By Jingyao Li
Record investigations, missing names
China’s top anti-corruption authorities announced on Jan. 17 that in 2025, a total of 115 officials at the provincial-ministerial level or above were placed under investigation, while 69 officials at the same level received disciplinary sanctions. Notably, the names of 50 investigated officials and 16 disciplined officials were not publicly disclosed.
The unusually large number of unnamed cases has drawn attention from observers, raising questions about how senior officials within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are being handled behind closed doors.
A growing gap between official figures and public disclosures
On Jan. 17, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI)—the CCP’s top internal disciplinary body—and the National Supervisory Commission, the state anti-corruption agency, released nationwide figures for 2025. They reported that 115 provincial- and ministerial-level officials or above were placed under investigation and 69 were disciplined during the year.
A Jan.19 report by Caixin noted that, based on data published on the CCDI and National Supervisory Commission websites, only 65 provincial-ministerial officials were publicly named as having been investigated during the same period, while 53 were publicly named as having been disciplined. This leaves 50 investigated officials and 16 disciplined officials whose identities were not disclosed.
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Since July 2023, the CCDI has published quarterly statistics on centrally managed officials investigated and disciplined. Official data show that in 2024, 73 provincial-ministerial officials or above were investigated and 73 were disciplined. In 2023, 87 centrally managed officials were investigated, while 49 provincial-ministerial officials were disciplined.
Taken together, these figures indicate that 2025 recorded the highest number of centrally managed officials placed under investigation since the CCP’s 20th National Congress.
Internal handling outside public disclosure
Caixin did not explain why the names of dozens of investigated and disciplined officials were withheld. However, individuals familiar with Party disciplinary practices say that non-public handling has become increasingly common.
Independent commentator Du Zheng has written in Up Media that in recent years the CCP has stopped publicly announcing the outcomes of some high-level disciplinary cases. According to Du, many officials are removed from office without explanation, and investigations are concluded without formal public notice.
Du argues that such cases are often classified as internal handling, with punishments imposed through Party mechanisms rather than through judicial proceedings or public announcements.
Discrepancies from earlier years appear to support this assessment. CCDI data released in 2025 showed that 92 centrally managed officials were investigated in 2024, while public case listings accounted for only 58 named cases. In January 2024, CCDI Secretary Li Xi reported that 87 centrally managed officials were investigated in 2023, yet public disclosures listed only 45 named cases.
Du also cited the case of Lieutenant General Shang Hong, a deputy commander of the Strategic Support Force under the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), who was stripped of his delegate status ahead of the 20th Party Congress and then disappeared from public view. He suggested that in the Rocket Force and military equipment corruption cases that surfaced in 2023, the number of PLA officers handled internally may have been even higher.
Allegations of secret punishments in national security cases
Du further cited accounts suggesting that secret executions may occur in espionage and national security cases. He referenced the experience of Japanese scholar Suzuki Eiji, who was imprisoned in China on espionage charges and released in 2022.
Suzuki later stated that trials and verdicts in espionage cases are not made public in China, and that individuals connected to such cases can disappear without explanation. While in detention, Suzuki said he heard rumors that a Chinese diplomat posted to Ireland had been secretly sentenced to death.
Former Chinese official Zhou Guogang has also stated that during internal Party training sessions, officials were told that some death penalty cases involving officials are never publicly disclosed.
Du argued that while internal handling has existed throughout CCP history, such opaque practices have intensified under Xi Jinping’s rule.
The anti-corruption campaign turns inward
Commentator Wang Youqun analyzed the record number of senior military officers placed under investigation in 2025 and argued that the trend reflects deeper structural failures within the system.
According to Wang, corruption under Xi Jinping has reached a point where it is no longer remediable. Many officials personally promoted by Xi have themselves fallen, including He Weidong, Miao Hua, Wei Fenghe, Zhou Yanning, Li Yuchao, and Wang Houbin. Wang also noted that Xi’s three closest military aides—Qin Shengxiang, Zhong Shaojun, and Fang Yongxiang, all of whom served in the Central Military Commission General Office, the PLA’s top administrative body—have all encountered serious trouble.
Wang said this pattern underscores the failure of the anti-corruption campaign itself. Rather than containing corruption, he argued, repeated crackdowns have coincided with its expansion, rendering the problem increasingly uncontrollable. He pointed out that at the Fifth CCDI Plenum in January, Xi no longer spoke of “winning” the anti-corruption battle, but instead emphasized the need to avoid “losing.” In Wang’s view, the mass collapse of full generals in 2025 stands as the clearest sign of that failure.
Wang further argued that the campaign has increasingly become a tool for internal political struggle. Since coming to power, Xi has launched successive purges aimed at eliminating rivals. The number of provincial- and ministerial-level officials removed under Xi, Wang said, exceeds the combined total during the administrations of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. The number of senior military officers purged under Xi, he added, surpasses the total number of generals who fell during China’s civil war, foreign wars, and the Cultural Revolution combined.
Wang observed that after reports emerged that Xi suffered a serious health incident during the Third Plenum in July 2024, the direction of the campaign appeared to shift. Large numbers of Xi’s own allies were subsequently targeted, his key supporters within the PLA were removed, and his three closest military aides were effectively cut away. As a result, Wang said, the political pressure generated by years of purges has increasingly begun to turn back toward Xi himself.
Editor’s Note: This article is based on official disclosures by China’s anti-corruption authorities, reporting by Chinese media outlets, and analysis by independent commentators. Claims regarding undisclosed disciplinary actions, internal handling, or secret executions of officials cannot be independently verified and are presented as assessments by the cited sources.
