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State Department Undercuts Beijing’s Taiwan Strategy With Single Statement

Published: April 15, 2026
A television shows the meeting between Kuomintang (KMT) chairwoman Cheng Li-wun and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, at a restaurant in Taipei on April 10, 2026. (Image: I-Hwa Cheng / AFP via Getty Images)

This “Xi–Zheng meeting” was originally designed to set the tone for framing cross-strait relations as an internal affair, but a single statement from the U.S. State Department directly rejected the political framing of the meeting. The U.S. emphasized that China should engage in unconditional dialogue with Taiwan’s democratically elected government and may also interact with all political parties. This is not merely a diplomatic principle, but a deliberate effort to cool and deconstruct the narrative. What was originally portrayed as a political consensus across the Strait was, from the U.S. perspective, reduced to inter-party social interaction rather than substantive progress in cross-strait relations.

China deliberately engages only with specific political parties

Looking back at the arrangement of the Xi–Zheng meeting, its political intent is quite clear. When China interacts only with parties that accept certain political preconditions while deliberately excluding Taiwan’s democratically elected government, this becomes a form of conditional selection rather than open engagement. China does not need to enter formal negotiations, yet it can still present the impression externally that cross-strait dialogue is ongoing, thereby supporting its narrative of “internal affairs.”

When China interacts only with specific political parties, yet the image presented appears as if “someone in Taiwan is in dialogue,” it is easy for outsiders to misinterpret this as a consensus within Taiwan toward China. This concern may not immediately change policy, but it can lead outsiders to question whether Taiwan’s position is unified, and may also cause allies to reassess Taiwan’s reliability. The effect of the Xi–Zheng meeting lies not in its content, but in exposing Taiwan’s internal political divisions directly on the international stage.

Taiwan’s Kuomintang Chairperson Cheng Li-wen speaks during a press conference in Beijing on April 10, 2026. China’s President Xi Jinping met Taiwan’s opposition party leader Cheng Li-wun in Beijing on April 10, telling the visiting delegation he had “full confidence” that Taiwanese and Chinese people would be united. (Image: ADEK BERRY / AFP via Getty Images)

The US dismantles China’s strategy with a single statement

However, the response from the U.S. State Department directly deconstructed this strategy. This response functions like three arrows. First, it brings the democratically elected government back to the center of dialogue, clearly defining the legitimate actors in cross-strait engagement. Second, it acknowledges that party-to-party contact can exist, but frames it as secondary political interaction rather than the main axis of cross-strait relations. Third, it refocuses attention on the reality of China’s ongoing pressure on Taiwan, thereby undermining the atmosphere of engagement China seeks to create. Together, these three points dismantle the political effect of the Xi–Zheng meeting at the international level.

Who is qualified to represent Taiwan in dialogue?

More importantly, this response is not only directed at China, but also draws a line within Taiwan’s internal politics. When the international community clearly states that dialogue should return to the level of the democratically elected government, the space for using selective engagement to shape political narratives is reduced. This puts political parties that favor closer engagement with China under external scrutiny, while also requiring pro-international alignment forces to demonstrate greater consistency. This is not merely a diplomatic response; it directly affects the structure of party competition within Taiwan.

This also shifts the meaning of the meeting. China originally hoped the Xi–Zheng meeting would reinforce the impression that cross-strait dialogue already exists and suggest that alternative political pathways exist within Taiwan. But after the U.S. redefinition, the meeting is no longer seen as a breakthrough in cross-strait relations, but rather as a symbolic interaction. It does not expand cross-strait engagement; instead, it clarifies who is qualified to represent Taiwan in dialogue.

Taiwan
A guard raises Taiwan’s national flag along Democracy Boulevard at Taipei’s Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. (Image: I-HWA CHENG/AFP via Getty Images)

Cross-strait dialogue must return to Taiwan’s elected government

China attempted to reshape the cross-strait narrative through the Xi–Zheng meeting, but the U.S. effectively reduced it to party-level exchange with a single statement and brought the issue back to the status quo of the Taiwan Strait and regional security. For Indo-Pacific countries, the key issue has never been who meets whom, but whether stability in the Taiwan Strait can be maintained and whether Taiwan’s free democratic system can continue to function. This is not merely Taiwan’s internal choice, but a shared interest of the entire regional security architecture.

When China attempts to use selective engagement to create the impression that “alternative cross-strait dialogue channels already exist,” the U.S. response effectively rejects this framing and re-establishes the legitimacy boundary of dialogue. The core of the cross-strait issue has never been which party represents Taiwan, but must return to Taiwan’s democratically elected government and institutional dialogue free from coercion.

True peace requires abandoning the use of force against Taiwan

This brings the issue back to the most realistic point. Any attempt to bypass Taiwan’s elected government and repackage the form of dialogue cannot change the fundamental structure of Taiwan Strait security, nor can it replace Taiwan’s strategic position in the region. For Indo-Pacific countries, what matters is not how many voices exist within Taiwan, but whether Taiwan can maintain a clear, stable, and predictable external stance.

Therefore, the ultimate outcome of this meeting is not a new cross-strait pathway, but a clearer understanding in the international community of who is qualified to represent Taiwan in dialogue. Stability in the Taiwan Strait will not be changed by a few party-to-party exchanges, but depends on whether China abandons the use of force against Taiwan and whether it is willing to engage in unconditional dialogue with Taiwan’s democratically elected government. Any arrangement that bypasses this premise is merely political maneuvering and will only serve as propaganda material for China, not a genuine path to dialogue.

(Authorized reprint by Shangbao via Kan China.)

(The article represents the author’s personal views and opinions.)