By Li Jingyao, Vision Times
The annual Beidaihe meeting has begun — and speculation is swirling over whether leadership reshuffles are on the agenda this year. Independent commentator Du Zheng, who writes for “Up Media”, cited Beijing sources with close ties to senior officials as saying that the gathering is discussing major personnel changes, including the possible departure of current Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
According to the source, Xi, a seasoned player in political power struggles, has been negotiating with rival factions and has floated the conditions for his stepping down.
Bargaining over power
Du Zheng reported that the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee is expected to carry “hidden” agenda items, including the principles of leadership succession — and perhaps the most sensitive question: whether Xi will step down, when he might do so, whether the transition will be immediate or phased, what form his departure will take, and how his successor will be arranged. “But all of this,” he noted, “will first be settled at the Beidaihe meeting, then rubber-stamped at the Fourth Plenum.”
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According to Du’s source, Xi is far from a leader who would surrender easily. “He has been bargaining with his political opponents, offering to step down as General Secretary in exchange for retaining the post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission — much like Deng Xiaoping did in his day.”
The precedent goes back to the 12th Central Committee’s Fourth Plenary Session in 1985, when Hu Yaobang served as General Secretary, and a member of the Politburo Standing Committeewhile, Deng Xiaoping, although ranked third in the Politburo Standing Committee in the power hierarchy, as military chief, controlled the armed forces and was the CCP’s true power broker.
However, the Beijing insider noted that if Xi were to give up the Party’s top post but keep the military chairmanship, the role would be largely symbolic — Xi’s authority could not match Deng’s. Even with such an arrangement, the source said, as part of a leadership transition deal, Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia might retire voluntarily, effectively “going down together” with Xi. His replacement could still be someone from Zhang’s network, since Xi’s influence in the military has eroded and many of his loyalists have already been purged.
The source argued that such a shift would not threaten the Party’s survival: “The CCP is a coalition of vested interests. As long as the Party stands, its factions will continue to use one another.”
Independent political commentator Cai Shenkun agreed that the most likely topic at this year’s Beidaihe gathering is the Fourth Plenum. He added that even if the meeting were purely for rest and leisure, Party elders would still be briefed on recent Politburo decisions, the “15th Five-Year” national economic plan, and the handling of top generals Miao Hua and He Weidong.
However, Cai Shenkun believes that this meeting likely did not include discussions about the 21st Party Congress or whether Xi Jinping would seek another term.
A political earthquake?
According to sources cited by Du Zheng, the upcoming September 3rd military parade is more of a public show than a genuine display of military control — Xi’s presence at the parade does not necessarily signify a firm grip over the armed forces. The real turning point, they say, could come in October at the Fourth Plenary Session, where unexpected “leadership reshuffles” and “up-or-down” personnel changes might emerge. That meeting will also serve as a bellwether for whether the 2027 Party leadership transition will proceed smoothly.
One scenario, the sources speculate, would be if Xi Jinping were to suddenly and unexpectedly relinquish all his powers — a move that could signal the start of an internal revolution. Xi’s successor, they warn, could be even more ruthless, potentially igniting a popular uprising and hastening the collapse of the Chinese Communist regime.
Du Zheng noted another unusual development: during visits to Henan in May and Shanxi in July, Xi did not inspect any military units. In the past, such regional tours often included barracks visits, reinforcing his image of “holding the gun” for self-protection. The omission this time, Du suggests, is striking.
While many remain skeptical that China — despite its mounting crises — could experience a sudden political upheaval given its powerful stability-maintenance apparatus, Du points out that the Soviet Union collapsed almost overnight. History, he says, has shown that entrenched assumptions can be overturned in an instant, and observers should keep an open mind.
Commentator Li Dayu, summarizing the leaks, outlined two possible trajectories for China’s political future: 1. Xi steps down as Party General Secretary but nominally retains the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission; Or, 2. Xi is forcibly removed and replaced by another leader — a change that could accelerate the CCP’s path toward collapse.
Shifts in Beijing’s power structure
Since rumors emerged from last year’s Third Plenum that Xi had collapsed from a stroke, signs of change in his grip on power have multiplied. State media has quietly begun a process of “de-Xi-ification” — removing the slogan “2442” and other loyalty pledges to Xi, sidelining his closest allies through purges and disappearances, and showing him absent from a growing list of major political occasions.
When this year’s Beidaihe meeting began, Politburo Standing Committee member and Central Secretariat chief Cai Qi visited vacationing experts in the resort town on August 3. Analysts comparing his remarks to those of previous years detected subtle but telling changes. U.S.-based commentator Chen Pokong noted that Cai’s phrasing had shifted from emphasizing “Xi Jinping personally” to “the Party Central Committee.”
Given that Cai is one of Xi’s most trusted lieutenants, such word choice is seen as a deliberate signal — a sign that the CCP is moving away from one-man rule toward collective leadership. Chen argued that this represents a major setback for Xi since the Third Plenum, regardless of whether he steps down at the Fourth Plenum.
On shaky ground
Commentator Li Yanming echoed that the change in Cai’s rhetoric mirrors broader shifts at the top of the Party. It aligns with reports that, after Xi’s health scare at the Third Plenum, state and military media began downplaying his “supreme” status while spotlighting the Party Central Committee and the principle of collective leadership.
The contrast was especially stark on July 7, the 88th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. In Beijing, a high-profile commemoration was attended by senior leaders and presided over by Cai Qi, who delivered the keynote speech and declared the related exhibition open. Xi Jinping, however, was absent — instead traveling to the remote city of Yangquan in Shanxi Province to lay a wreath at the Hundred Regiments Offensive memorial and tour its museum.
Xi’s Shanxi visit was notably low-key. He was accompanied by only six officials: Tang Fangyu, deputy director of the Central Policy Research Office; Meng Xiangfeng, executive deputy director of the Central Office; Shanxi party chief Tang Dengjie; Vice Premier He Lifeng; Shanxi governor Lu Dongliang; and National Development and Reform Commission head Zheng Shanjie.
By contrast, Cai’s Beijing event drew a heavyweight roster that included multiple vice-national-level leaders: Wang Yi, Li Shulei, Zhang Youxia, Wang Xiaohong, Zhang Qingwei, Wu Zhenglong, Wang Yong, and CMC member Liu Zhenli.
Commentator Tang Jingyuan also pointed out the most conspicuous absence from Xi’s side — Central Military Commission vice chairman Zhang Youxia, who, by protocol, would normally accompany Xi on such commemorations. Instead, Zhang appeared in Beijing alongside Cai. To Tang, this signals that Zhang is now “standing with Cai Qi,” suggesting an emerging alliance within the Party’s top ranks.
