On Feb. 11 and Feb. 16, 1967, senior Chinese Communist Party officials gathered at Huairen Hall in Zhongnanhai. The meeting was nominally convened to discuss “grasping revolution and promoting production.” It became a direct collision between veteran marshals and the Central Cultural Revolution Group.
Tan Zhenlin spoke first, without restraint. Pointing at members of the Cultural Revolution Group, he accused them of seeking to topple veteran cadres. “I have made three mistakes in my life,” he declared. “First, following Mao Zedong in the revolution; second, joining the Communist Party; third, still working in the office now.” He grabbed his briefcase and announced he was done. “Beheading, imprisonment, expulsion from the Party—do as you please.”
Ye Jianying followed with his own outburst. He slammed the table at Chen Boda and Kang Sheng with such force that he fractured a bone in his right hand. “You have thrown the army into chaos, and the localities into chaos as well. What exactly are you trying to do?”
That confrontation later became known as the “February Countercurrent.”
Kang Sheng reportedly recorded every word and relayed the exchanges to Jiang Qing and Mao Zedong that same night, characterizing the marshals’ resistance as an attempted “military coup.” Mao’s reaction was explosive. According to accounts, he declared that if opposition to the Cultural Revolution continued, he would leave Beijing with Lin Biao and return to Jinggangshan, inviting others to “bring back the Kuomintang.” The marshals were soon compelled to make public self-criticisms.
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The outside narrative has often suggested that Mao was caught off guard. Internal accounts point to something else: a test. The February meeting exposed who would challenge the direction of the Cultural Revolution—and who would retreat once Mao signaled displeasure.
Lin Biao did not attend. He claimed illness. He watched. His position was delicate. He needed Mao’s authority intact to secure his own succession, yet he also had no interest in seeing Jiang Qing’s faction dominate unchecked.
Zhou Enlai presided over the sessions and attempted to contain the clash. Once Mao’s stance was clear, Zhou adjusted. Struggle sessions followed. Tan Zhenlin and Chen Yi were denounced. The veteran marshals were ordered to conduct “profound examinations.” Survival inside the Party required calibration rather than confrontation.
Mao labeled the episode the “February Countercurrent.” The consequences were immediate. Tan Zhenlin was confined and required to write daily confessions. Chen Yi was subjected to mass denunciation rallies and physical strain that left lasting injury. The marshals who had built the regime were publicly humiliated by the system they had helped construct.
Yet Ye Jianying was not removed.
The question is not whether Ye was angry. He broke a bone slamming the table. The question is why that anger did not end his career.
The answer lies in limits.
Ye attacked Chen Boda and Kang Sheng. He did not attack Mao Zedong. That distinction was decisive. Mao tolerated friction beneath him; he did not tolerate challenges to his personal authority.
There was also military calculus. By 1967, Mao relied on Lin Biao but feared excessive concentration of power within the armed forces. Eliminating every veteran marshal would have tilted the People’s Liberation Army entirely toward Lin’s network. Retaining Ye Jianying preserved an internal counterweight and prevented the army from becoming a single-faction instrument.
Accounts suggest Ye later submitted reports to Mao on military stability, signaling that removing him could unsettle senior commanders across major military regions. Mao chose a middle path: criticize, isolate, but do not topple.
The purge of the veteran marshals cleared space. Lin Biao elevated Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo into key posts within the Central Military Commission structure. Revolutionary Committees expanded across localities, often backed by military authority. Power did not disappear; it reorganized.
The February Countercurrent was not a democratic rupture. It was a struggle within the Party over control, authority, and survival. The marshals defended order within a system built on concentrated power; they did not seek to dismantle it.
Scholars have offered differing interpretations. Cheng Xiaonong has argued that competition between military and Cultural Revolution factions over factories and resources intensified factionalization within the army. Yu Maochun has described Mao’s maneuvering as deliberate power balancing. Professor Ming Juzheng has framed the episode as a demonstration of how unchecked authority generates internal struggle rather than institutional restraint.
Ye Jianying understood the limits of permissible resistance. Tan Zhenlin and others pressed beyond them. Mao responded accordingly.
The suppression of the veteran marshals consolidated Mao’s command over the military. It also reshaped factional alignments that would later culminate in the rupture with Lin Biao. The system tightened, not moderated.
By Fu Longshan
