By Li Deyan, Vision Times
A newly-released report by a U.S. military research institute has shed light on the management and storage of nuclear warheads within the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategic missile forces, revealing rare details about how China stores, transports, and deploys its nuclear arsenal.
The report, titled “Dancers at the Knife’s Edge: PLA Rocket Force Nuclear Warhead Management” was published on March 9 by the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), which operates under the Air University.
Researchers analyzed the organizational structure responsible for managing nuclear warheads within the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), including the storage, maintenance, and transportation of the weapons. The report traces how nuclear warheads are reportedly moved from a central storage facility deep within the Qinling Mountains in Shaanxi Province to regional operational bases and ultimately to missile brigades.
Central storage site identified
According to the study, the Rocket Force’s Base 67, located in Baoji, Shaanxi Province, serves as the primary command responsible for the storage and management of China’s nuclear warheads. The base reportedly oversees a number of subordinate units responsible for technical services, communications, electronic warfare, transportation, air defense, and equipment inspection. Personnel within the unit reportedly refer to themselves as “guardians of the nation’s treasure.”
Success
You are now signed up for our newsletter
Success
Check your email to complete sign up
The report also highlights a highly secure underground or semi-underground storage facility known as Hongchuan, located deep in the Qinling Mountains. The site is believed to be one of the Rocket Force’s most sensitive nuclear storage locations and is reportedly accessible through a single narrow road.
Researchers note that the centralized structure of China’s nuclear storage system could create potential vulnerabilities, as large portions of the arsenal may be concentrated in relatively few facilities. The report also suggests that limited infrastructure around the Hongchuan site, including restricted transportation access, could slow military response times in certain scenarios.
How China manages nuclear warheads
The study describes a multi-step process governing how China’s nuclear warheads are handled. Specialized units are responsible for storing, testing, and maintaining warheads at central facilities. When deployment is required, the warheads are transported, by rail, road, or occasionally air, to regional bases. From there, they are delivered to missile brigades, where the warheads are finally mated with missiles before launch.
China has long followed a doctrine commonly referred to as “warhead–missile separation,” meaning that nuclear warheads are typically stored separately from delivery systems until they are needed. Analysts say this policy reflects Beijing’s desire to maintain strict central control over nuclear weapons and prevent their unauthorized deployment.
CASI researchers also noted that Chinese military documents rarely use the term “warhead,” instead referring to the weapons as “special equipment” or even “national treasures.” Because of China’s tight information controls, the report was compiled by piecing together scattered fragments of publicly available information, open-source intelligence, and academic research.
Far-reaching strategic implications
Commentators analyzing the report say the centralized storage structure may have strategic consequences in a potential conflict. U.S.-based political commentator Zhang Tianliang noted that China’s nuclear command structure prioritizes political control and internal stability.
According to Zhang, the separation of warheads from missiles is designed partly to reduce the risk of internal power struggles or accidental launches within the military. “If nuclear weapons need to be deployed, they must first be transported from central storage facilities,” Zhang explained, adding that the process requires several steps before missiles can be launched. He also argued that this structure may slow China’s ability to respond rapidly during a crisis.
The release of the report has also fueled discussion about intelligence gathering related to China’s military. Former Shanghai entrepreneur Hu Liren, now a political commentator living in the United States, said the information contained in the report suggests that U.S. analysts possess significant knowledge about the internal organization of China’s nuclear forces.
According to Hu, publicly released U.S. reports likely contain only a portion of what American intelligence agencies know about the Chinese military. “The level of detail in the report, down to specific base numbers, responsible units, and logistical structures, suggests the United States has gathered substantial information about the Rocket Force,” he said.
Simmering tensions
Hu also argued that the centralized management of China’s nuclear arsenal reflects the political structure of the CCP, where ultimate authority over strategic weapons is concentrated at the top leadership level. He further suggested that such centralized control is intended to ensure that only the country’s top political leadership can authorize access to nuclear stockpiles.
The report comes amid growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China, particularly over military modernization, nuclear deterrence, and technological competition. While the CASI study relies primarily on open-source analysis, it offers a rare window into how China’s nuclear weapons infrastructure may operate.
As tensions between Washington and Beijing continue to shape global security dynamics, experts say understanding the structure and vulnerabilities of nuclear command systems remains an important part of strategic analysis.
