By Cai Siyun, Vision Times
On Feb. 28, a joint U.S.–Israel airstrike struck deep into Iran, reportedly killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei along with several senior military and political officials. The operation has also brought scrutiny over the performance of Iran’s air defense network, an intricate system built from Russian and Chinese imports alongside domestically-developed platforms. According to analysts and experts, the results exposed deep structural weaknesses in Tehran’s defensive architecture.
Taiwan’s “Liberty Times” reported that Iran’s air defense network is a hybrid system composed primarily of Russian and Chinese equipment integrated with indigenous systems.
A hybrid defense network
At its core were Russian-made S-300 and Tor missile systems, long touted as capable of intercepting stealth aircraft. Yet in the early stages of the strike, multiple S-300 radar arrays and command vehicles were reportedly destroyed in precision Israeli attacks. Short-range Tor systems assigned to protect nuclear facilities also failed to intercept low-altitude penetrating drones.
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China’s HQ-9B air defense systems and related electronic components likewise struggled with data-link integration in live combat. Meanwhile, Iran’s domestically developed Bavar-373 and Ghadir systems demonstrated detection capabilities but proved unstable under sustained electronic warfare interference.
Shu Hsiao-huang, a scholar at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, argued that the U.S. military’s suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) was highly effective. He speculated that Washington combined “hard kill” physical destruction, “soft kill” electronic interference, and cyber operations to disable Iranian radar systems. The campaign, he said, validates recent U.S. investments in fifth-generation fighters, long-range precision weapons, and loitering munitions.
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Shu further noted that although Iran has received Chinese and Russian military support, its air defense network suffered significant damage in previous U.S.–Israeli strikes last year and has struggled to recover. Facing a highly coordinated and technologically sophisticated air penetration campaign, Iran’s counterstrike capacity appeared limited.
S-300 and Tor systems neutralized
Lin Chao-lun, associate researcher at Taiwan’s Institute for Cybersecurity and Decision-Making Simulation, offered a broader structural explanation in an analysis titled “Why Iran Failed to Effectively Resist the U.S.–Israel Coalition.” He wrote that China-Iran military cooperation has evolved from simple hardware transfers to a combined framework of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and strategic material supply.
Beginning in the summer of 2025, China reportedly delivered HQ-16 and HQ-17AE surface-to-air missile systems to help rebuild Iran’s damaged air defense grid following what was described as a “Twelve-Day War.” China also supplied loitering munitions to replenish Iranian stockpiles.
Negotiations reportedly intensified over the CM-302 (YJ-12) anti-ship missile and the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle. China also continued supplying key raw materials and carbon-fiber equipment for ballistic missile production.
The two countries additionally developed a hybrid “kill chain” architecture. Leveraging a satellite network exceeding 500 spacecraft, China provided Iran with round-the-clock optical, radar, and signals intelligence. Iran also transitioned from GPS guidance to China’s encrypted BeiDou-3 military navigation signals to enhance strike precision and resistance to Western interference.
Yet when the U.S.–Israel coalition launched its assault, this web of support failed to deliver defensive resilience. Lin attributed the breakdown to three primary factors:
First, overwhelming intelligence penetration and tactical surprise. The operation reportedly relied on precise knowledge of senior Iranian officials’ locations. U.S. and Israeli intelligence services had allegedly tracked Khamenei and key defense leaders, identifying a moment when multiple top officials were gathered in Tehran. At 9:40 a.m. local time, long-range precision munitions simultaneously struck two buildings in what Lin described as a perfectly executed surprise attack.
Under such conditions, deep internal intelligence penetration combined with advanced electronic warfare suppression, Iran’s HQ-16 and HQ-17AE systems had little opportunity to raise readiness levels before being neutralized.
Second, a structural imbalance favoring offense over defense in China-Iran cooperation. China’s ISR and BeiDou systems primarily enhance Iran’s targeting capabilities, enabling it to locate and strike adversaries. However, Lin emphasized that offensive targeting enhancements do not automatically translate into defensive capacity against stealth aircraft and precision air-to-ground munitions.
Weapons under negotiation, such as the CM-302, and previously delivered drones are anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) assets designed for offensive deterrence, not high-altitude aircraft interception.
Third, incomplete deployment and integration gaps. Several advanced systems, including the CM-302 and DF-17, remain in negotiation phases and have not matured into operational capabilities. Even deployed Chinese-supplied air defense assets struggled without a fully modernized early-warning radar network and unified command-and-control system capable of countering sophisticated electronic suppression.
Lin concluded that Western military technology, led by the United States cutting edge technology, demonstrated overwhelming superiority. Its hardware and software systems have been tested repeatedly in combat, yielding high operational reliability and adaptability. Superior battlefield situational awareness, integrated electronic warfare systems, and long-range precision strike capabilities enabled comprehensive suppression of Iran’s defenses in the opening phase of combat.
By contrast, despite years of military cooperation and reform, Iran’s defense modernization exposed severe integration shortcomings when confronted with high-intensity, precision-driven threats. Imported Chinese systems and satellite-enabled ISR assets lacked cohesive integration, rendering them ineffective under sustained electronic suppression.
Even as China expands its military exports and influence in regional conflicts, a substantial gap remains when compared to U.S. combat experience, systems integration, advanced research, and real-time battlefield awareness. That multidimensional disparity, analysts argue, ultimately explains why Iran, despite relying on Chinese equipment and technical cooperation, was unable to mount an effective defense.
