A July 18 interview featuring Iranian economist Arsham Reisinezhad has drawn attention on social media after he argued that China does not view Iran as a genuine strategic ally, but rather as a “tactical tool” that can be leveraged to divert American military resources and strategic attention away from Beijing.
According to Reisinezhad, China benefits from a limited and manageable level of instability in the Middle East enough to force Washington to maintain ships, air-defense systems, missiles, and personnel in the Persian Gulf, but not enough to trigger a regional war that would severely disrupt oil supplies.
He also claimed that during the recent conflict surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, China supplied Iran with equipment, military technology, and satellite data.
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Calculated maneuvers
Reisinezhad described China’s support for Iran as calculated and conditional rather than comparable to the mutual-defense commitments found in a formal military alliance.
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As long as Iran remains capable of threatening U.S. bases, disrupting regional shipping, and forcing Washington to devote substantial resources to the Middle East, Beijing gains a strategic advantage. American assets committed to the Persian Gulf are assets that cannot be deployed as readily to the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, or broader Indo-Pacific.
At the same time, Beijing has little interest in allowing Iran to provoke a completely uncontrolled regional conflict. A prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz would damage not only Western economies, but also China, which remains heavily dependent on energy imports from the Gulf.
China’s preferred outcome, therefore, may not be an outright Iranian victory. Rather, Beijing benefits from an Iran that survives, retains the ability to retaliate, and continues imposing costs on the United States—without plunging the global energy market into a prolonged crisis.
That tension has also appeared in international media analysis. According to The Financial Times, the continued expenditure of U.S. missiles, air-defense interceptors, and military resources in the Iran conflict could weaken Washington’s preparedness for other contingencies, including a confrontation over Taiwan. Yet rising oil prices and disrupted Gulf shipping would also impose significant costs on China. For Beijing, the conflict offers both strategic benefits and serious economic risks, noted Reisinezhad.
Oil, satellite, and military technology
China and Iran have maintained close energy and trade ties for years. Following the imposition of U.S. sanctions, China became one of the most important buyers of Iranian crude.
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that during a brief ceasefire window from June to July 2026, Iran rapidly exported roughly 70 million barrels of oil worth an estimated $5 billion to $6 billion, with China believed to be the primary destination. The revenue reportedly gave Tehran a financial cushion before the United States reimposed restrictions.
Meanwhile, military and technological cooperation remains even more controversial. U.S. media reports have alleged that Chinese companies sold or marketed satellite imagery, geospatial intelligence, navigation equipment, and dual-use components to Iran. Other reports have suggested that Tehran became increasingly reliant on China’s BeiDou satellite-navigation system after disruptions to GPS signals, potentially improving the targeting capabilities of Iranian missiles and drones.
The Washington Post previously reported that some Chinese firms marketed geospatial intelligence concerning U.S. military deployments in the Middle East. The U.S. government has sanctioned several Chinese companies over alleged intelligence support for Iran.
Chinese military support
In April 2026, CNN cited U.S. intelligence sources who said China was considering supplying Iran with portable air-defense missiles through third countries. CBS News later reported that Beijing may also have examined providing X-band radar systems that could improve Iran’s ability to detect stealth aircraft and incoming missiles.
Reuters citing documents reportedly linked to the Iranian military, also reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had obtained a high-resolution reconnaissance satellite manufactured and launched by a Chinese company in 2024. The satellite may have been used to monitor military targets across the Middle East and assist in planning potential strikes.
Other reporting has focused on dual-use technology. Reuters previously cited U.S. officials who accused a major Chinese chipmaker of providing semiconductor-related technology to Iran’s military establishment. Separate reports said U.S. forces intercepted an Iranian vessel returning from China that allegedly carried equipment with both civilian and military applications.
A partnership of convenience
Iran’s value to Beijing rests on three main factors: access to discounted energy, proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, and its ability to keep the United States militarily engaged in the Middle East. Roughly one-fifth of global oil shipments typically pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Even without fully closing the waterway, Iran can raise shipping costs and oil prices through the threat of missiles, mines, fast boats, and drones.
That is the essence of Reisinezhad’s “tactical tool” argument: Iran may be unable to defeat the United States, but it can impose prolonged and costly demands on American military power.
Still, Beijing must maintain distance. China has deepened ties with Iran while simultaneously expanding energy and investment partnerships with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and other Gulf states. Openly joining Iran’s side would risk U.S. sanctions, damage Beijing’s regional relationships, and threaten its own energy security.
The China-Iran relationship is therefore best understood as an unequal partnership of convenience, says Reisinezhad. Iran needs China’s oil market, technology, and diplomatic support. China needs Iran to constrain the United States, but does not appear willing to bear the full cost of defending the Iranian government.
Reisinezhad’s assessment reflects the hard logic behind that relationship: Beijing does not want the United States to prevail, but neither does it want Iran to collapse. An Iran capable of draining U.S. resources without triggering an uncontrollable regional war may best serve China’s strategic interests.
