Days before the Fourth Plenary Session, the long-obscure State Secrets Bureau (SSB) unexpectedly emerged from behind the curtain — warning that Chinese media had inadvertently leaked classified information in their reporting.
The SSB’s official WeChat account “Baomi Guan” (Confidentiality Watch) published an unusually pointed essay on Oct. 10, listing three recent cases of alleged “media-related leaks.”
Analysts say the move underscores intensifying infighting inside the Communist Party, where officials and insiders are leaking sensitive information to the outside world faster than ever before.
“Cai Qi is out of options, and Xi Jinping is panicking,” one observer noted. “Bringing the State Secrets Bureau to the forefront means they no longer trust even their own propaganda apparatus.”
The bureau’s public accusations
In its post, “Baomi Guan” accused journalists of incorporating classified content into reports without authorization.
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One example described a publicity officer at a sensitive agency who provided internal reference materials to a reporter.
Seeking originality, the journalist allegedly inserted sensitive content from the classified files into the story, which was later approved for publication and widely shared online, causing what authorities called a “serious leak.”
Another case involved a government newspaper editor who obtained a CD containing “secret-level” material, used it to write a promotional piece, and saw it reposted by multiple self-media outlets.
The third case cited a television crew that filmed a prototype of a classified weapon during a military plant inspection. The footage appeared in a local news segment and was soon reposted on domestic and overseas websites, creating severe consequences.
The bureau warned that government websites and official social-media accounts, though useful for fast public messaging, have become targets of foreign surveillance.
If editors fail to conduct “proper secrecy review,” it said, “leakage incidents will easily occur.”
What is the state secrets bureau?
The Central Secrecy Commission Office (known as the Central Secrecy Office) and the State Secrets Bureau are in fact one organization operating under two names.
The bureau handles classification, regulation, enforcement, and investigation of leaks, and reports directly to the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the State Council’s jurisdiction.
Its current director, Li Zhaozong, serves under Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi, who also heads the Central General Office — making him Xi Jinping’s closest political gatekeeper.
Shen Mingshi, a research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, said Beijing’s sudden emphasis on secrecy shows a system in crisis.
“This is about keeping the Party’s dirty laundry hidden,” Shen told Vision Times. “The leadership doesn’t want the media revealing its internal conflicts, so it’s using secrecy to tighten information control.”
U.S.-based political commentator Chen Pokong noted that the CCP already maintains overlapping security organs — the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, among others.
“Now they’ve added the State Secrets Bureau,” Chen said. “It shows how unprecedented the sense of crisis is — nothing can leak, especially before the Fourth Plenum.”
Chen pointed out that much of the outside world’s information on internal CCP turmoil actually originates from within the system itself.
Leaks about Xi Jinping’s reported collapse at the Third Plenum, or the disappearance of generals Miao Hua and He Weidong, all surfaced from Beijing insiders and were later corroborated by independent reports.
“This tells us the Party is completely divided,” Chen said. “Everyone’s leaking to protect themselves or undermine rivals. That’s why the State Secrets Bureau suddenly stepped forward — Xi and Cai are desperate to restore control.”
A tool of fear before the fourth plenum
According to Chen, the bureau’s public reemergence serves a deterrent purpose:
“They want to scare insiders before the Fourth Plenum. Remember — last time at the Third Plenum, Xi’s stroke leaked out within hours. If something similar happens again, the fallout would be explosive.”
He added that should Xi “collapse or be incapacitated,” the news would immediately flood domestic and international media, leaving the leadership no room to contain the narrative.
“That’s why they brought the bureau to the front stage — it’s not about secrecy; it’s about survival.”
Commentator Li Linyi noted that both the State Secrets Bureau and the Ministry of State Security have traditionally operated in secrecy.
Their sudden public presence marks a dramatic shift.
“These agencies were designed to function in the dark,” Li said. “The fact that they’re now speaking openly reveals how emboldened the CCP has become in weaponizing its repressive tools — it no longer hides its nature.”
Beijing No Longer Trusts Its Own Media
Political analyst Tang Jingyuan observed that the new secrecy campaign reflects the CCP leadership’s deep distrust of state media.
“This move shows that even official outlets can no longer be trusted,” Tang said. “It’s likely part of a broader purge targeting journalists accused of ‘leaking’ Party information.”
Tang explained that the campaign reveals two layers of anxiety within the regime:
First, after years of wolf-warrior diplomacy, China’s diplomatic environment has deteriorated, leaving Beijing hypersensitive to any perceived intelligence leak.
Second, the CCP’s top ranks are locked in a silent struggle for power, and Xi’s team fears that reporters might inadvertently expose factional tensions or leadership health issues.
“The fact that the regime must now police its own mouthpieces,” Tang said, “shows how unstable the situation truly is.”
Analysts agree that the State Secrets Bureau’s sudden rise signals a climate of paranoia inside Zhongnanhai.
With the Fourth Plenum looming, Xi and Cai are scrambling to suppress both dissent and leaks — but in doing so, they have confirmed the very instability they seek to hide.
“When you have to threaten your own propagandists,” one scholar noted, “you’ve already lost control of the narrative.”
By Li Jingyao
