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Is Xi Jinping Losing Control? Insider Analyses Reveal How China’s Leader Could Be Forced to Step Down

Published: October 31, 2025
China's President Xi Jinping walks to the Monument to the People's Heroes during a wreath laying ceremony to honour deceased national heroes on Martyrs' Day in Beijing's Tiananmen Square on Sept. 30, 2025. (Image: Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)

As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) concludes its Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, the official communiqué once again reaffirmed “unity around the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core.”

Yet beneath this façade of loyalty, reports of infighting and internal rebalancing continue to ripple through Beijing’s top ranks.

Former CCP Central Party School professor Cai Xia predicts that a confrontation between Xi and the Party establishment is now “inevitable but not necessarily bloody,” suggesting that a “graceful exit” could ultimately end his rule.

Japanese political commentator Yaita Akio, meanwhile, outlines three potential paths to Xi’s downfall—from a health collapse to public unrest—arguing that China’s leadership has entered a period of structural instability.

Cai Xia: Xi’s showdown with the Party Is inevitable

Speaking on the BuMingBai Podcast, Cai argued that Xi’s one-man rule has reached its internal limits.

She foresees a behind-the-scenes alliance of Party elders and military figures quietly maneuvering to remove him while maintaining stability.

Cai traced the current impasse to the CCP’s internal power hierarchy, which she described as “power submitting to power.”

When Xi rose to power in 2012, retired leaders like Jiang Zemin saw him as obedient and nonthreatening. His early anti-corruption campaign targeted rivals while sparing elder networks.

But twelve years later, Xi’s accumulation of authority has hollowed out the military, triggered economic crisis, and isolated China diplomatically.

Cai believes that Party elders, fearing the collapse of the entire system, are now seeking a nonviolent internal transition to remove Xi.

The struggle between Xi and Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia has become, in Cai’s view, the regime’s most dangerous fault line.

Xi’s 2023 purge of Rocket Force officers, the detention of Li Shangfu, and sweeping corruption probes were designed to weaken Zhang’s power base.

Yet these purges backfired—creating what Cai calls a “balance of terror.”

Xi dares not move against Zhang for fear of military backlash, while Zhang cannot depose Xi without risking regime collapse.

If the army’s loyalty wavers, Cai predicts, the elders will seize the opportunity to force Xi’s retreat.

Public dissent and global pressure

At home, discontent is spreading despite censorship.

From the 2022 Peng Zaizhou bridge protest and the White Paper Movement, to the projection of anti-regime slogans in Chongqing, Jinan, and Wuhan in 2025, dissent is surfacing in creative new forms.

Abroad, Xi’s militarism and global posturing have provoked stronger Western unity. The U.S. and Europe are boosting defense budgets, expanding aid to Ukraine, and strengthening bipartisan consensus on defending Taiwan.

Cai argues that these external pressures will accelerate the CCP’s internal unraveling.

According to Cai, Xi’s early rise relied on elder patronage because he appeared “simple and compliant.”

Jiang Zemin and others supported him as a controllable successor, assuming he posed no threat. His selective anti-corruption purge punished political enemies but spared elder interests, reinforcing the Party’s culture of silence—where subordinates were purged, but superiors remained indifferent.

But as Xi consolidated power, the system hollowed out beneath him. Cai said Xi’s dominance has produced a vacuum at the top of the military, an economy pushing citizens toward revolt, and deep international isolation.

Fearing that Xi’s misrule could destroy the Party itself, elders have begun to quietly rein him in.

Cai emphasized that “the gun remains the key.”

Before 2018, no one could challenge Xi’s authority. But by 2023, as the People’s Liberation Army began showing signs of independence, Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia—acting out of self-preservation—started restraining Xi’s influence.

Meanwhile, lower-level cadres remain immobilized by the CCP’s surveillance apparatus, the “cutting-the-top” political culture that sidelines capable officials, and harsh disciplinary codes introduced in 2016 that punish even family members of the accused.

Cai noted Xi’s recurring pattern of “using allies to destroy rivals, then turning on those same allies,” citing examples such as Liu Yuan and Wang Qishan, whose fates have made Zhang Youxia cautious.

The elders, she said, could exploit Zhang’s control of the military to engineer an internal breakthrough.

Cai also portrayed Xi as someone who “bullies the weak and fears the strong.”

She cited anecdotes from the 1960s, when Xi allegedly fled neighborhood fights, as evidence of his instinct to avoid confrontation.

Even trusted subordinates like Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong may desert him once his position weakens—“when the tree falls, the monkeys scatter.”

If elders and the military apply coordinated pressure, Cai believes, Xi would likely opt for a “graceful exit” rather than fight to the end.

Finally, Cai argues that Xi’s obsession is not money but fame and absolute power.

“He seeks not wealth, but immortality,” she said—an ambition to be remembered as a “sovereign for the ages.”

His lavish parades, inviting 26 foreign delegations, were designed to showcase his vision of a “community of shared future for mankind”—a euphemism for reshaping world order.

Cai recalled that in 2012, reformist economist Du Runsheng advised Xi to choose between political reform and war with Taiwan. Xi, believing that “war would be easier,” chose the latter—revealing his long-held hegemonic ambition.

Cai concludes that Xi’s downfall will likely come through an internal maneuver between Party elders and the military, not a violent coup.

She identifies three converging forces: a loosening military under Zhang Youxia, pressure from retired elites, and deepening economic and diplomatic crises.

Handled carefully, Xi might be persuaded to step down peacefully. If not, China could face a destabilizing political rupture.

Yaita Akio: Three scenarios for Xi’s fall

Japanese commentator Yaita Akio offers three plausible scenarios for Xi’s collapse—ranked from most to least likely.

1. Health Breakdown (Most Likely)

Xi’s physical condition, Yaita notes, appears increasingly fragile—two cups (one for water, one for herbal medicine) at meetings, long absences, and rumors of surgery. Though Xi and Putin publicly joke about “living to 150,” Yaita believes his health may fail before his ambitions do.

2. Assassination (Possible but Unlikely)

Xi’s sweeping purges have created enemies across the military. While his security detail remains tight, “no ruler can guard against betrayal forever.” If a faction like Zhang Youxia’s tacitly allows action, Yaita says, success becomes possible—but still improbable.

3. Popular Uprising (Potential Threat)

Economic decline could ignite unrest. The 2022 White Paper Revolution was an early tremor; a broader wave of discontent—akin to Romania’s 1989 uprising—could see disillusioned officials defect to anti-Xi factions. Prolonged economic decay, he warns, may turn this from theory into reality.

Different timelines, same destination

While Cai envisions a negotiated retreat, Yaita warns of sudden collapse.Both agree that Xi’s regime is stable only on the surface.

Beneath lies an exhausted structure—fractured elites, disillusioned officers, and a restless society.

Whether through calculated transition or abrupt crisis, both analysts see the same outcome: the Xi era is entering irreversible decline.

Both Cai and Yaita identify 2023 as the pivotal year when China’s internal balance of power shifted.

Zhang Youxia’s cautious resistance marked the first limit on Xi’s control over the military.

The purge of nine generals, worsening economic headwinds, and Western backlash after China’s military parade convinced Party elders that Xi himself had become the Party’s greatest liability.

Cai argues that the next stage will depend on how long the system’s survival instinct can override Xi’s personal ambitions.

If economic deterioration and public anger continue, Yaita warns, internal defection and external pressure could converge, triggering an uncontrollable implosion.

By Yin Hua