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CCP Military Purge Intensifies as Xi Jinping’s Shenzhen Power Base Is Seized

Published: November 19, 2025
On March 11, 2023, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, newly-elected CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia (front) takes the oath alongside elected members of the Central Military Commission during the fourth plenary meeting of the National People’s Congress. (Image: GREG BAKER/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)

By Li Jingyao, Vision Times

China’s sweeping military purge continues to heat up following the simultaneous downfall of nine senior generals from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As disciplinary shockwaves ripple through the armed forces, state PLA media has issued an “unusually severe” set of political commentaries. Meanwhile, emerging reports from southern China point to an even more consequential development: Xi Jinping’s long-established power base in Shenzhen may have been taken over by a rival faction.

On Nov. 14, the PLA Daily released the third installment in its rectification series, titled “Breaking the Illusion of a Quick Victory.” The commentary stressed that the anti-corruption campaign “cannot be won quickly,” describing the investigations of He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others as “major achievements” — but emphasized that these cases “do not mean the work is complete.”

‘The fight will only grow tougher’

Commentator Zhong Yuan said the article indicates more senior officers may soon be targeted. The piece warns that the struggle has reached “a new threshold marked by severe and complex conditions” and insists that “no one should expect a single decisive blow.”

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The article further cautioned that “hesitation, slackening, or retreat” risks reversing earlier progress — an acknowledgement, Zhong argues, that internal resistance inside the PLA remains strong and competing factions continue to wrestle for control.

It also denounced the lingering “corrosive influence” within the ranks and urged efforts to continue “in depth and without pause.” Zhong described the combined PLA and Ministry of Defense commentaries as a direct signal of intent — a notice of battle from the faction currently directing military affairs.

Zhong added that releasing the outcomes of the He Weidong–Miao Hua investigations immediately before the Fourth Plenum resembled a political provocation. Although Xi Jinping retained his Party titles at the meeting, the intensified rhetoric from the military suggests a fresh challenge to his authority.

‘New threshold’ means higher-ranking targets could be next

On Nov. 11, PLA Daily published another striking editorial: “Stricter Than the Local Governments, Ahead of the Whole Party.” It opened with: “The people’s army does not tolerate corruption, and its honor must not be stained.”

The piece framed the purge of He Weidong and Miao Hua as a continuation of post-18th Party Congress reforms, warning that corruption is the “first killer of combat readiness.” Without eliminating it, the article said, “winning future wars becomes empty talk.”

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Zhong noted the commentary’s emphasis on “governing the self to govern the world” — language that he argues implicitly rebukes Xi’s earlier slogans about “strengthening the military.” After a decade of recurring scandals, he said, the article tacitly admits those slogans have failed to produce real results.

He also highlighted the article’s focus on “the state of the world” and “theft of political safety” — rhetoric that goes far beyond internal discipline and suggests the struggle over military authority has entered a more volatile, advanced stage.

Commentator Jiang Feng interpreted a key line — “stricter than the localities, ahead of the whole Party, and tightening as it goes” — as a message aimed squarely at senior provincial leaders and top military officers. Jiang summarized the implied warning as: “The arrests so far are only the beginning. The ranks targeted next will be higher.”

According to Jiang, the military is signaling that “the gun has already moved.”

Xi’s Shenzhen stronghold overtaken

As PLA rhetoric hardens, political shifts have begun unfolding in Xi Jinping’s most important southern stronghold: Shenzhen, long considered his second power base after Shaanxi.

Multiple sources report that Feng Zhonghua, former head of the Guangdong Organization Department, has been promoted to Guangdong deputy Party secretary and concurrently appointed Shenzhen Party secretary — replacing officials previously aligned with Xi.

Shenzhen has historically been a key node of Xi family influence. Earlier investigations into Shenzhen Metro Group chairman Xin Jie revealed connections to Xi’s elder sister Qi Qiaoqiao and her husband’s company, Shenzhen Yuanwei Industrial.

Feng Zhonghua’s political background suggests a shift toward a rival lineage:

  • 1998–2001: Served as a secretary in the Ministry of Construction under then-minister Yu Zhengsheng.
  • 2006–2008: Worked under Li Dongxu, another long-time Yu Zhengsheng associate.

Yu Zhengsheng — a former Politburo Standing Committee member (China’s top ruling body) — is widely viewed as connected to Deng Xiaoping’s son, Deng Pufang.

Analyst Tang Jingyuan notes that the Xi and Deng families have been historical adversaries. Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun, was repeatedly marginalized during Deng Xiaoping’s era. In the current generation, Xi Jinping and Deng Pufang represent sharply opposed political orientations. Deng has previously issued pointed criticism of Xi, and Xi ultimately removed him from the chairmanship of the China Disabled Persons’ Federation.

Tang argues that Feng’s takeover of Shenzhen signals a direct encroachment by the Deng faction. “It means the old Xi stronghold has already been replaced. With Xi’s allies in the military largely purged, we now see his political network in the Party and government also being cleared.”