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Rumors Swirl Over Possible Fifth Plenum as Hu Chunhua, Zhang Shengmin Tipped for Politburo

Reports suggest the Chinese Communist Party may convene a Fifth Plenary Session in early 2026, potentially ushering in a major leadership reshuffle
Published: December 16, 2025
Hu Chunhua (left), a CCP Politburo Standing Committee member and vice premier, attends the closing session of the National People’s Congress with then–Chongqing Party secretary Chen Miner at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People in China. (Image: Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)

By Li Jingyao

Speculation surrounding the political fate of former Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui continues to heat up, with new claims circulating online suggesting that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may convene its Fifth Plenary Session as early as January 2026. According to these reports, Ma’s removal from power could be formally announced at the meeting.

The same sources allege that the plenum would usher in a significant reshuffle of the CCP’s top leadership, with as many as five new officials added to the CCP’s top ruling body, the Politburo, including Hu Chunhua and Zhang Shengmin. Analysts say that if confirmed, such moves would represent a direct challenge to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s inner circle, with Ma’s case viewed as an opening salvo aimed at Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan, followed by actions targeting Xi Yuanping, Xi’s younger brother.

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Claims of Hu Chunhua’s return to the Politburo

According to Jiang Wangzheng, an overseas Chinese political blogger who frequently comments on CCP elite politics on the social media platform X, the Fifth Plenum could be held on Jan. 5, 2026, and Ma Xingrui’s downfall would be formally announced at the meeting.

Jiang claimed that five officials are slated for inclusion in the Politburo: Zhang Shengmin, Chen Xiaojing, Zhao Yide, Feng Fei, and Hu Chunhua. He further alleged that Cai Qi would nominate Peng Liyuan as an alternate Politburo member — a largely symbolic position without voting power.

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Tang Jingyuan, a U.S.-based Chinese affairs analyst who closely follows CCP elite politics, noted that historically, CCP Fifth Plenums have never been held in January, raising questions about the timing. He added, however, that Ma’s removal would not necessarily require a plenum announcement.

“The speed suggests that anti-Xi party elders want to reshuffle personnel before next year’s ‘Two Sessions,’ China’s annual parliamentary meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and then formalize the changes through procedural steps,” Tang said.

He explained that real power struggles revolve around a limited number of critical posts. “Unless Xi’s core allies are cleared out to free up positions, there is no room to install new figures.”

Ma Xingrui’s connection to Peng Liyuan

Jiang’s claims include Hu Chunhua’s elevation to full Politburo membership and Peng Liyuan’s promotion to alternate status. Tang dismissed the latter scenario as politically implausible.

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Reviewing Ma Xingrui’s career trajectory, Tang argued that Ma’s rapid ascent was not primarily due to direct political overlap with Xi Jinping, but rather strong backing from Peng Liyuan. “Ma Xingrui belongs to the so-called ‘Madam faction,’ often described as the Shandong bloc. He is regarded as its standard-bearer,” Tang said.

Tang further emphasized that Ma and Peng are politically inseparable. “If a new version of the ‘Gang of Four’ narrative were ever to emerge, Peng Liyuan and Ma Xingrui would rank first and second. Investigating Ma is effectively a move against Peng.”

He added that if anti-Xi forces lacked the strength to confront Peng Liyuan directly, they would not select such a politically sensitive figure when many other corruption cases could have been pursued instead.

Peng Liyuan and Xi Yuanping’s networks

Analysts note that Xi Jinping’s core power base lies in his Fujian network and the so-called Zhejiang “New Army,” with the Tsinghua faction considered comparatively weaker. The Shaanxi hometown faction, associated with Xi’s brother Xi Yuanping, is also regarded as a key pillar of Xi’s support.

These labels are commonly used by observers to describe informal political networks built around shared regional backgrounds, career paths, or personal ties to Xi Jinping and his family, rather than formal party factions. Tang argued that Peng Liyuan’s Shandong-based network, sometimes referred to as an “inner-court faction,” is particularly influential, with reach across the party, government, and military systems.

He added anti-Xi forces began dismantling this bloc even before the Fourth Plenum, starting with Ma Xingrui, whose political troubles reportedly surfaced in July. After the Fourth Plenum, the downfall of Fang Hongwei, Party Secretary of Xi’an and an alternate member of the Central Committee, was widely interpreted as a direct strike against Xi Yuanping’s sphere of influence.

“This outlines a clear sequence,” Tang said, adding, “First Peng Liyuan’s network, then Xi Yuanping’s, and eventually the Zhejiang and Fujian factions.”

Ma Xingrui’s case expands across China

According to Jiang Wangzheng’s latest claims, Nie Zhuang, vice chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government, has been taken in for investigation in connection with Ma’s case.

Jiang also alleged that Liu Shaotang, former deputy director of the Guangzhou Public Security Bureau, was detained for illegally protecting Ma’s financial proxies. Liu was removed from his post in April this year.

These developments suggest that Ma’s case is expanding across Xinjiang, Zhejiang, and Guangdong, increasing pressure at multiple levels. Tang described Nie and Liu as “small fish,” but said their cases underscore the intensity of the power struggle unfolding behind the scenes.

He speculated that once Ma’s case is concluded, figures within the Zhejiang faction, possibly including Chen Miner, could be next. All this would unfold before attention turns to Xi Jinping’s core Fujian network, potentially leading to the unraveling of the main pillars of the so-called “Xi camp.”

Editorial note: This article is based on publicly circulating reports and commentary from independent analysts. The claims described have not been independently verified by Vision Times, and relevant authorities have not publicly confirmed the allegations.