Following the CCP’s 20th Fourth Plenum, a new wave of political turbulence has shaken China’s bureaucracy.
A series of senior officials have been dismissed or sentenced in recent days, signaling what analysts call the “next phase of intra-party struggle.”
Former Hunan Party Secretary Xu Dazhe and CMC Audit Chief Sun Bin were both stripped of their National People’s Congress (NPC) delegate status.
Meanwhile, Cao Xingxin, former deputy general manager of China United Network Communications Group (China Unicom), was sentenced to 12 years in prison for bribery.
Commentators say the latest cases show that Xi Jinping’s sweeping anti-corruption campaign has expanded beyond the military and into the party and government apparatus, targeting even his long-trusted allies.
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According to a report by Hong Kong’s HK01, the Binzhou Intermediate People’s Court in Shandong Province handed down a public verdict on Oct. 28.
Cao Xingxin, a former Party Group member and deputy general manager at China Unicom, was convicted of accepting bribes totaling 26.75 million yuan (US$3.7 million) and sentenced to 12 years in prison with a fine of 2 million yuan.
Court documents show that between 2005 and 2024, Cao exploited his positions at the CCP Organization Department and later at China Unicom to secure promotions and project approvals for associates in exchange for money and favors.
A key link to Chen Xi — Xi Jinping’s trusted confidant
Cao’s downfall has drawn attention because of his long-standing ties to Chen Xi, a fellow Tsinghua University alumnus of Xi Jinping and one of his closest political allies.
Chen served as head of the CCP Organization Department for over a decade and is now president of the Central Party School, which trains provincial- and ministerial-level officials.
Cao worked under Chen during multiple tenures at the Organization Department and later as Party secretary and deputy director of the National Academy of Organization Cadres, a key training institute directly overseen by the department.
Political commentator Chen Pokong said in his program that the 12-year sentence suggests Cao’s corruption was moderate by CCP standards, but his punishment carries a strong political message.
“Under normal circumstances, 26 million yuan would draw a life sentence or death penalty with reprieve,” Chen said. “This light punishment means he’s a political casualty of factional struggle, not a typical graft case.”
Chen Pokong argued that Cao’s trial “inevitably points back to Chen Xi.”
After stepping down as Organization Department head in 2023, Chen remained president of the Central Party School — a position he technically should not have held, as he was no longer a Central Committee member.
“Xi kept Chen in place because the Party School controls China’s senior officials,” Chen said. “Now, with his former subordinates under investigation, Chen himself may face scrutiny.”
Official records confirm that Cao was placed under investigation in September 2024.
By Feb. 2025, the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) had expelled him from the Party, citing “trading power for money and sex” and “interfering in personnel appointments.”
Analysts: Power struggle expands to Party and government systems
Commentators believe the case marks a shift in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, from cleaning up the military to purging the Party’s internal apparatus — particularly the Organization Department, which controls promotions across all levels of government.
Several high-ranking officials linked to Chen Xi have reportedly come under investigation since 2024.
Among them: Li Ganjie, who replaced Chen as Organization Department head in 2023 and is also a Tsinghua alumnus close to Xi, was unexpectedly removed from office in April this year and is rumored to be under investigation.
Analyst Li Yanming noted that the reorganization within the Organization Department is closely tied to Xi’s ongoing power crisis.
“Now that Shi Taifeng, a figure acceptable to all factions, has taken over the department,” Li said, “the question is whether Chen Xi will be forced to step down as Party School president — a key indicator of future political shifts.”
Beyond the Organization Department, other members of Xi’s “aerospace faction” — officials who rose through China’s state-run space and defense industries — are also under pressure.
The NPC Standing Committee confirmed on Oct. 28 that Xu Dazhe, a former aerospace executive turned Hunan governor, was stripped of his delegate qualification.
Analysts believe this may signal growing risk for Ma Xingrui, another aerospace technocrat and Xi loyalist.
Ma was abruptly removed as Party Secretary of Xinjiang in July 2025 under the vague phrase “transferred to another position.”
Commentator Chen Pokong said the pattern is clear: “Xu’s fall means Ma Xingrui is next. Both men built their careers in China’s aerospace sector and were promoted under Xi’s patronage.”
The ‘Shandong connection’ and political patronage
Chen Pokong and other overseas commentators also highlighted Ma’s personal ties to Peng Liyuan, Xi’s wife.
Both hail from Yuncheng County, Shandong, and are said to share local family networks.
In 2016, during Ma’s tenure as mayor of Shenzhen, local reports suggest he arranged for city-owned enterprises to purchase shares in Cinda Insurance, a subsidiary of state-owned China Cinda Asset Management — at nearly triple the market price.
The transaction, valued at 4.2 billion yuan, reportedly helped Cinda cover losses while strengthening political ties.
Three days later, Ma was appointed acting governor of Guangdong Province, marking his leap to ministerial rank.
Analysts say such episodes illustrate how political loyalty and personal networks often outweigh economic logic in China’s bureaucratic promotions.
Xi’s continued purges of his own allies have prompted ridicule even among Party insiders.
Some have described his actions as a “self-castration of personnel power.”
The Wall Street Journal, in a June 2025 analysis, reported that Xi personally ordered the latest round of investigations to demonstrate “self-revolution” — his term for tightening internal discipline and anti-corruption efforts.
Commentator Zhang Tianliang agreed with that assessment: “Xi has ruled for over a decade. Every senior official today was handpicked by him. By purging his own allies, he’s trying to prove that the Party can supervise itself — without Western-style checks and balances.”
However, Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) fellow Shen Mingshi suggested the strategy is backfiring.
“By invoking ‘self-revolution,’ Xi gave his opponents a tool to attack him,” Shen said. “He can no longer protect his own people. Each removal weakens his power base.”
Analyst Zhong Yuan noted that Xi has been losing ground since April 2024, and the recent Fourth Plenum only exposed deeper fractures within the leadership.
Although Xi formally retains his three top positions — Party general secretary, state president, and CMC chairman — he reportedly failed to fill vacancies with loyalists during the meeting.
“The Fourth Plenum ended in paralysis,” Zhong said. “The Party wants to preserve its privileges and ‘save the system,’ but that’s a dead end. China’s real solution lies in dismantling the CCP’s monopoly on power.”
By Li Jingyao
