By Wei Pu
International outlets have recently run several installments of Li Nanyang’s interviews with Bao Tong under the title “Bao Tong Revisits June Fourth.” The series offers a number of striking and original insights, many of which help illuminate the power dynamics behind the Tiananmen crackdown.
Bao Tong argued that a widespread belief about the massacre is mistaken. Many assume Deng Xiaoping ordered the use of force to protect the Communist Party.
Bao said Deng’s real motive was far more personal: to protect himself, and to ensure that after his death China would not produce a “Khrushchev” figure who might denounce him and destroy his legacy.
For that goal, Bao said, Deng was willing to let the Party split apart and even to open fire on civilians in the Party’s name. He described June Fourth as a military operation personally decided, initiated, and directed by Deng—one aimed not at the students, but at Zhao Ziyang.
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In Bao’s view, the crackdown amounted to a coup engineered by Deng, with Zhao as its target. Some agree with Bao Tong’s conclusion that June Fourth effectively functioned as a coup against Zhao Ziyang.
His reasoning and evidence are compelling.
But on one point some differ: the idea that the operation was solely Deng Xiaoping’s personal scheme, decision, and execution.
A vast body of June Fourth documentation shows that the Party’s conservative elders—Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Song Renqiong, Yu Qiuli, Wang Zhen, Yao Yilin, Deng Liqun, Li Peng, and others—played a major role in amplifying and supporting Deng’s decision to use force.
Deng urged forward
From Hu Yaobang’s memorial onward, these elders consistently urged Deng forward. They disagreed with both Deng and Zhao on aspects of economic reform.
But on political reform and the defense of one-party rule, they stood closely aligned with Deng.
Deng’s “political bottom line” was also theirs.
Their accusations against Zhao — such as promoting “bourgeois liberalization” — were the same complaints Deng held most strongly.
Throughout the crisis, Deng and the elders worked in lockstep.
Like Deng, they disliked the high emotional tone of Hu Yaobang’s memorial service and believed Zhao had orchestrated it.
Like Deng, they suspected Zhao of being the “black hand” behind the student movement.
They accused the students of being “manipulated,” pointed at Zhao as “a plotter,” and said his aim was to “bring down Deng to save Zhao.”
Deng’s removal of Zhao was indeed calculated.
Here, Bao Tong’s assessment is accurate.
It resembled the maneuvering Deng used to push out Hu Yaobang—tactics I have discussed in earlier essays.
Deng was known within the Party for his political skills; some estimate that he helped force out more than a dozen senior officials.
In the CCP’s internal struggles, his methods rivaled those Mao used during the Cultural Revolution.
The difference was that Mao smashed the Party’s institutions and surrounded himself with only a few loyalists, while Deng mobilized the conservative elders and the machinery of the state to isolate and crush Zhao Ziyang.
Personal emotion also played a role.
READ MORE: Seven Assassination Attempts: How Deng Xiaoping Survived Mao-Era Plots
Deng was deeply suspicious
When Hu Yaobang supported the idea that Deng should retire earlier, Deng took it as a sign that Hu hoped to replace him.
In 1988, as “topple Deng, protect Zhao” sentiment spread, Deng suspected Zhao of harboring “unspoken motives” and “personal ambition.”
To Deng, Zhao’s opposition to the April 26 Editorial, his comments to Mikhail Gorbachev revealing Deng’s role behind the scenes, and his stance against using force all appeared as attempts to push him aside and take full control.
Deng’s hostility toward Bao Tong also grew from suspicion.
According to lawyer Zhang Sizhi, a turning point came when state radio aired a portion of Zhao’s conversation with Gorbachev.
Deng reportedly reacted angrily: “Why was Zhao’s voice broadcast so loudly? Bao Tong must have told the station to do that. He’s playing tricks.”
In Deng’s mind, it was further evidence of a faction plotting against him.
Memoirs and records—including Li Peng’s Diaries and works by Yang Jisheng and Wu Wei—show that Deng had already concluded by 1988 that Zhao Ziyang was committed to liberalization and would eventually need to be removed.
This was also the conservative elders’ consensus. Deng simply waited for the right moment.
Hu Yaobang’s memorial provided it—just as the 1986 anti-liberalization campaign provided the opening to remove Hu.
In my view, Deng’s move against Zhao was both self-protective and aimed at preserving the Party.
The elders stood with him.
Together, they executed a coup directed at Zhao, with Deng as its driving force.Deng had long intended to remove Zhao Ziyang.
June Fourth merely gave him the perfect opportunity.
Had the movement not occurred, Deng would have found another.
