Japan’s former defense minister has revealed that leaked documents suggest Xi Jinping considered a military attack on Taiwan after the CCP’s 2024 Third Plenum, but was stopped by Zhang Youxia, the now-purged former vice chairman of China’s top military command body. The disclosure raises urgent questions about whether Xi’s intent to use force remains active.
Morimoto Satoshi, Japan’s former defense minister, told Taiwan’s Liberty Times in a recent interview that leaked documents circulating online, which he assessed as roughly 80 percent credible, contained several striking claims. The most significant: after the CCP’s Third Plenum in 2024, Xi Jinping, the CCP’s general secretary and China’s top leader, actively considered launching a military assault on Taiwan, and was dissuaded from doing so by Zhang Youxia and other senior military figures.
This claim is significant because U.S. intelligence officials have publicly stated that Xi directed China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to complete all preparations for action against Taiwan by 2027. If the leaked documents are accurate, Xi’s interest in using force was even more urgent than Washington’s timeline suggested.
The former defense minister warns that previous assumptions may be wrong
Morimoto said the documents, if authentic, challenge a longstanding assumption held by Japanese defense analysts. The prevailing view had been that a full-scale military assault on Taiwan would carry such enormous costs and risks that Xi would deprioritize it in favor of other approaches. Analysts expected Beijing to pursue political fragmentation, military infiltration, and information warfare to weaken Taiwan’s institutions without launching a direct attack.
“If this document is real, then our earlier assumption that the Chinese leadership would avoid military unification may have been mistaken,” Morimoto said. “Xi Jinping clearly considered it, and that intent may not have changed.”
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Morimoto outlined two possible scenarios following Zhang Youxia’s removal. The first is that by purging internal opposition, Xi has consolidated his military command authority to such an extent that a military attack becomes more likely. The second is that Beijing pivots to non-military tools: political manipulation, economic leverage, information operations, and covert infiltration to achieve its objectives short of open warfare. In that case, Morimoto warned, Taiwan’s 2028 presidential election could become a critical inflection point.
The CCP’s united front strategy targets Taiwan’s youth
The second scenario aligns closely with signals already emerging from Beijing. At a CCP work conference on Taiwan held Feb. 9-10, 2026, Wang Huning, the Politburo Standing Committee member who oversees the Party’s united front and propaganda operations, added new language about “promoting the peaceful development of cross-strait relations,” a shift that suggests the regime, shaken by internal military turmoil, is leaning more heavily on covert influence operations.
Wang’s speech placed conspicuous emphasis on a specific demographic: Taiwan’s young people. He called for “facilitating and expanding people-to-people exchanges” and “supporting Taiwanese citizens, especially youth, to come to the mainland to study, work, and live.” For the CCP, this language is operational. The regime is mobilizing its vast apparatus of Party-controlled organizations to process Taiwanese visitors and residents as targets for political indoctrination. Young Taiwanese, raised in a democratic society, have little framework for recognizing this kind of systematic manipulation.
Wang’s language about “promoting spiritual closeness between compatriots on both sides” and “supporting Taiwanese businesses on the mainland” serves a single strategic function: deep infiltration of every layer of Taiwan’s society. The aim is to cultivate Taiwanese individuals who will serve as CCP proxies, speaking on the Party’s behalf in various guises within Taiwan itself. This method is more difficult to detect and more effective at eroding public trust than overt military threats.
Some pro-Beijing political forces in Taiwan already function as extensions of the CCP’s influence apparatus. The regime’s “invisible war” against Taiwan has been underway for years.
CCP military activity around Taiwan dropped sharply after the US strike on Iran
The shift toward covert operations also reflects the CCP’s response to recent demonstrations of American military power. After the U.S. and Israeli strike that killed Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei, PLA military aircraft activity around Taiwan dropped to near zero. According to AFP data compiled from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, from Feb. 28 through March 9, Taiwan detected only two Chinese military aircraft in the Taiwan Strait zone over a 24-hour reporting period, compared to 86 during the same window the previous year. It was the longest period of near-zero CCP military aircraft detections since AFP began tracking the data in 2024.
This pullback demonstrates the deterrent effect of overwhelming American military force on CCP behavior. It also suggests Beijing will increasingly rely on its covert influence networks inside Taiwan rather than overt military provocations.
Chiang Ching-kuo’s warning about CCP deception remains urgent
The late President Chiang Ching-kuo, who spent his career confronting the CCP’s tactics, warned Taiwan’s public and the international community repeatedly about the nature of the Party’s approach.
In October 1982, Chiang told a Newsweek reporter that expectations of the CCP honoring any “one country, two systems” agreement were naive. “The Chinese Communists do not keep their word,” he said. He noted the absurdity of a regime that denies freedom to its own population promising to preserve freedom in Taiwan.
In May 1984, Chiang stated flatly that “two systems coexisting within one country is impossible. The Chinese Communists are merely using this to lure us, and we will not be deceived.” He added: “Our policy toward the Chinese Communists will not change. We will not yield and we will not compromise, because yielding and compromise will lead to our destruction.”
Decades after Chiang’s warnings, the CCP’s toolkit has expanded from radio broadcasts and leaflet drops to sophisticated media influence operations, social media manipulation, and the cultivation of pro-Beijing politicians and commentators who openly attack Taiwan’s government and president on the Party’s behalf.
By Jianyi
