Japan is preparing a major overhaul of its naturalization and residency rules—changes that could dramatically reshape the landscape for pro-Beijing nationalists who have made the country their home while attacking it online. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is expected to finalize the new framework by January 2026, signaling one of the most assertive immigration recalibrations Japan has attempted in decades.
The message behind the shift is clear: those who enjoy Japan’s benefits while denigrating the country should no longer expect a smooth path to citizenship.
Japan’s Immigration Services Agency reported that 844,000 Chinese nationals were living in Japan as of June 2024. At the current pace, the population could surpass one million by 2026—not including those who have already naturalized.
Although the rise in numbers isn’t seen as an outright failure, the new scrutiny has sent shockwaves through China’s “Little Pink” nationalist circles. Their behavior—embracing Japan’s social systems while posting anti-Japan rhetoric on Chinese platforms—has become an increasingly sensitive issue.
Examples of this “double life” have been accumulating for years.
Cases fueling Japan’s frustration
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One of the most controversial figures is Zhang Jingzi, a Korean Chinese naturalized in Japan who frequently appears on television. Despite building a career in Japanese media, she refuses to be recognized as Japanese and openly says she naturalized only to enjoy visa-free travel.
Her most explosive remark came in 2023, when she said on air that she would provide information about Japanese citizens “if required under Chinese law.”
To many in Japan, the comment confirmed their fears: naturalization, for some, is a loophole—not a commitment.
China’s National Intelligence Law obligates all Chinese nationals, even those who acquire foreign citizenship, to cooperate with intelligence requests. Zhang’s words were therefore interpreted as more than a reckless comment—they were viewed as a real threat.
A similar case is that of Yoshinaga Ai, a Chinese-born Japanese citizen who ran unsuccessfully for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly in 2025. She presented herself publicly as a defender of Japanese values, yet told followers on Xiaohongshu that she aimed to “fight for Chinese people in Japan.” Her anti-Japan rhetoric has since become part of her political baggage.
Former CCTV host Wang Zhian, banned in China and now living in Japan, also raised eyebrows after boasting on X that he would soon obtain Japanese nationality. His behavior was viewed as an example of a well-worn shortcut: language school → technical visa → marriage → naturalization.
Under Takaichi’s incoming policies, these routes are set to disappear—and past statements are expected to carry real consequences.
A hardline shift: Longer waits, deeper checks
Leaked drafts obtained by Mainichi, Yomiuri, Asahi, and immigration insiders outline five major tightening areas:
Naturalization may effectively require 10+ years
Current rules allow naturalization after five years of residency. Under the new system, applicants could face reviews as strict as—or stricter than—permanent residency checks.
Welfare and insurance violations flagged at very low thresholds
Unpaid medical or insurance fees as small as ¥10,000 (about USD $67.00) will be permanently recorded, triggering red flags during immigration checks and potentially leading to entry denial.
Mandatory nationality disclosure for land purchases
Japan will create a nationwide database of foreign-owned properties, focusing on sensitive areas like Hokkaido, water sources, and forests.
Expanded review of political speech and past online behavior
Authorities will examine posts from Xiaohongshu, Douyin, Weibo, and WeChat. Remarks like Zhang Jingzi’s intelligence pledge—or even long-forgotten anti-Japan statements—could end an application immediately.
Tighter scrutiny of taxes and social insurance
Even minor delays in payments may now be grounds for rejection. Officials say this responds to longstanding public frustration that some foreign residents contribute less while benefiting more.
What this signals is a fundamental shift: Japan is recentering citizenship as a political and national identity—not a convenience or economic tool.
A wider democratic trend: Little Pink communities react
For many pro-Beijing nationalists, the most alarming part is not the extended timeline but the exposure of their “double identities.”
Old videos insulting Japan or pledging loyalty to Beijing’s political causes could now resurface as disqualifying evidence.
Predictably, backlash erupted on Xiaohongshu. Complaints that “Japan discriminates against Chinese people” or “Japan fears China’s rise” filled the platform. But analysts say the deeper fear lies elsewhere: if Japan’s model succeeds, other democracies might follow.
European governments have already begun discussing similar approaches. Australia and Canada are reviewing their own systems and considering stricter vetting for migrants from authoritarian states.
Japan remains one of the global hotspots for “Little Pink” activism outside China—second only to Taiwan and Singapore. The government’s recalibration is seen by many as a belated attempt to close loopholes that have allowed political influence efforts to take root.
Taiwan, by contrast, has often loosened naturalization rules out of fear of being labeled discriminatory. Decades of cross-Strait influence operations, including marriage-based infiltration, have left Taiwan vulnerable in ways Japan is now moving aggressively to avoid.
The new Japanese model is a two-track strategy: to welcome compliant, skilled immigrants while shutting off channels of potential subversion.
A turning point in Japan—and a warning for Taiwan
Japan’s reforms reflect a core democratic principle: protecting openness requires boundaries.
Takaichi’s government is reframing citizenship not as a demographic patch but as the highest form of belonging to the political community. For those who built their “Japan dream” on shortcuts—enjoying public benefits while calling Japan derogatory names—the era of easy naturalization is closing.
Japan is not turning inward.
It is tightening rules where national security intersects with political identity—while remaining open to lawful, constructive migrants.
For Taiwan, observers note, Japan’s shift offers a clear lesson: democracies cannot afford to be naïve when confronting influence operations backed by authoritarian states.
The message is not exclusion.
It is defense.
Japan’s move shows that mature democracies can enforce firm rules without abandoning fairness—and that protecting the integrity of citizenship is essential to preserving public trust.
