The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee concluded with no major reshuffling of top leadership. Xi Jinping retained his three formal titles—Party General Secretary, State President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC)—signaling, at least on the surface, that his dominance remains unchallenged.
But political observers say the façade of unity masks deep fractures. Xi’s once iron grip over personnel appointments appears to be eroding, his path to re-election faces new obstacles, and even the Party’s propaganda machinery—long the core pillar of his rule—is showing signs of rebellion.
Veteran media analyst Wang Jian noted that the most telling indicator of Xi’s waning influence lies in the recent appointment of Zhang Shengmin as Vice Chairman of the CMC—a position that effectively places Zhang Youxia to Xi’s left and Zhang Shengmin to his right, leaving Xi symbolically isolated in the center.
“Under normal circumstances, Xi would have fought tooth and nail to block Zhang Shengmin’s promotion,” Wang said. “The fact that he failed means the forces behind Zhang Shengmin are now more powerful than Xi himself. This marks a serious weakening of Xi’s control over personnel decisions.”
According to Wang, the decline of Xi’s personnel power began last year. His network within the military and diplomatic corps—once dominated by officers from the 31st Army Group—has largely disintegrated. Nine generals have recently fallen in corruption probes, effectively wiping out the 31st Army’s presence from the senior ranks.
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“Xi failed to protect Miao Hua and He Weidong, his key allies in the military,” Wang added. “Once his control over the military cracked, the entire foundation of his power collapsed.”
A commentary in the Renminbao reinforced this view, noting that while Xi continues to hold the three top titles, his ability to command the armed forces has eroded. Zhang Shengmin—head of the CMC’s Discipline Inspection Commission—was instrumental in investigating generals loyal to Xi, with Zhang Youxia’s backing. Now, with Zhang’s promotion to Vice Chairman, the two form a tandem that effectively sidelines Xi.
Analysts say Xi’s decision to tolerate the arrangement reflects a forced compromise—a tactical retreat to preserve appearances of unity and avoid triggering a full-scale institutional crisis.
Diplomatic system nearing collapse
Wang Jian also noted that Xi’s weakening authority extends to the diplomatic arena. The downfall of Qin Gang, once Xi’s trusted protégé and foreign minister, carried deep symbolic weight. “Xi failed to protect Qin Gang—and by extension, failed to protect his own image,” Wang said.
Another key figure, Liu Jianchao, who rose alongside Qin under Xi’s patronage, is also reportedly sidelined. “Xi can’t protect everyone,” Wang observed. “He controls the surface, but not the system. The machinery beneath him is breaking down.”
In Wang’s assessment, Xi’s one-man rule persists institutionally but lacks operational capacity: “He maintains the form of absolute control, but the function is collapsing.”
The abrupt removal of Zhong Shaojun, former Political Commissar of the National Defense University and Xi’s long-time military aide, further exposed fissures in Xi’s command network.
Zhong, who served as Xi’s personal secretary during his early years in Zhejiang and later as Director of the CMC General Office, was quietly reassigned in 2024 to the National Defense University. The public first learned of his replacement not through official Chinese media but through an unusual “reverse leak” from abroad.
On Oct. 25, the Chinese Embassy in North Korea announced on its official website that a delegation led by Lieutenant General Xia Zhihui, now identified as the new Political Commissar of the National Defense University, attended a reception in Pyongyang commemorating the 75th anniversary of the PLA’s overseas operations.
This disclosure—originating outside China’s domestic propaganda channels—effectively confirmed Zhong’s removal.
U.S.-based commentator Chen Pokong said the CCP is attempting to downplay these internal purges to preserve Xi’s prestige. “All three of Xi’s top military secretaries—Qin Shengxiang, Zhong Shaojun, and Fang Yongxiang—are gone,” Chen noted. “Add to that the purge of generals Xi personally promoted, and his military influence has collapsed. His inner circle is dismantled.”
Censorship and propaganda department ‘mutiny’
When Xinhua News Agency republished the embassy’s report, references to Xia Zhihui’s new title and Zhong Shaojun’s absence were quietly deleted.
Commentator Jiang Feng said this censorship reveals the propaganda system’s internal contradictions. The Publicity Department under Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi appears torn between obeying Xi’s directives and managing political damage control.
“The strategy is to obscure and understate,” Jiang said. “They want to minimize attention to the fact that Xi’s most trusted military aide has been removed. For Xi, this is a personal humiliation—and hard proof that he no longer controls the military.”
But Jiang argues that the incident also exposes something more alarming: fragmentation within the propaganda system itself.
“The Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang—technically under the Foreign Ministry—just fired the first shot of defiance against the Party’s unified narrative,” Jiang said. “That means Beijing’s messaging chain of command is no longer unified. That’s the real story.”
According to Jiang, this “defection” within the propaganda apparatus is the clearest evidence yet that Xi’s authority is fracturing—and that the Party’s information control system, once its most cohesive weapon, is beginning to unravel.
Re-election drive stalls, power rebalancing underway
Wang Jian describes China’s current political climate as “stable at the top, fractured in the middle, chaotic at the base.” On paper, Xi’s supreme status remains intact, but in practice, his ability to steer the Party machinery is weakening.
“For more than a decade, Xi’s one-man system was sustained by absolute control over the military,” Wang explained. “But after this mass purge and Zhang Shengmin’s rise to Vice Chairman, the armed forces are no longer Xi’s power base. He may still hold the title of CMC Chairman, but the military is no longer his army.”
This shift, Wang said, has produced a “structural stalemate” in elite politics: Xi retains symbolic authority but faces mounting institutional pushback.
Former Central Party School professor Cai Xia echoed this view, noting that Xi’s health troubles during the Third Plenum allowed Zhang Youxia to expand his influence and secure disciplinary actions against nine generals before the Fourth Plenum convened. “By the time the session opened, the decisions were already locked in,” Cai said.
However, she added, the new arrangement represents a “balance of terror.” Zhang Shengmin’s elevation to Vice Chairman without a Politburo seat signals that neither faction can fully dominate. “Both sides are forced to coexist, each fearing the other’s collapse would drag the system down.”
Wang Jian concluded that Xi’s re-election push is now in limbo. “He controls the surface but not the system,” Wang said. “Institutional counterforces are reorganizing. This rebalancing of power will define the next phase of Chinese politics.”
By Li Jingyao
