By Li Deyan, Vision Times
With the Fourth Plenum of the CCP’s 20th Central Committee fast approaching, Beijing’s political temperature has reached a fever pitch. Recent articles published in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) flagship newspaper, “The People’s Daily,” have drawn increased scrutiny on what analysts say are “veiled endorsements” of Hu Chunhua and Wang Yang — two reform-minded leaders once sidelined by current leader Xi Jinping.
On Oct. 13, 2025, “People’s Daily” ran a piece titled: “Youthful Chapter: Grand Rivers and Seas Strive Toward a Bright Future, Fulfilling the People’s Expectations.” At first glance, it appeared to be a standard propaganda essay celebrating a youth campaign led by the Cyberspace Administration, the Communist Youth League, and the Ministry of Water Resources. But its phrasing quickly caught the attention of China-watchers and analysts.
U.S.-based political commentator Tang Jingyuan noted that “Youthful Chapter” (青春华章) sounds phonetically similar to “Hu Chunhua,” while the phrase “grand rivers and seas” (河海) mirrors Wang Yang’s given name—Yang meaning “ocean.” Tang argues that these linguistic coincidences were no accident but deliberate symbolic signals hinting at the two men’s political resurgence.
Echoes of the ‘Hu–Wang–Hu’ legacy
But the article’s setting only deepened public intrigue. The campaign took place at Hohai University, a top institution under the Ministry of Water Resources — where former Party leader Hu Jintao, mentor to both Hu Chunhua and Wang Yang, began his career. Hu studied hydraulic engineering at Tsinghua University before rising through the Ministry and eventually leading the Communist Youth League.
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Tang pointed out that this shared background — Hohai University, the Water Resources Ministry, and the Youth League — forms a symbolic triangle connecting Hu Jintao, Hu Chunhua, and Wang Yang. “The article’s title alone encodes a message,” he noted, adding, “‘The grand sea (汪洋) is destined to sail toward a new future—don’t disappoint the nation’s expectations.’”
Even the use of the archaic phrase “Grand indeed!” (大哉), drawn from classical scripture in the Yizhuan, carries regal overtones. Historically used to praise dynastic renewal, Tang believes its inclusion signals a possible “change of mandate” — a subtle reference to regime transition.
The “Bole” metaphor raises eyebrows
Just a day later, on October 14, People’s Daily Online published another article titled “Marching China’s Bole of the Cattle Industry.” Ostensibly about livestock breeding in Inner Mongolia, the story again raised eyebrows.
Inner Mongolia is where Hu Chunhua launched his political career, serving there for years before moving into national leadership. In Chinese tradition, “Bole” (伯乐) refers to a wise mentor who recognizes hidden talent. Tang interpreted the piece’s subtext as clear: “The mentor (Hu Jintao) is Bole, and the brilliant one (Hu Chunhua) is his chosen steed.”
By running two symbolically charged stories in quick succession, People’s Daily appeared to be “testing the waters,” suggesting that the Party’s elder faction may be positioning Hu Chunhua and Wang Yang as potential successors in a post-Xi political order.
A carefully-orchestrated message
Observers emphasize that People’s Daily is not just a media outlet but the CCP’s official institutional voice—its editorials often reflect elite consensus or deliberate leaks of internal divisions.
The involvement of key ministries—the Cyberspace Administration, Ministry of Education, and Communist Youth League—suggests that the campaign was authorized at high levels, possibly signaling a message from senior Party elders to lower ranks: prepare for a leadership transition.
“The CCP doesn’t deal in coincidences,” Tang summarized. “When symbolic names, historical metaphors, and organizational signals converge, it usually means a deal—or a struggle—is already in motion.”
Leaks point to a ‘Xi–Zhang’ showdown
Meanwhile, a separate series of online reports has electrified political observers. On October 15, commentator Shanhe Dongfu claimed that General Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), had secretly met with Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, Wang Yang, and Hu Chunhua to discuss “matters of grave concern.”
According to the leak, Zhang reported unusual troop movements within the Central Guard Bureau—the elite unit tasked with protecting top CCP leaders. He allegedly noticed unfamiliar personnel and unexplained security shifts near the plenum’s preparatory venue. The same report claimed that Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong and Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi had been making frequent, discreet visits there—signs, Zhang feared, of Xi’s loyalists tightening control ahead of the session.
Zhang reportedly warned that Xi would not relinquish power peacefully and that the plenum could spiral into a “radical confrontation,” undermining the Party’s long-maintained “image of unity.”
Private responses from senior members
The leaks also describe how former Premier Wen Jiabao allegedly reassured Zhang, promising political protection. “No matter the outcome,” Wen was quoted as saying, “I, Wang Yang, and other comrades will stand with you and Liu Yuan. We will not allow Xi’s camp to harm you.”
He reportedly added that if Zhang were forced to take “decisive or extreme measures” to protect the institution, “no one among us will blame you.”
Wang Yang, on the other hand, is said to have taken a more cautious stance, urged restraint: “Let them make the first move,” he reportedly said. “We cannot afford an accidental clash.”
Hu Jintao, now in frail health, is said to have delivered a succinct message through Hu Chunhua, recalling prior power transfers:
- “Deng Xiaoping passed power to Jiang Zemin peacefully.
- Jiang to Hu — also peaceful. Hu to Xi — nearly turned violent due to interference by others.
- Xi must now pass power peacefully; any attempt to incite violence will not be tolerated.”
High stakes
While these reports remain unverified, they fit the broader pattern of elite tension visible ahead of the plenum. Multiple overseas outlets suggest that Xi’s purported willingness to step down may have been a strategic feint by buying time to consolidate control over the security apparatus.
Analysts warn that the Central Guard Bureau, responsible for the plenum’s security, could become the flashpoint of a leadership confrontation. If Zhang Youxia, who must attend the session in person, feels threatened, he might preemptively mobilize troops, or even detain Xi himself.
According to Tang’s sources, Wen Jiabao has already signaled “full support for any necessary measures” if Xi’s faction moves first, highlighting just how fragile the CCP’s internal balance has become.
Observers now describe the atmosphere as the most volatile since the downfall of the Gang of Four. Xi’s opponents appear determined to block him from securing another term, while his loyalists tighten security and purge suspected defectors. Every faction — the Party elders, the Youth League, and the military — seems to be drawing its own red lines.
Whether the Fourth Plenum ends with a negotiated transition or an open confrontation remains uncertain. But few doubt that China’s ruling elite is entering one of its most precarious moments in decades.
Editorial Note: This article summarizes public reports and online commentary concerning internal CCP power dynamics ahead of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee. Many of the claims, particularly those about private meetings and alleged security shifts, cannot be independently verified.
