Scholars, including David Shambaugh, a professor at George Washington University, have estimated that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may spend as much as $10 billion annually on overseas propaganda, equivalent to more than 70 billion RMB. Because of the system’s opacity, no precise public figure is available.
For many years, overseas propaganda was associated with visible symbols, such as billboards in Times Square or English-language television channels in foreign hotels. That model no longer captures how the system operates. Activity now centers on social media platforms, algorithmic distribution, and coordinated digital networks sustained by state financing.
In 2025 and 2026, artificial intelligence tools have become integrated into this structure. What officials describe domestically as an effort to “tell China’s story well” increasingly relies on platform mechanics rather than traditional broadcasting.
The disappearing budget line: where the money originates
China’s public budget documents do not contain a category labeled “global propaganda.” Related spending appears under other headings.
Under “foreign affairs spending,” funds categorized as public diplomacy support overseas think tanks, international forums, and the social media operations of embassies and consulates.
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Under “culture, tourism, sports and media,” state outlets such as CGTN and Xinhua News Agency receive allocations that finance overseas bureaus and personnel. Public disclosures show funding levels capable of sustaining large global operations.
Local governments also participate through “government procurement of services.” Cities including Xi’an and Chengdu have issued tenders allocating millions of RMB to third-party firms tasked with operating overseas social media accounts or arranging sponsored visits by foreign content creators.
From state broadcasters to foreign influencers
A central challenge for state media abroad has been credibility. In response, messaging increasingly appears through non-official voices.
Organizations with official backgrounds, including the China Intercontinental Communication Center, have signed foreign nationals residing in China to produce online content. Through lifestyle vlogs focused on food, travel, and daily routines, these creators publish first-person narratives on YouTube, TikTok, and other platforms. The videos typically avoid explicit political slogans while emphasizing themes such as safety, convenience, and economic development.
At the same time, platform incentives have created commercial alignment. Content portraying China in positive terms can generate significant traffic within domestic Chinese platforms and attract sponsorship. In these cases, messaging spreads through market mechanisms shaped by algorithmic recommendation systems.
Technological escalation: AI systems and coordinated accounts
By 2026, digital activity has shifted toward technology-intensive methods.
Networks of accounts that once resembled simple bots now incorporate AI-generated profile images, regular posting patterns, and limited interactive responses. Under ordinary circumstances, these accounts publish neutral lifestyle material. During politically sensitive moments, they release similar narratives across multiple threads within short timeframes.
Another tactic involves high-volume posting beneath sensitive topics. Large numbers of peripheral comments increase the difficulty of locating substantive replies. Threads become saturated, and original reporting competes with unrelated material.
Cultural channels and indirect transmission
Some messaging travels through entertainment channels rather than political debate.
Online fiction platforms and short-form drama series have built substantial overseas audiences. Genres such as CEO-themed romance dramas or cultivation-based fantasy novels circulate narratives shaped by Chinese production environments.
Video games have also drawn global attention. Titles such as Black Myth: Wukong have received extensive international coverage. Media promotion, coordinated community engagement, and amplification across platforms accompanied these releases.
The positional contest on X
TikTok relies primarily on interest-based recommendation feeds. On X, discussion unfolds in public comment threads. By 2026, activity surrounding China-related topics on X has shown organized patterns.
Accounts holding paid Premium status, marked by blue verification badges, receive elevated visibility in comment sections under the platform’s ranking system. Clusters of such accounts frequently appear near the top of threads concerning Xinjiang, U.S.–China relations, or other sensitive issues. Similar phrasing and synchronized timing are often visible across multiple posts.
Alongside official diplomat accounts, numerous profiles present themselves as independent commentators, geopolitical observers, or former journalists. Interaction often follows a sequence: one account posts, another amplifies, a third adds links in the comments, and later a state media outlet references the discussion. Attribution becomes difficult once the content circulates across platforms.
Some publicly known online personalities have defended CCP positions during contentious debates. Other accounts operate without clear institutional identification.
Digital suppression and coordinated pressure
Activity on X is not limited to messaging. It also includes direct targeting of critics.
When exiled dissidents, democracy activists, or academic commentators post about human rights or governance in China, large volumes of replies can appear within minutes. Posts frequently include spam, explicit imagery, or repetitive characters. Threads with high concentrations of such content may be flagged or downranked by automated moderation systems.
Recent patterns include personalized attacks. AI tools capable of analyzing posting history allow coordinated accounts to generate tailored criticism or defamatory claims. Female critics have reported manipulated or fabricated images circulating in reply chains. Political activists have described repeated threats and coordinated reporting campaigns.
In these environments, sustained comment flooding alters what users encounter first in a thread and affects how discussions unfold across platforms.
The views expressed are solely those of the author.
By Xin Gui He Chu
