Recently, a screenshot allegedly showing an internal social media analysis system used by China’s public security authorities has been circulating online. The image shows that by entering an account and selecting its social media platform, the system can display various types of user information.
Some analysts believe that regardless of whether the image is authentic, it reflects an effort by the Chinese authorities to integrate individuals’ online identities with their real-world identities.
Social media analysis system: mass acquisition of user information
Recently, a screenshot purportedly of an internal CCP public security system has been circulating online. The top-left corner reads: “Social Media Account Information Analysis System v3.6 (Internal Version).” At the top center of the interface, it shows that the “current user” is “System Administrator,” the “affiliated department” is “Cybersecurity Investigation Unit,” and the “permission level” is “Level 3.”
The screenshot shows that on the far left under the “Function Navigation” section, there are options including: “Account Information Query,” “Personal Information Database,” “Behavioral Trajectory Analysis,” “Device Fingerprint Analysis,” “Social Relationship Analysis,” “Content Posting Analysis,” “Public Opinion Monitoring and Early Warning,” “Risk Assessment Center,” and “Data Statistics Reports.”
The screenshot indicates that the page is currently on the “Account Information Query” section. Below it are different query types, and the selected option appears to be “Twitter Account.” On the right side, under “Account Input,” the user only needs to enter the target account, after which the system displays detailed information about that account, including profile picture, platform (Twitter), account ID, bio, registration date, account status, language, influence level, number of followers, number of tweets, location, and time zone.
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The information displayed next is described as chilling.
Under the “Subject Information” section, the system reportedly shows various sensitive personal details of the account holder, including real name, gender, date of birth, place of origin, nationality, ID number, passport number, mobile number, backup phone number, email address, WeChat ID, QQ number, frequently used address, and commonly used IP regions (United States / China / Singapore).
In addition, there is more. The “Account Association Information” section includes linked websites, associated email domains, other social media accounts, and commonly used devices.
The “Login and Device Records” section includes the number of commonly used devices, number of frequently used IP addresses, most recent login IP, and most recent login time.
The “Account Behavior Summary” section includes content orientation, most recent active time, posting frequency, interaction level, main interaction targets, risk alerts, and historical violation records.
There are also additional fields such as “Risk Rating,” “Family Members,” and “Remarks.”
The query time is shown as: April 17, 2026, 19:25.
In addition, there are modules such as account search, behavior analysis, and risk assessment. From this, it can be seen that this so-called “social media analysis system” designed by the Chinese authorities can retrieve a wide range of information about a user simply by entering a social media account. What is even more alarming is that this appears to apply to multiple social media platforms, with options for at least several different services visible in the screenshot.
Analysis: The CCP aims to merge online identity with real-world identity
The various information fields displayed on the page link together different types of data about the account owner, forming a comprehensive behavioral profile. The screenshot shows how account activity, device information, and real-world identity are presented together, clearly indicating that this “social media analysis system” turns individual online users into identifiable and trackable targets within the system.
Mou, a mainland Chinese network engineer, told Chinese media outlet New Tang Dynasty Television https://www.ntdtv.com/b5/2026/04/22/a104089221.html that the most concerning aspect of such systems is not any single piece of data, but the fact that they can continuously track user behavior over long periods of time—especially for overseas social media accounts.
Mou emphasized that regardless of whether the screenshot is authentic, the direction it represents is clear: the integration of online identity and real-world identity.
Mou stated that if such a mechanism truly exists, then users’ comments, videos, and interactions on overseas platforms could be continuously recorded over time and converted into quantifiable metrics. This would no longer be simple information monitoring, but rather an intelligent targeting system focused on specific individuals.
From this, it can be seen to what extent the CCP authorities’ so-called “long-arm jurisdiction” over overseas users has developed. Even openly producing content on free social media platforms abroad, or simply leaving ordinary comments, could potentially make a person a tracked target. By collecting and retrieving personal information through big data systems, the intentions behind such practices are self-evident.
