Iran already had enough enriched uranium to build multiple crude nuclear weapons. It then spent eight months secretly preparing to use it, while telling the world a deal was ‘within reach.’
Commentary by Andrew Jensen
On the morning of Feb. 27, Oman’s foreign minister appeared on CBS in Washington to announce what he described as a breakthrough in negotiations with Iran. Tehran had agreed to zero stockpiling of enriched uranium, full monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the irreversible conversion of its existing nuclear material into fuel.
“This is something completely new,” he said. “If you cannot stockpile material that is enriched, then there is no way you can actually create a bomb.”
That same day, however, the IAEA circulated a confidential report indicating that Iran had hidden 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity in an underground tunnel complex at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center. The agency could not verify the size, composition, or location of the stockpile and reported a “loss of continuity of knowledge” about Iran’s nuclear materials.
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Evidence reviewed by analysts, including intelligence reports, satellite imagery, and international monitoring data, also suggests that while negotiations were underway, Tehran was advancing elements of a nuclear weapons capability by concealing portions of its program from inspectors while accelerating construction of hardened facilities. These developments unfolded in the months leading up to military strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure in early 2026.
Negotiations and nuclear stockpiles
The proposed diplomatic framework discussed in late February centered on a sweeping restriction of Iran’s nuclear program. According to officials involved in the talks, Tehran would halt stockpiling of enriched uranium, allow full monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and convert its existing nuclear material into reactor fuel.
But the IAEA’s confidential reporting raised immediate concerns about whether such commitments could be verified. Agency inspectors had already warned of a “loss of continuity of knowledge” regarding Iran’s nuclear material after access to key facilities was restricted for months. The agency reported that Iran had hidden the 60-percent enriched uranium stockpile in an underground tunnel complex at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center.
Without access to multiple enrichment sites, inspectors could not confirm the size, composition, or location of Iran’s stockpile. Military strikes targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure began the following day.
The debate over enrichment
For years, international monitoring efforts focused on whether Iran would enrich uranium to 90 percent purity, the level typically considered weapons grade. But some researchers argued that threshold may not have been the decisive factor. In July 2025, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published research suggesting that 60 percent enriched uranium could potentially be used in crude nuclear devices without further enrichment.
A study by Illinois State University physicists estimated that roughly 40 kilograms of 60 percent enriched material could produce a kiloton-yield device.
Iran’s stockpile reportedly exceeded that amount many times over. Such a device might not be small enough for ballistic missiles, analysts said, but could theoretically be delivered through other means, including aircraft or maritime transport.
Parallel development paths
Research by the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) also suggested that Iran was pursuing two parallel strategies. Sources cited by the institute said Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei authorized development of compact nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles in October 2025, following a regional conflict with Israel earlier that year.
Miniaturized warheads require uranium enriched to 90 percent purity. But ISPI reported that Tehran may have deliberately delayed enrichment to that level while advancing other elements of weapons design.
As the institute noted, “Enriching fissile material now would only risk leaving Iran in an extremely exposed position.” Under such a strategy, weapon design and infrastructure could advance while enrichment levels remained below the widely watched 90-percent threshold.
Under this strategy, Iran could continue diplomatic negotiations while advancing elements of its nuclear program outside the view of international inspectors. Accounts from officials involved in the talks suggest that Iranian negotiators openly acknowledged aspects of this approach.
What the Iranians said at the table
Trump’s Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff signaled early that negotiations with Iran would focus not only on uranium enrichment but also on weaponization. In April 2025, months before Operation Midnight Hammer, he told Fox News that talks would address: “verification on weaponization. That includes missiles, the type of missiles that they have stockpiled there, and it includes the trigger for a bomb.”
His remarks referred to intelligence assessments dating back to March 2024 indicating that Iran had conducted nuclear explosion modeling, detonation tests, and neutron radiation trials. After the February 2026 strikes, Witkoff described what had unfolded during the negotiations.
Iranian negotiators began by asserting what they called their “inalienable right” to enrich uranium. According to Witkoff, they acknowledged possessing roughly 460 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, enough material for multiple crude nuclear devices. “They were proud,” Witkoff said, “that they had evaded all sorts of oversight protocols.”
The Times of Israel also claimed that Iranian negotiators boasted “to us directly, with no shame” about evading international safeguards. During the talks, the United States proposed a 10-year enrichment freeze combined with American-funded nuclear fuel supplies. Iran rejected the proposal.
But what oversight protocols had they evaded? Iran’s enrichment levels were already known to the IAEA, and the quantities had been reported. What they were referring to, analysts say, was everything that occurred after June 2025: weapons laboratories rebuilt in secret, uranium moved underground, authorization for warhead development, and construction at sites the world did not know about, all carried out while inspectors lacked access and diplomats continued negotiations in Geneva.
Concealed facilities
Satellite imagery and intelligence reports indicated that Iran was rebuilding parts of its nuclear infrastructure during the months leading up to the 2026 strikes. At the Parchin military complex, Israel had previously destroyed a facility known as Taleghan 2 in 2024. Satellite images later showed reconstruction activity, including a structure encased in concrete and buried under soil.
According to David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, the new structure appeared designed to house a blast chamber for high-explosive experiments associated with nuclear weapons development. “Stalling the negotiations has its benefits,” Albright wrote in February 2026.
Meanwhile, construction accelerated at Pickaxe Mountain, an underground facility near Natanz tunneled deep into granite. Analysts reported the site could reach depths of 80 to 100 meters, potentially beyond the reach of conventional bunker-buster bombs. Satellite images taken in February also showed cranes, cement mixers, and heavy equipment at the entrance of the site.
Israeli officials later suggested the site could soon have made Iran’s nuclear program effectively immune to conventional strikes.
Oil exports and strategic preparations
In the weeks before the strikes, Iran also dramatically increased oil shipments. Between Feb. 15-20, Iran tripled the rate of loading oil tankers at Kharg Island. According to Kpler data cited by Bloomberg, 20.1 million barrels were loaded in six days at over 3 million barrels per day, more than double the normal rate. Storage tanks dropped from 88 percent capacity to 67 percent.
The number of tankers near the terminal doubled from 8 to 18. Some analysts interpreted the surge as an effort to convert oil reserves into cash ahead of a potential escalation.
A narrowing window
Whether military strikes were justified will likely remain debated among policymakers and analysts. But the available evidence indicates Iran was simultaneously negotiating diplomatic agreements while advancing elements of its nuclear infrastructure.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu later described the urgency of the situation. “If we do not stop them now, they will become invulnerable,” he said. In a Fox News interview, he added: “They started building new sites, underground bunkers that would make their atomic bomb program immune within months.”
As construction advanced and enriched uranium accumulated, analysts said the window for preventing a hardened nuclear infrastructure was rapidly closing.
Editorial note: Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Vision Times.
