat. The article, he said, carried no more than four or five points of political force.
The following day, Feb. 2, the paper published a front-page commentary titled Advancing Through Challenges With a Strong Sense of Mission. The headline itself marked a turn away from reckoning and toward forward motion.
Once again, Zhang Youxia appeared only once. This time, the article stated that investigating Zhang, Liu Zhenli, and others would “remove roadblocks and stumbling stones hindering development and squeeze out the excess padding in combat capability.”
Gone were references to “eliminating major political hidden dangers” or “purging toxic legacies.” The downgrade was unmistakable. Some online commentators interpreted the description of Zhang as a “roadblock” as an oblique reference to internal opposition to Xi Jinping’s policy of using force against Taiwan.
Tang acknowledged that interpretation but said it was incomplete. Compared with the sweeping political crimes listed on Jan. 24, the Feb. 2 article represented a sharp de-escalation. In his assessment, the intensity had fallen to no more than two or three points.
One phrase, and the key to a previous purge
The Feb. 2 article contained a phrase Tang considered decisive: the call to “squeeze out the excess padding in combat capability.”
On March 9, 2024, when He Weidong, then vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and one of Xi Jinping’s most trusted military lieutenants, was still at the height of his power, he told military delegates during China’s annual legislative sessions that the PLA must crack down on “false combat capabilities.” At the time, the Hong Kong–based South China Morning Post, an English-language outlet aligned with Beijing, reported that He’s remarks were likely tied to corruption probes in sensitive areas such as weapons and equipment procurement.
Zhang Youxia had previously served as head of the CMC Equipment Development Department, the body overseeing arms procurement and military modernization.
According to Tang, He’s attack on “false combat capabilities” was a direct strike at Zhang Youxia and an effort to prepare public opinion for Zhang’s removal at the Third Plenum, a major Communist Party policy meeting, in July 2023. The language used in the Feb. 2 military daily commentary closely echoed He’s earlier phrasing.
That echo, Tang argued, reveals the true cause of He Weidong’s downfall. He had been acting on Xi Jinping’s instructions to move against Zhang Youxia. But at a critical moment, Tang said, Xi suffered a stroke during the plenum, abruptly reversing the balance of power. He Weidong’s attempt to consolidate Xi’s authority collapsed, and he was crushed by Zhang in retaliation.
Later, after Zhang regained the upper hand, he became complacent. He, too, was eventually taken down in a surprise move launched by Xi.
One contrast is telling. Since He Weidong’s fall was officially announced in October 2025, the military daily has not published a single article criticizing He or addressing the major case involving Miao Hua, a former top naval political commissar.
That silence, Tang argued, is itself evidence. The downfalls of Zhang Youxia and He Weidong were not routine anti-corruption cases but the visible scars of direct factional warfare between Xi’s camp and entrenched anti-Xi forces within the PLA.
Xi Jinping’s authority inside the military erodes
The scale of the purge is staggering. During Xi Jinping’s first decade in power, more than 160 generals were investigated under the banner of anti-corruption. Since 2022, another 133 generals have fallen. Of the 44 military officers on the CCP’s 20th Central Committee—the party’s top ruling body—29 have already been officially removed.
Lin Zili, a political science professor at Tunghai University in Taiwan who studies Chinese elite politics, told overseas Chinese-language media that the relentless removal of senior commanders—often without public explanation—has inevitably bred fear and resentment within the ranks.
“Zhang Youxia was almost the last senior commander who maintained a degree of mutual respect with Xi Jinping,” Lin said. “When even someone like that is detained without explanation, the psychological blow to ordinary officers and soldiers is enormous.”
Multiple sources close to the CCP military say that after Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were taken down, many officers privately questioned the legitimacy of the detentions. In their view, the moves amounted to political purges that shattered confidence in top-level decision-making and triggered resentment across several theater commands.
According to people familiar with the situation, directives issued by the Central Military Commission are now quietly resisted at the grassroots level. Orders circulate but go unimplemented. The chain of command has effectively stalled. Some rank-and-file soldiers have even begun referring to Xi Jinping by the derogatory nickname “Baozi.”
Xi Jinping moved swiftly to remove Zhang Youxia. Yet as the military newspaper’s rhetoric retreated and resistance within the ranks remained silent but pervasive, the episode exposed a deeper reality: Xi’s grip on the armed forces has weakened far more than official propaganda is willing to admit.
