According to the latest reports from British media, the Chinese transnational criminal organization “Prince Group” and its mastermind Chen Zhi have a complex relationship with China’s national security agencies, and are allegedly involved in potential disruptive activities worldwide, particularly in Taiwan. Under Chen Zhi’s leadership, the Prince Group engages in fraud, money laundering, and human trafficking, and has consequently faced sanctions from the UK and the U.S.
The UK Times cited former U.S. intelligence officer David Sauer, who has extensive experience in East Asia, reporting that Communist Chinese intelligence agencies sometimes use Chinese criminal organizations for operations, and Chen Zhi’s Prince Group is a prime example. “Several incidents occurred within Taiwan, and they may have instigated harassment of others,” Sauer noted.
The rise of the Prince Group and its criminal empire
Chen Zhi, a businessman from China also known as Vincent Chen, underwent a rapid transformation over a few short years. According to whistleblower Cliff Teo, a Singaporean Chinese who previously handled his accounts, Chen Zhi first met Teo in 2014 as a modest businessman in a T-shirt and jeans. By then, Chen Zhi had acquired Cambodian citizenship and owned a small internet services company in Phnom Penh, but ambitiously sought to establish a subsidiary in Singapore to obtain residency. Just three years later, Chen had reinvented himself as a wealthy, well-dressed man in Cambodia, with ostentatious properties and branded attire, his wealth and influence growing exponentially.
Under Chen Zhi, the Prince Group rapidly expanded its criminal network, engaging in large-scale fraud, complex money laundering, and appalling human trafficking. These operations not only generated immense wealth for the group but caused severe, irreparable harm to victims. The group operated with high secrecy and professionalism, moving funds through offshore companies and bank accounts to evade international law enforcement.
Cliff Teo, who previously managed accounts for the Prince Group, was instructed to set up dozens of companies and offshore bank accounts in Taiwan, illustrating the group’s extensive financial reach, including in Taiwan. He claimed never to have directly handled the money or participated in criminal acts, but while preparing financial reports, he noticed large sums frequently flowed into accounts totaling $300 million, with unclear destinations—an alarming discovery that prompted his departure. These mysterious fund flows represent only the tip of the iceberg of the Prince Group’s laundering network and highlight the scale of its criminal operations.
Complex relationship with Chinese security agencies: A double-edged sword
Success
You are now signed up for our newsletter
Success
Check your email to complete sign up
David Sauer pointed out that Chinese intelligence agencies indeed sometimes utilize criminal groups, with Chen Zhi’s Prince Group serving as a clear example. Similar tactics have been observed in Europe, where authorities use criminal groups for harassment, sabotage, surveillance, or money laundering to fund official espionage. International attention has been drawn to similar activities by Chinese authorities.
The Times quoted a former Chinese intelligence officer, using the pseudonym Eric, who witnessed Chen Zhi in Phnom Penh lavishly hosting Chinese intelligence officials at clubs and requesting their assistance. This demonstrates Chen Zhi’s willingness to connect with state intelligence agencies to protect or leverage resources for the group’s benefit.
Eric stated that Chinese intelligence used the Prince Group’s hacker capabilities to target dissidents, showing that the group’s technical resources were co-opted for state-level political purposes. The U.S. government has also accused the Prince Group of bribing officials in China’s Ministry of Public Security and National Security Department to shield its “business” from interference. These allegations paint a picture of the Prince Group not merely as a criminal organization but as an entity potentially in a symbiotic relationship with state intelligence, with some activities tacitly approved or assisted by authorities.
However, Chen Zhi’s relationship with the Chinese state is not without risk. Despite protection and resources, he faces potential retaliation. Cliff Teo noted that Chen Zhi and associates had previously feared being “turned on” by Chinese intelligence.
The Prince Group’s global activities extend to Taiwan, an important operational area. Cliff Teo confirmed he was tasked with setting up dozens of companies and offshore bank accounts in Taiwan for the group. These entities facilitated fund transfers, asset concealment, and potentially other illicit operations in Taiwan.
More concerning, David Sauer noted, “Several incidents occurred in Taiwan, and they may have instigated harassment of others.” Although specifics were not disclosed, this aligns with the broader context: Chinese intelligence may use Chen Zhi’s group to carry out “grey zone” operations in Taiwan, blurring the line between state and non-state actions, posing risks to social stability and national security.
International sanctions and overseas asset strategy
Facing international scrutiny and sanctions, Chen Zhi turned his attention to Europe, particularly the UK. Before the UK government terminated the “investor visa” route in mid-February 2022, Chen and associates had obtained investor visas, which were intended to attract capital but may have had loopholes post-Brexit that allowed controversial figures like Chen to gain residency.
Once in the UK, Chen acquired high-value properties in London, including luxury homes and office buildings in the financial district, providing both shelter and avenues for laundering money. Some residences, purchased under relatives’ names, overlooked the U.S. Embassy in London, raising espionage concerns and suggesting potential intelligence connections.
International pursuit did not stop. In March 2025, UK police raided Prince Group-related offices in the Isle of Man during a money-laundering investigation. The island’s low taxes and lenient regulations made it a convenient location for hiding assets. Ironically, Chen reportedly departed London successfully on the same day, and his whereabouts remain unknown. In October, the UK imposed sanctions on Chen and associates, signaling zero tolerance for their criminal activities.
Whistleblower Cliff Teo
Cliff Teo, as a key whistleblower, provided critical insights into the Prince Group’s operations. Managing Chen’s vast network of offshore companies for seven years, he gained firsthand knowledge of internal operations and financial flows. Teo emphasized he never handled funds or participated in crimes but discovered suspicious fund movements totaling $300 million, typical of money-laundering operations. Alarmed, he left the group.
Teo alerted financial institutions in 2021, coinciding with Taiwanese banks tightening scrutiny on transactions related to the Prince Group. His revelations offered law enforcement crucial leads and strengthened financial oversight against suspicious transactions.
Chen diversified assets and personnel across nations, including Cambodia, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the UK, often using legal fronts to obscure illicit operations. Teo estimated Chen’s net worth at around $60 billion—likely exaggerated, but indicative of the criminal group’s immense wealth and influence.
By Yang Tianzi
