At present, China–Japan relations have once again become dangerously tense due to the Taiwan issue. On Nov. 7, 2025, during a parliamentary questioning session, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that a “Taiwan contingency” could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, implying that Japan might exercise collective self-defense and intervene in a Taiwan Strait conflict. As soon as these remarks were made, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded swiftly. Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong summoned the Japanese ambassador to China on Nov. 12, demanding that Takaichi immediately retract her “erroneous statements.”
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian emphasized that the Taiwan issue is the “first red line that must not be crossed” in China–U.S. relations, and that China had already made its “stern position” clear. Even more provocative was that Xue Jian, China’s Consul General in Osaka, openly suggested that if Takaichi did not restrain herself, she would face a “decapitation-style” response — widely interpreted as a threat that, before attacking Taiwan, Beijing might use force to eliminate Japan’s potential interference.
As retaliation, Beijing quickly issued a travel warning advising its citizens to avoid going to Japan. Under such extreme tensions, the scenario of the CCP launching a sudden military strike on Japan — though still an extreme hypothetical — is no longer unimaginable.
This article analyzes the CCP’s chances of success in such a strike from multiple dimensions: military, economic, diplomatic, geographic, and internal political factors. It must be stressed that peaceful dialogue is the rational path; war would bring catastrophic consequences.
Military dimension: Quantity cannot outmatch quality and defensive barriers
According to the 2025 Global Firepower Index, China ranks third globally in military strength, while Japan ranks seventh. China has about 2 million active-duty troops, over 5,000 tanks, more than 3,000 combat aircraft, and 400 naval vessels — far exceeding Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (about 250,000 personnel, 1,000 tanks, 700 aircraft, and 150 naval vessels). In naval and missile-delivery capabilities, China’s DF-series missiles can cover all of Japan, and its submarine fleet is larger, theoretically favorable for a “blitz-style” surprise attack.
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However, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces are highly professional, built around defense and counterattack. Japan possesses world-class anti-ship missiles (such as the ASM-3) and the Aegis combat system, and its F-35 stealth fighters can be rapidly deployed to intercept incoming forces. Although China has numerical superiority, it lacks experience in amphibious operations; its last large-scale landing operation was during the Korean War. More critically, Japan’s command structure is unified and its response time rapid, whereas China’s armed forces, despite modernization, still face coordination issues. Simulation analyses suggest that China might control waters around the Senkaku Islands in a short-term skirmish, but in a prolonged conflict it would suffer due to stretched supply lines.
Overall probability of success: around 50 percent for a short local clash, but under 30 percent for a full-scale war.
1. Missile offense and defense: Saturation attacks vs. multi-layer interception
China’s Rocket Force has more than 2,000 short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (including the DF-21D “carrier killer” and DF-26), capable of striking all of Japan and even threatening U.S. bases in Guam. In a surprise first strike, China could launch a “saturation missile rain.” U.S. simulations suggest that hundreds of simultaneous launches could temporarily cripple Japan’s air defense, damaging runways and radar installations at Tokyo or Yokosuka.
However, Japan’s missile defense system is highly advanced. Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 Block IIA interceptors can engage targets above 1,000 km. On land, PAC-3 Patriot systems cover low-altitude threats. By 2025, Japan will also deploy new “island defense missiles” with an approximate range of 1,500 km to strike Chinese coastal targets. Interception success rates are estimated at over 70 percent, and U.S.–Japan joint early-warning systems (such as SBIRS satellites) can detect missile launches minutes in advance.
Although China could use hypersonic weapons like the DF-17 to penetrate some defenses, the cost is high, and Japan is accelerating its development of laser missile-defense technology.
Missile-war advantage: China may gain about 60 percent suppression capability in the initial phase, dropping to 40 percent in a sustained exchange.
2. Japan’s counterstrike and decapitation potential: Israel-style precision strikes
Although Japan has long been constrained by Article 9 of its constitution, the 2025 Defense White Paper explicitly emphasizes developing “counterstrike capability” (strikes on enemy bases). Integrated with U.S. missile networks, Japan could jointly locate and strike Chinese missile launch sites or command nodes — similar to Israel’s precision decapitation strikes in 2025 against Iranian and Houthi leadership targets.
Japan plans to acquire 500 Tomahawk cruise missiles by 2026 and is upgrading its domestic hypersonic glide vehicle (HVGP). Combined with F-35 stealth penetration and intelligence sharing, Japan could destroy Chinese coastal command centers or Rocket Force headquarters during a counterattack. Experts believe that although nominally “defensive,” this capability could effectively target Chinese political and military leadership, drastically raising deterrence.
Japan’s defense budget has reached 9.9 trillion yen (about $66.7 billion), 1.8% of GDP, and is accelerating this transformation.
If China launched a strike, this “Israel-style” counterresponse could expose Beijing’s leadership to significant risk.
Probability of Chinese success after considering Japan’s counterstrike: under 25 percent.
Economic consequences: A double-loss scenario and global supply chain collapse
China and Japan are deeply economically intertwined. In 2024, bilateral trade exceeded $300 billion, involving electronics, automotive manufacturing, and semiconductors. War would immediately break East Asian supply chains: Japan’s semiconductor shortage would hit China’s smartphone industry, while Chinese rare-earth export bans would severely damage Japanese manufacturing.
Simulations suggest GDP for both nations could drop more than 10 percent in the short term, with global losses exceeding $1 trillion. Western nations might freeze Chinese overseas assets and cut off SWIFT access, repeating the Russia-Ukraine sanctions model. China’s export-driven economy cannot withstand prolonged isolation.
Japan’s economy is more resilient; its diversified trade network (U.S., Europe, Australia) allows rapid reorientation. Energy would also be a problem: China imports 90 percent of its oil via sea routes, whereas Japan — although an island nation — has stronger reserves.
Economic stamina advantage: Japan. China cannot sustain a long war.
Potential Japanese losses include infrastructure damage, civilian casualties, port shutdowns, semiconductor plant destruction, automotive supply-chain breakdowns, and potential nuclear contamination if reactors are hit. Rebuilding could cost more than $2 trillion and take a decade.
Diplomacy and alliances: Near-certain isolation of the CCP
Japan is not alone. The U.S.–Japan Security Treaty obligates the United States to defend Japan’s territory, including the Senkaku Islands. Any Chinese strike would trigger U.S. Seventh Fleet intervention. With 11 carrier strike groups, the U.S. naval presence far exceeds China’s.
AUKUS (Australia–U.K.–U.S.), the Quad (U.S.–Japan–India–Australia), and even NATO could respond to an “Indo-Pacific crisis.” China’s diplomatic circle is small (mainly Russia and North Korea) and cannot counter a Western coalition.
Diplomatic success probability for China: nearly zero.
Geography and logistics: Island chains as natural barriers
Japan’s geography favors defense. Although China is close to the Senkaku Islands, a full strike requires crossing the First Island Chain, where U.S. forces could intercept. Invading Japan itself requires major amphibious capacity — China’s 075 landing ships cannot support tens of thousands of troops. Typhoon seasons further strain logistics. Japanese submarines could sever Chinese supply lines.
Historical lessons like Japan’s Pearl Harbor strike show that early success cannot prevent eventual defeat if logistics collapse.
Geographic/logistical difficulty: overwhelmingly disadvantageous for China.
Internal and political factors: Public opinion and legitimacy
Although Chinese society harbors anti-Japanese sentiment, economic concerns are far more dominant. A war could spark anti-war protests. Japan’s pacifist tradition is strong, but in a defense scenario, public unity would likely increase.
1. Internal anti-warfForces
China’s internal dissent — such as the 2025 Chongqing protests — reflects discontent with surveillance and authoritarian control. War could inflame these sentiments into larger anti-war movements. Even abroad, overseas Chinese protests suggest ideological fragmentation.
Japan has even stronger anti-war activism, with mass gatherings on Constitution Day and anti-arms-trade demonstrations. These may initially pressure Japan’s government, but in a national defense scenario, unity tends to strengthen.
2. Espionage and sabotage
China’s intelligence agencies have been active in Japan, including 2025 cyberattacks like MirrorFace’s ROAMINGMOUSE malware and spy ships near territorial waters. These operations could disrupt Japan’s command systems early on.
However, Japan’s intelligence cooperation with the U.S. (NSA) has strengthened, and joint counter-espionage campaigns are ongoing. Japan also monitors Chinese military movements. While China might gain short-term advantage, sustained sabotage would be difficult.
The CCP’s chance of a successful strike on Japan Is under 20 percent
The First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895): A conflict between the Qing Empire and Imperial Japan, ending in Japan’s victory. (Image: Adobe Stock)
Overall assessment: China’s chance of successfully attacking Japan is below 20%. Numerical military advantages collapse quickly under U.S.–Japan alliance intervention, economic self-destruction, and geographic barriers. The deeper risk is internal: war could lead to the CCP’s regime collapse. Historically, the Anti-Japanese War saved the CCP, but today China’s global economic dependence means defeat and sanctions could create an “80% probability” of regime failure, similar to the Soviet downfall after the Afghan war.
For Japan, such a defensive war might unleash a “Postwar Revival 2.0” — renewed cohesion and economic recovery with U.S. support — but only if the conflict ends quickly.
This would not only be a disaster for China and Japan, but for the entire world. The CCP has likely already assessed the probability and consequences of war with Japan and reached conclusions similar to this article — unless China’s military is intentionally exaggerating its strength to Xi Jinping, leading to a disastrous miscalculation. Otherwise, the CCP would not dare strike Japan first — unless Xi has simply grown tired of living.
Therefore, those in Japan fearful of war should not be overly worried. The Xi regime is a paper tiger — impressive in appearance, weak in ability. Japan should not allow China’s diplomatic pressure to be shifted onto Prime Minister Takaichi. Her political judgment deserves trust and firm support. The United States is the lighthouse of democracy and freedom; Japan is the beacon of human civilization today; the CCP is the global symbol of tyranny. This has become a worldwide consensus.
I firmly believe the CCP is already near its end and will not last much longer. After its collapse, China and Japan will unquestionably become good neighbors. Japan will certainly become a model for a future new China to learn from. When that day comes, I will travel across Japan again, visit the homes of Mr. Ishihira and Prime Minister Takaichi, eat sashimi, drink sake, go to Toyama to enjoy snowy scenery with my Japanese friends, and upon returning to China, write a Japan Travel Diary so that more Chinese people will grow to love Japan.
My friends in Japan, let us look forward to that day together.
This article represents the author’s personal views and position and does not necessarily reflect the views of Vision Times.
