Bu Yu Tong, Vision Times
At the end of September, the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo announced the dates for the Fourth Plenary Session slated for Oct. 20-23. But buried within Xinhua’s official communiqué was a familiar, seemingly-innocuous line: “The meeting also discussed other matters.”
To seasoned China-watchers, that phrase is anything but trivial as it has long served as a coded signal of political upheaval within the Party. This time, it may point to a power shift within the top ranks of China’s military. Growing signs suggest that General Zhang Youxia, the veteran vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), is consolidating control in an effort to weaken and oust current leader Xi Jinping. One of his protégés could also soon replace He Weidong as the CMC’s second vice chairman, experts note.
Hidden signals in Party rhetoric
In short, Zhang’s faction within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) appears ascendant — while Xi’s loyalists are being swept aside in a widening internal purge.
Success
You are now signed up for our newsletter
Success
Check your email to complete sign up
Understanding the coded language of CCP communications is essential. The phrase “discussed other matters” has often preceded major political purges in recent years.
For example, on June 30, 2024, the Politburo used this exact wording — and the very next day, Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui, one of Xi’s close allies, was abruptly removed. Earlier that month, another Politburo meeting with identical phrasing foreshadowed the expulsion of two former defense ministers, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe.
Liu Zhenli steps into the spotlight
During the Politburo’s collective study session on Sept. 29, analysts notied that General Liu Zhenli, Chief of the CMC’s Joint Staff Department, was in attendance. Liu had recently accompanied Xi on a high-profile visit to Xinjiang, serving as deputy leader of the delegation.
His sudden rise in visibility is no coincidence, experts note. With Xi’s confidants He Weidong and Miao Hua still absent from public view, Liu’s reemergence suggests shifting alliances at the top of the military hierarchy.
Liu also shares deep ties with Zhang Youxia. Both men are veterans of China’s 1980s border war with Vietnam — a shared legacy that now defines one of the PLA’s most powerful factions.
The rise of the ‘Vietnam war faction‘
As a 22-year-old soldier, Liu Zhenli fought in the 1986 Laoshan campaign as part of the 112th Division’s reconnaissance battalion under the Lanzhou Military Region. Zhang Youxia, meanwhile, led the 119th Regiment of the 14th Army during the earlier 1984 Two Mountains Campaign.
Today, the two belong to what analysts call the “Vietnam War Faction,” while the sidelined generals He Weidong and Miao Hua are part of the “Taiwan Strait Faction.”
Most of Liu’s key promotions — from group army commander to Army Chief of Staff, then to Army Commander and finally to Chief of the Joint Staff — occurred under Zhang’s watch as vice chairman of the CMC. Their careers have been intertwined for decades, built on trust and battlefield camaraderie.
Now, with He Weidong and Miao Hua out of the picture, Liu’s ascent looks all but assured, especially as Zhang consolidates power within the PLA.
Factional purge within the military
In July 2024, the CMC issued a new set of “Regulations” containing a rare and chilling phrase: “Completely eradicate the poisonous influence.” The directive marked the beginning of a sweeping purge.
A series of PLA Daily commentaries soon confirmed that factional infighting was tearing through the ranks. Political officers were warned not to be “ambiguous on major political issues,” and never to “speak with two tongues or wear two faces.”
In Party-speak, this was a demand for total loyalty. Officers were being forced to declare allegiance — either to Xi’s faction, led by Miao Hua and He Weidong, or to their rivals. One September editorial made the subtext explicit: “In the face of major issues, one must dare to draw the sword and engage in struggle.”
To those familiar with CCP rhetoric, such language exposes a deep internal divide — and the leadership’s reliance on fear to enforce ideological conformity.
Contradicting messaging in the PLA’s mouthpiece
The contradictions in PLA Daily have become increasingly visible. Some articles still lavish praise on Xi Jinping, while others choose to omit his name altogether.
In May 2024, the elite 82nd Group Army issued a statement declaring absolute loyalty “to the Party,” but not to Xi personally. The author, Zhao Zhiguo — political director of the 80th Combined Brigade under the Central Theater Command — commands one of the PLA’s most powerful units.
That omission sent shockwaves through the military. The same unit repeated the pattern on August 25 in an article titled “The Light of Honor Illuminates the Path of Transformation.” It spoke of reform and morale — yet again, made no mention of Xi.
This silence stands in sharp contrast to earlier years, when PLA Daily frequently ran headlines like “Xi Jinping: I Have Always Paid Close Attention to the PLA Daily.”
The “four major crimes” of Miao Hua
In late July, a bombshell article appeared on the WeChat account (a popular chat and blogging app in China) Huashan Qiong Jian, operated by the China Military Culture Forum — an organization with deep links to the PLA’s former General Political Department.
The piece, titled “Shocking Report: Purging Miao Hua’s Poison — Political Cadres Must Undergo a Bone-Cutting Self-Revolution,” openly accused Miao Hua of four major offenses within the government:
- Hypocrisy and factionalism: Preaching “absolute loyalty” while forming political cliques.
- Abuse of power: Promoting cronies and punishing dissenters.
- Building personal empires: Creating “small circles and mini-kingdoms” within the military hierarchy in an attempt to consolidate power.
- Corruption: Turning military authority into a marketplace for bribes, kickbacks, rank sales, and personal enrichment.
The tone was scathing. Miao Hua — long seen as Xi’s top political operator in the military — was portrayed as a man of “false loyalty” and unchecked ambition. Yet surprisingly, the article never mentioned Xi by name.
An indirect attack on Xi himself
The article’s conclusion presented the purge as moral rehabilitation rather than punishment:
“To purge Miao Hua’s poison is not to persecute individuals, but to save them — to restore the credibility of political work and the health of the PLA’s political ecosystem.”
For years, Party propaganda credited Xi Jinping with “saving the army.” Now, a military-linked outlet implied the opposite — that the PLA’s political environment had deteriorated under his watch and required “salvation.”
In truth, the so-called “toxic legacy” of Miao Hua is a byproduct of Xi’s own personnel strategy. His loyalists built the very networks now being condemned. Thus, to purge Miao Hua’s poison is, in essence, purging Xi’s poison, says
