Xi Jinping, the CCP’s general secretary and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s top military command body, addressed the military and armed police delegation on March 7, 2026, with language that left little doubt about his intentions. “The military carries guns,” Xi told the assembled delegates. “There absolutely cannot be anyone in the military who harbors disloyalty to the Party, and there absolutely cannot be any place for corrupt elements to hide.” The warning came as depleted rows of delegates and grim-faced officers made the cost of Xi’s military purges impossible to conceal, even at the regime’s most carefully staged annual political event.
Only six full generals attended the military delegation session
According to state broadcaster footage, the military officers in attendance stared at the podium with uniformly grim expressions. The six full generals present were: Zhang Shengmin, the CMC’s sole remaining vice chairman; Dong Jun, the defense minister; Yang Zhibin, the Eastern Theater Command commander; Han Shengyan, the Central Theater Command commander; Yi Xiaoguang, the former Central Theater Command commander; and Fan Xiaojun, the former Northern Theater Command political commissar.
Zhang Shengmin, Dong Jun, Han Shengyan, Yang Zhibin, and Fan Xiaojun are all delegates to the rubber-stamp National People’s Congress (NPC). Yi Xiaoguang serves on the standing committee of the CPPCC, the Party’s political advisory body.
The active-duty lieutenant generals who attended included: Zhu Chuansheng, a deputy chief of the CMC’s Joint Staff Department; Liu Di, head of the CMC’s Training and Management Department; Chen Chi, head of the CMC’s Logistics Support Department; Liang Ping, a deputy political commissar of the Central Theater Command; and Xia Zhihe, political commissar of China’s National Defense University.
Lieutenant generals from the four military service branches and the armed police also attended: Cai Zhijun and Zhang Shuguang from the army; Zhang Zheng and Hu Yuhai from the navy; Wang Gang and Shi Honggan from the air force; Lei Kai and Zhou Jingjiong from the rocket force; and Peng Jingtang and Wang Hongbin from the armed police.
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Thirteen full generals failed to appear at the Two Sessions
The NPC’s official delegate roster still lists 243 military delegates, including Zhang Youxia, the former CMC vice chairman, and Liu Zhenli, the former CMC member, both of whom have been officially announced as purged.
Among those 243 delegates, 18 hold the rank of full general. Only five of the 18 appeared at both the delegation’s formation meeting on March 3 and the plenary session on March 7. The other 13 were absent from both events.
Several of the missing generals have not been seen in public for an extended period, including Ju Gansheng, Xu Xueqiang, Guo Puxiao, and Chang Dingqiu.
The CPPCC’s standing committee originally included 15 military members: nine full generals and six lieutenant generals. Of the nine generals, only Yi Xiaoguang attended the March 7 military delegation session and the CPPCC opening ceremony on March 4. Three others, the army’s former commander Han Weiguo, the army’s former political commissar Liu Lei, and the former head of the CMC’s Logistics Support Department Gao Jin, were stripped of their CPPCC credentials at a meeting held on March 1-2. Five more generals on the CPPCC standing committee, Wang Ning, Zhu Shenglin, Zhao Zongqi, Wu Shezhou, and Zheng He, were absent from all three key sessions.
Xi’s purges destroyed the military leadership he built
The scale of Xi’s military purges has become impossible to conceal, even at the CCP’s most carefully choreographed annual political event. Since the 20th Party Congress in 2022, 36 senior military officers have been publicly stripped of their NPC delegate status. The list includes 16 full generals, 14 lieutenant generals, and 6 major generals.
The political irony is acute: nearly all 16 of the purged full generals were personally promoted and given their rank by Xi Jinping. The list reads like a roster of Xi’s own creation: former CMC vice chairman He Weidong; former head of the CMC Political Work Department Miao Hua; former defense minister Li Shangfu; former rocket force commanders Zhou Yaning and Li Yuchao; former air force commander Ding Laihang; former navy political commissar Yuan Huazhi; former armed police commander Wang Chunning; former deputy director of the CMC Political Work Department He Hongjun; former armed police political commissar Zhang Hongbin; former CMC Political-Legal Affairs Commission secretary Wang Renhua; former navy commander Shen Jinlong; former navy political commissar Qin Shengxiang; former Information Support Force political commissar Li Wei; former air force political commissar Yu Zhongfu; and former army commander Li Qiaomin.
Xi signaled the purges will continue
Xi’s language at the March 7 session left little room for interpretation. He stressed that the upcoming “15th Five-Year Plan” period must begin with strict oversight, with particular attention to the flow of funds, the exercise of power, and quality controls in major military projects. He called for strengthened supervision of military-civilian integration projects. Zhang Shengmin echoed the message at a subgroup session on March 5, calling for “deepened political rectification and anti-corruption efforts.”
U.S.-based independent commentator Cai Shenkun posted on X: “In just three years, Xi has taken down two CMC vice chairmen and five CMC members. The only one left walking behind him is a trembling Zhang Shengmin. And still Xi keeps shouting: ‘The military carries guns, there absolutely cannot be anyone in the military who harbors disloyalty.'” Cai added: “Xi is clearly still not at ease with the military, still does not trust it. How long Zhang Shengmin can last on that podium is anyone’s guess.”
Online commenters were equally blunt. “How long before Zhang Shengmin gets purged?” one asked. “The best-case scenario is that he makes it to the 21st Party Congress and retires safely,” someone replied. “That’s less than two years away. Hard to say.”
The broader question hanging over the Two Sessions is one that Xi’s critics have raised repeatedly: with so many senior commanders gone, so many seats empty, and so much institutional knowledge purged, what kind of military is left? And if the purges continue, as Xi’s own words suggest they will, how does this military fight a war?
