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Cheng Li-wen’s ‘Chain of Peace’ Proposal Sparks Debate Over Taiwan’s Security Strategy

Published: June 4, 2026
On April 10, 2026, Kuomintang (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wen left after attending a press conference in Beijing. (Image: Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wen departed for the United States on June 1. Ahead of her trip, she told reporters at a press conference that it was time to “move beyond the Cold War mindset” and work toward transforming the first island chain into a “chain of peace and prosperity,” according to Taiwan’s Central News Agency (CNA).

Cheng’s pre-departure remarks immediately drew strong reactions across Taiwan’s political circles and prompted questions from observers if she is seeking to preserve Taiwan through peace, or is trying to please Beijing.

Is Cheng Li-wen standing on the CCP’s side?

Cheng Li-wen began her 16-day visit to the United States on June 1. Accompanying her on the trip was KMT Central Standing Committee member Qin Pengzhen, who previously served as an official in China’s National Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises and has publicly advocated cross-strait unification.

According to a report by SET News, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislative caucus held a press conference on June 3 to respond to current public concerns.

Fan Yun, secretary-general of the DPP caucus in Taiwan’s legislature, stated that she wished Cheng well on her diplomatic mission to the United States as the representative of Taiwan’s largest opposition party. Fan said she hoped Cheng’s visit would achieve positive results, gain support, and further strengthen relations between Taiwan and the United States.

Fan added that the concept of the First Island Chain was developed in response to the Chinese Communist Party’s military expansion. Therefore, Cheng’s call to dismantle or move beyond that concept naturally raises concerns among many people about whether she is aligning herself with the interests of the CCP.

However, regarding Cheng Li-wen’s perceived assertion that the “First Island Chain” mindset should be abandoned, Fan Yun said she “strongly disagrees.”

Fan emphasized that “the First Island Chain is a concept developed in response to the Chinese Communist Party’s military expansion.” She noted that Taiwan occupies a crucial position within the First Island Chain and that China, as an emerging hegemonic power, has created numerous security challenges for Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, both militarily and at sea.

“Cheng Li-wen’s proposal to discard this concept really does make people wonder whether she is standing on the side of the Chinese Communist Party,” Fan said.

Taiwan’s Kuomintang Chairperson Cheng Li-wen speaks during a press conference in Beijing on April 10, 2026. China’s President Xi Jinping met Taiwan’s opposition party leader Cheng Li-wun in Beijing on April 10, telling the visiting delegation he had “full confidence” that Taiwanese and Chinese people would be united. (ADEK BERRY / AFP via Getty Images)

Wu Ching-yi: ‘Unfastening Taiwan’s seatbelt’ to please the CCP

In response, political commentator Wu Ching-yi wrote in a Facebook post on June 3 that President Lai Ching-te had emphasized at the Computex 2026 conference that stability in the Taiwan Strait is the foundation of global supply-chain security.

Wu noted that U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had reiterated that U.S. policy toward Taiwan remains unchanged, with maintaining the status quo still at its core. She further pointed out that U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had stated at the Shangri-La Dialogue that the central pillar of America’s Pacific strategy is to “establish deterrence along the First Island Chain.”

According to Wu, these three statements together send a highly consistent strategic message: “Taiwan is not merely a cross-strait issue. It is a critical node in the global AI supply chain, the Indo-Pacific security order, and the broader deterrence framework aimed at China.”

Wu argued that in this context, calls to move away from the “First Island Chain” framework amount to weakening Taiwan’s strategic safeguards—“unfastening Taiwan’s seatbelt”—in a manner that could be seen as accommodating or pleasing Beijing.

In contrast, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been steadily expanding its activities, transforming the Taiwan issue from a matter of “cross-strait military confrontation” into a broader arena encompassing the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the First Island Chain, coast guard enforcement powers, and the international maritime legal order.

Wu Ching-yi criticized Beijing, saying that Chinese coast guard vessels have conducted patrols east of Taiwan and have protested maritime boundary negotiations between Japan and the Philippines. She also claimed that, at the end of May, Chinese vessels entered waters around the Pratas Islands (Dongsha) and confronted Taiwan’s coast guard. According to Wu, these are not isolated provocations but part of a continuing strategy aimed at turning the Taiwan Strait into an “internationalized battlefield.”

Wu argued that Taiwan’s recent demonstrations of robotic dogs and unmanned defense systems are intended to respond to these “gray-zone” threats. She stated that when Beijing uses coast guard forces, maritime militia, legal warfare, and gray-zone tactics to pressure Taiwan’s offshore islands and surrounding waters, Taiwan’s efforts to upgrade unmanned systems, AI-enabled sensors, offshore-island surveillance capabilities, and rapid-response forces are “not acts of provocation, but necessary components of deterrence by denial.”

She added that if Beijing seeks to apply incremental pressure through low-cost “salami-slicing” tactics, Taiwan must ensure that “every slice becomes impossible to cut.”

Wu therefore questioned why Cheng Li-wen chose this particular moment to call for “ending First Island Chain thinking” and replacing strategic defenses with dialogue. According to Wu, although such rhetoric appears to advocate peace on the surface, it is in practice noticeably out of step with the Indo-Pacific security approach currently being reinforced by the United States and its regional partners.

Wu emphasized: “The First Island Chain is not an outdated concept from the last century; it is Taiwan’s most important security line today. Deterrence by denial is not provocation—it is a practical prerequisite for preventing war.”

She argued that when Beijing is increasing pressure on Taiwan, Cheng’s eagerness to “unfasten Taiwan’s seatbelt” inevitably raises questions among observers: “Is this really about preserving Taiwan through peace, or is it about accommodating Beijing?”

Wu concluded with a sharp criticism of the Kuomintang (KMT): “At a time when the mainstream Indo-Pacific security framework is strengthening the First Island Chain, why is the KMT in such a hurry to dismantle that line itself?”