Truth, Inspiration, Hope.

Beijing Faces Mounting Setbacks as Its Global Efforts Are Increasingly Undermined

Published: March 19, 2026
The Great Hall of the People. On Nov. 12, 2013, a police officer stands guard outside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, where the 205-member Central Committee convened its Third Plenary Session. (Image: Getty Images)

Commentary

According to a report by Reuters, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed in a briefing on Sunday morning that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army dispatched 26 military aircraft within 24 hours, appearing intensively around the Taiwan Strait.

Why had such harassment around Taiwan briefly stopped earlier? Clearly, it was to create a peaceful atmosphere for Trump’s visit to China. Now that large-scale military activity has resumed, clues can be seen from a March 14 report by Voice of America:

On Friday, March 13, the U.S. State Department welcomed progress by Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan in authorizing the Executive Yuan to proceed with signing certain Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for arms purchases with the United States. It also urged Taiwan’s political parties to set aside differences and quickly pass a special defense budget to demonstrate Taiwan’s determination to strengthen its self-defense capabilities.

From the Voice of America report, it is evident that the Trump administration is steadily advancing arms sales to enhance Taiwan’s defense capabilities and will not change course because of Trump’s visit to China. This is precisely why the Chinese Communist Party has resumed another round of intensive military aircraft activity around Taiwan. Xi Jinping’s current military actions toward Taiwan are mainly for deterrence or coercion, with a performative aspect, echoing the ongoing united front efforts in Taiwan.

Xi Jinping’s preparations for a Taiwan Strait conflict—from military reforms to purges of senior military leadership—are far from complete. In other words, a force truly loyal to Xi has not yet been fully established. Given Xi’s current capacity, what he can do is largely limited to performative deterrence against Taiwan.

No matter how Xi exhausts national resources to prepare for a Taiwan conflict in an attempt to achieve military unification, the global situation is undergoing major changes. Xi must not only face the reality of incomplete military reforms and unstable morale at home, but also the harsh reality that the Chinese Communist Party’s “axis” allies are suffering major setbacks. Even if Xi were to launch a localized war, it would be difficult to gain international support or assistance.

U.S. President Donald Trump meets his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, on Oct. 30, 2025. (Image: Screenshot via Reuters)

What does ‘Trump–Monroeism’ mean for Xi Jinping?

In Xi’s strategic vision, the core of U.S. hegemony is the dominance of the U.S. dollar, backed by military supremacy. For the renminbi to truly gain international status, China needs not only economic scale but also global military influence.

Over the past decade, Beijing has gradually rolled out an ambitious global strategy: through the Belt and Road Initiative, port investments, energy cooperation, political alliances, and control of key shipping routes, it has sought to build an international network spanning Eurasia, the Middle East, Africa, and even the Americas. Within this network, China exports both industrial capacity and governance models, gradually constructing an international community capable of competing with the Western system.

This clearly challenges the international order established by the United States since World War II and the Cold War. Trump’s response has been forceful: combining direct competition with strategic encirclement. By reemphasizing “America First” and the Monroe Doctrine—referred to by some as “Trump–Monroeism”—the U.S. has launched a series of actions in both the Americas and the Middle East. While the core objective is U.S. security, these moves have objectively delivered sustained and profound blows to Xi’s global strategy.

From the Panama Canal to Greenland: reasserting the inviolability of the Americas

First, intervention in the operation of the Panama Canal. This vital shipping route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific has long been regarded by the U.S. as central to national security. Chinese-backed enterprises had attempted to expand influence through port and logistics investments around the canal, but under U.S. political and security pressure, these projects are being curbed or restructured to prevent threats to core American interests.

Second, maritime shipping and anti-drug systems in South America. The U.S. has strengthened naval patrols, border control, and crackdowns on transnational crime, effectively remilitarizing regional waters. For China, this means its economic presence in Latin America is unlikely to translate into strategic footholds. Venezuela, once seen as a key partner, had received large Chinese loans and energy cooperation, but with its leadership removed, it is expected to be incorporated into the U.S. security system.

Cuba, heavily dependent on Venezuelan economic support, is now facing change amid an economic crisis. China’s ideological allies are heading toward collapse.

In the Arctic, the Trump administration has paid close attention to Greenland. China had attempted to enter the region through mining and infrastructure investments, but the U.S. quickly blocked key projects and secured control over critical areas through diplomacy, preventing Chinese and Russian influence. Greenland is not only a key node in future Arctic shipping routes but also vital to North American defense.

From the Panama Canal, Venezuela, and Cuba to Greenland, Trump’s actions essentially redraw America’s geopolitical security boundaries. This represents a modern version of the Monroe Doctrine and effectively blocks China from establishing strategic footholds in the Americas.

On Feb. 28, 2026, during maritime operations supporting Operation Epic Fury, the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Frank E. Peterson (DDG 121) launched a Tomahawk land-attack missile. (Image: courtesy of the U.S. Navy via Getty Images)

From the Middle East to strategic chokepoints: shrinking space for the China–Russia–Iran axis

If the Americas represent an outer extension of China’s global strategy, the Middle East is a far more critical energy and strategic hub. In Xi’s vision, Iran is a key partner. China signed long-term agreements with Iran on energy and infrastructure to secure a stable foothold in the Persian Gulf. The recent U.S.–Israel military actions against Iran aim to eliminate its nuclear and military threats. Iran may suffer severe military and economic damage, potentially leading to regime change and normalization—depriving China of a partner capable of creating instability in the region.

Meanwhile, the Russia–Ukraine war has dragged Russia into prolonged attrition. Rather than weakening the West, it has significantly reduced Russia’s own strength. China faces an awkward balancing act: unable to fully distance itself from Russia, yet unable to gain clear strategic benefits.

In South and West Asia, instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan continues to worsen. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, once a flagship Belt and Road project, now faces heightened security risks following the Taliban’s return to power, with increased activity from extremist groups undermining regional stability and posing risks to China’s strategic interests.

At the same time, changes in Japan’s security policy and enhanced defense cooperation with Taiwan have reshaped the Western Pacific. Japan has strengthened military ties with the U.S., while Taiwan continues upgrading its defense systems—including unmanned technologies—raising the cost and risks of any future Taiwan Strait conflict.

During the era of “hide your strength, bide your time,” global conditions favored China’s economic rise. But as Xi has shifted toward military expansion, preparing for potential forceful unification with Taiwan and fueling tensions in the South China Sea and Indo-Pacific, the international environment has turned increasingly unfavorable to the Chinese Communist Party.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping raises a teacup while meeting Tajik President Emomali Rahmon at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Sept. 2, 2025. Rahmon is not pictured.(Image: Parker Song – Pool / Getty Images)

A ‘great transformation’

Xi Jinping’s vision of a “great transformation unseen in a century” aimed to challenge U.S. hegemony through military expansion and global strategy, building an international order centered on China. However, reality is harsh: military reforms remain incomplete, internal cohesion is unstable, and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait is largely performative. “Trump–Monroeism” has reshaped security in the Americas and compressed China’s strategic space in the Middle East, while the China–Russia–Iran axis is weakening. Belt and Road flagship projects are faltering, and strategic footholds are collapsing one by one. As global trends reverse, Xi’s militarized ambitions are rapidly unraveling, leaving China facing deep internal and external crises.

(This article reflects only the author’s personal views and does not necessarily reflect the views of Vision Times.)