As Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-manufactured air defense weapons and other systems are put to the test amid conflicts in Venezuela and Iran, questions have emerged about their real-world performance. At the same time, observers have noted what appears to be a major shake-up within China’s military-industrial complex.
With multiple officials in the defense sector falling from power, a growing number of academicians have also been stripped of their titles by China’s top academic institutions, prompting widespread speculation. According to insider claims, obtaining an academician title can cost as much as 20–30 million yuan, with some recipients allegedly engaging in similar practices after gaining their positions. In some cases, business figures have reportedly used bribery, including the use of women, to influence academicians. Meanwhile, the recent clustering of deaths among senior academicians has also raised suspicions of underlying factors.
Private business owners allegedly use bribery to influence academicians
The Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Engineering—commonly referred to as the “Two Academies”—are widely regarded as representing the highest level of scientific research in China. Membership in these academies is typically a lifetime honor and is rarely revoked under normal circumstances.
However, over the past two years since the second half of 2024, observers have noted that at least ten academicians have been successively removed from the Two Academies. These include members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences such as Liu Guozhi (an expert in high-power microwaves), Liu Cangli (a weapons specialist), and Yang Wei (often referred to as the “father of the J-20 fighter jet”).
Those removed from the Chinese Academy of Engineering include Xiao Longxu (missile expert), Jin Donghan (power machinery specialist), Luo Qi (nuclear reactor expert), Cao Jianguo (aero-engine specialist), Wei Yiyin (missile guidance and control expert), Wu Manqing (radar expert), and Zhao Xiangeng (nuclear weapons engineering expert).
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On April 3, 2026, independent commentator Du Zheng wrote in Taiwan-based media outlet Up Media that the investigation into the ten academicians is likely tied to corruption related to their official duties, as well as their connections to fallen figures within China’s military-industrial sector.
In his article, Du noted that reaching the rank of academician in China often brings access to “fame, wealth, and sex.” As recognized authorities in their respective fields, such individuals are seen as gatekeepers to resources and influence, making them key recipients of various forms of benefit transfers—including money and personal favors.
He cited an example involving a friend who served as the office director of a large private Chinese conglomerate. According to the account, the company maintained an all-female public relations team tasked with “special assignments.” On one occasion, in order to advance approval for a new pharmaceutical project, the company invited a senior academician from the Chinese Academy of Sciences to endorse it. The company’s owner reportedly hosted the academician on a private yacht and used personal inducements to secure his support, after which the project quickly moved forward.
Buying an academician title costs tens of millions
Du Zheng revealed that becoming an academician in one of China’s Two Academies also comes with a more “practical” source of income. Because each election cycle is fiercely contested behind the scenes, aspiring academicians often resort to bribing those who hold nominating or recommending power.
In May 2023, Chinese biologist Rao Yi wrote on his WeChat account “Rao Talks Science”:
“The biggest problem with the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Engineering is that, in every round this century, candidates have directly offered money to academicians with voting rights… And the current academicians all know who was elected through bribery… Many sitting academicians have not only received money themselves but also know clearly who else has bribed.”
The post was later deleted.
The origins of the problem go back at least to 2011, when Rao Yi and Shi Yigong, then dean of the School of Life Sciences at Peking University, were candidates for the CAS academicianship. Rao was eliminated in the first round and later announced on Weibo that he would no longer participate in future elections, noting that “everyone knows the real reason I wasn’t selected.”
According to public records, the ten academicians recently removed from the Two Academies were elected as follows: Jin Donghan, Liu Guozhi, and Wu Manqing in 2009; Zhao Xiangeng in 2011; Yang Wei in 2017; Xiao Longxu, Cao Jianguo, Luo Qi, and Wei Yiyin in 2019; and Liu Cangli in 2021.
Du Zheng suggested that, based on Rao Yi’s account, all ten of these removed academicians may have purchased their titles when they were candidates.
The exact amount needed to secure a title is unclear, but insiders say it is not limited to paying the recommending academicians—it also involves bribing all voting members. Estimates suggest that without spending at least 20–30 million yuan, it would be nearly impossible to obtain an academicianship. Yet, those seeking such positions often have the means to pay this price, especially executives in central state-owned enterprises.
Once they secure the title, many spend lavishly to “recoup” their investment by accepting bribes themselves and selling influence to new candidates, steadily driving up the cost of obtaining an academicianship. Du Zheng also noted that these military-affiliated academicians have additional opportunities for corruption, such as inflating budgets for defense R&D projects.
Corruption in China’s military-industrial sector stuns observers
Du Zheng noted that another direct reason for the recent investigations into Chinese military-industrial academicians is the poor quality of China’s weapons systems, which undermines combat capability. As a result, the authorities have been tracing research fraud within the defense sector.
According to Hong Kong pro-Beijing media South China Morning Post, in March 2024 during China’s National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (“Two Sessions”), then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong reportedly called for a crackdown on the military’s so-called “false combat capability.” Du Zheng suggested this statement likely included issues of falsified weapons development.
Earlier in 2024, Bloomberg cited sources indicating that U.S. officials, based on intelligence, had learned of widespread corruption in the Chinese military, prompting a large-scale purge by Chinese leadership. U.S. estimates suggested that China’s Rocket Force had engaged in multiple forms of financial misconduct—for example, several missile silos in western China reportedly had faulty covers, rendering the launch process ineffective. In some cases, missiles intended to be loaded with propellant were reportedly filled with water due to corrupt practices.
Yao Cheng, a former staff officer at the Chinese Navy now living in the U.S., told Radio Free Asia that corruption in the PLA was routine. He described how operational funds intended for military equipment were often diverted to social expenses:
“Other departments in the military didn’t have money. When they needed funds, commanders would take some from the equipment budget. The money allocated from the top should have been enough, but because it was misappropriated, it wasn’t sufficient.”
Yao also shared shocking anecdotes of everyday corruption in the forces:
“In family housing areas, we cooked with fuel taken from airplane tanks. Aviation fuel was used for cooking; when burned, the flame was green and odorless. In some cases, we even used solid missile propellant as firewood for hotpots, because other military provisions were insufficient. I often went to the armory to get small rounds of solid fuel for hotpots.”
Such stories illustrate that these corrupt practices were systemic rather than isolated incidents, highlighting the scale of misconduct in the military-industrial system.
One high-profile case underscores the magnitude of the problem. On March 25, 2026, the Intermediate People’s Court in Dalian, Liaoning Province, sentenced Tan Ruisong, former Party Secretary and Chairman of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), to death with a two-year reprieve for embezzlement, bribery, insider trading, and disclosure of insider information, and ordered the confiscation of all his personal assets.
Court documents indicated that:
- From July 2003 to 2010, Tan used his positions as Deputy General Manager of AVIC Second Group and AVIC to illegally appropriate public assets totaling 89.93 million yuan.
- Between 1998 and 2024, in roles including Deputy General Manager of Harbin Dong’an Engine Group, General Manager of Harbin Aviation Industry Group, and Chairman and General Manager of AVIC, Tan received over 613 million yuan in bribes for facilitating mergers, project contracts, and other matters.
- From March 2012 to March 2023, Tan repeatedly engaged in insider trading and leaked sensitive information during restricted periods.
The reported six hundred million yuan in corruption attributed to Tan alone provides a window into the scale of graft in China’s military-industrial system.
Sudden cluster of deaths among senior academicians raises questions
In March 2026, amid growing attention on the Chinese authorities’ removal of a number of academicians from the Two Academies, several elderly members began dying in quick succession.
- March 25, 2026: Li Youping, 91, an academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, electronics and communications expert, and former director of the Science and Technology Committee at the China Academy of Engineering Physics, passed away after unsuccessful treatment for illness. Obituaries described Li as a key pioneer in China’s nuclear weapons electronics program and the founder of the first-generation nuclear bomb telemetry system. He also led the design of China’s first re-entry telemetry system.
- March 24, 2026: Wei Zhengyao, 90, an academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, a military information technology specialist, and researcher at a PLA cyber unit institute, died after illness. Wei had long worked in China’s military IT research and led multiple major projects.
- March 23, 2026: Wu Dexin, 90, academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and former director of the Microelectronics Center, died after illness. Obituaries noted she was among the so-called pioneers of China’s semiconductor and integrated circuit research. During the early years of the CCP’s rule, she led research on planar high-speed switching transistors, which later became core components in the “109B” computer supporting China’s “Two Bombs, One Satellite” program.
- March 20, 2026: Sun Yu, 89, academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, chief expert at China Electronics Technology Network Communication Research Institute (54th Research Institute), and communications technology specialist, passed away after illness. Obituaries called Sun one of the founders of China’s defense communications program. He contributed to the first atomic bomb telemetry system, the first-generation rocket test telemetry system, and the design of the first-generation intercontinental missile flight safety control system.
Du Zheng noted that while these heavyweight academicians were all around 90 years old, the elderly CCP cadres historically have access to privileged medical care, making such clustered deaths unusual.
According to Du, although these retired academicians were largely immobile, they could still collect large sums in bribes during candidate recommendations. Their sudden clustered deaths may be linked to political pressure: fallen academicians implicated in past bribery could have been interrogated by authorities, and the resulting mental stress may have worsened their health, leading to death.
