By Cai Xia, Vision Times
On Oct. 25, former Central Party School professor Cai Xia — a veteran insider with knowledge of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) inner workings — made a shocking revelation on her program “Fangfei Time.” Cai disclosed that Miao Hua and He Weidong, both senior officers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), had secretly established an independent military unit in Langfang, Hebei Province, completely detached from China’s existing theater commands, regional forces, and the formal PLA hierarchy.
Though the unit was classified as deputy division level, Cai said its equipment and resources matched that of a deputy army corps, a “low-rank, high-resourced model” receiving far more funding and hardware than its official designation justified.
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“The chain of command for this unit is highly unusual,” said Cai, adding, “It answers directly to Miao Hua and He Weidong — and accepts no orders from any other PLA or CCP military institutions.”
‘Xi’s private army’
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Cai also emphasized that she had learned of the secret unit years earlier through multiple internal channels but had refrained from public disclosure out of caution. “The purpose of this unit is self-evident,” she explained during her program. “It was created by Miao and He as a personal armed force tailored for Xi Jinping — essentially, Xi’s ‘private army.’ Its location in Langfang was chosen for its proximity to Beijing, allowing it to be rapidly deployed for Xi’s personal protection and political security.”
Cai’s credibility as a source stems from her background: Born into a “red second generation” family, she underwent military training in her youth before teaching for decades at the CCP’s Central Party School, where she specialized in Party history. Her extensive connections within the system gave her access to sensitive information from “high-level insiders.”
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Cai’s revelation coincides with a swirl of rumors circulating online about nine generals — including Miao Hua and He Weidong — allegedly plotting to unseat Zhang Youxia, one of the CCP’s most powerful military figures. She argued that these claims lend the story greater plausibility and help illuminate the tangled web of rival factions and betrayals shaping the Party’s inner power struggle.
The paradox of Xi’s power
If current leader Xi Jinping truly holds absolute control over the military — as his image projects — why would he need Miao Hua and He Weidong to form an extra-legal, independent armed force? China’s existing security network is already vast and multilayered, noted Cai, including:
- The Central Guard Bureau handles Xi’s personal protection
- The Beijing Garrison Command oversees capital defense
- The Central Security Bureau manages special operations
- The PLA’s five theater commands, regional forces, and paramilitary police all report ultimately to Xi as CMC chairman.
With such extensive apparatus, “there is no rational need to create an additional force,” Cai notes. This means the very existence of a secret army suggests not security, but deep mistrust and fear within the system itself.
More puzzling, if the force was indeed established, why did the regime later purge its own creators When nine generals were officially dismissed on Oct. 17, Miao Hua and He Weidong were among the ones included. Yet both had been personally promoted by Xi and were regarded as core members of his “31st Group Army” faction — the so-called “Xi Family Army.”
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Their removal, therefore, contradicts the narrative that they had turned against Xi, notes Cai. At the time, Xi’s primary targets for purges were officers aligned with Zhang Youxia’s faction — not his own. “If Miao and He were Xi’s loyalists,” Cai asks, “Why would they rebel against the very man who elevated them?”
The only reasonable explanation, she continues, may lie in Xi’s growing “paranoia and isolation.” Even loyalists risk being branded as traitors once they accumulate power. Curiously, the Chinese military and state media have downplayed or concealed news of Miao and He’s downfall.
The scandal first surfaced through overseas commentators, then was reluctantly confirmed by the Ministry of National Defense — while Party-controlled outlets have maintained silence. This secrecy, Cai’s program notes, “reveals how fragmented the power structure has become.”
Reaping what is sown
On July 21, 2025, the PLA’s official newspaper the “People’s Liberation Army Daily” published an article titled “On Vigorously Promoting Fine Traditions and Completely Cleansing Residual Poison.” It announced new rules to “rebuild the reputation of political cadres” — yet conspicuously avoided naming whose “poison” was being cleansed. “Can such vague language truly help Xi consolidate power within the military?” Cai asked. “It seems doubtful.”
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When Xi first rose to power, his political purges were bold and public — the removals of Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, Zhou Yongkang, and Bo Xilai were trumpeted as victories against corruption. Mao Zedong’s earlier purges of Peng Dehuai and Lin Biao were even more dramatic, mobilizing mass movements and nationwide propaganda campaigns in order to quickly consolidate power.
By contrast, today’s PLA purges are more quiet and vague, suggesting that Xi no longer commands the same control or confidence. Moreover, the backgrounds of Miao Hua and He Weidong differ sharply from Mao’s rivals. They are not military strongmen with independent bases of power, but career loyalists who advanced through flattery and obedience.
“Without Xi’s patronage,” Cai notes, “Miao Hua and He Weidong could never have entered the CMC. The idea that they would organize a coup against him defies all logic.”
Instead, the program proposes a different possibility: Miao and He may have formed the Langfang-based force to protect Xi, specifically as a counterweight to Zhang Youxia’s 82nd Group Army stationed in nearby Baoding. If so, Zhang may have used this move against them — branding their actions as rebellion to eliminate his rivals and weaken Xi in the process.
A widening rift
The recent promotion of Zhang Shengmin, head of the military’s disciplinary commission, to vice chairman of the CMC further illustrates the crisis. Strikingly, Zhang was not appointed to the Politburo (China’s top ruling body), signaling that Xi made the move out of necessity rather than strength.
Zhang Youxia’s apparent success in his so-called “palace coup,” analysts say, means Xi’s real control over the military has effectively collapsed — though he still retains his political titles. But at the same time, the new Central Committee lineup conspicuously omits replacements from the military, a move interpreted as a sign of growing separation between the Party and the gun. “The Party can no longer command the gun — and the gun can no longer command the Party,” says Cai.
According to Cai’s analysis, the CCP now faces a fractured power dynamic:
- The Party, represented by Xi, has lost direct control of the military.
- The military, dominated by Zhang Youxia and senior elders, seeks stability but resists Xi’s centralization.
- This uneasy balance, Cai warns, “cannot hold” for an indefinite amount of time.
“The rivalry between Zhang and Xi is irreconcilable — a struggle of life and death,” said Cai during the segment. “When their fragile compromise breaks, the regime’s collapse will no longer be gradual but explosive.”
The revelations of a “private army,” the disappearance of loyal generals, and the muted response from state media together paint a picture of a Party divided against itself. While Xi retains his titles, his actual control appears to be slipping — not through a single coup, but through a slow erosion of authority.
“The deeper crisis is structural,” Cai notes, adding, “A Party that once claimed to control the gun now finds its gun unwilling to obey.”
