By Li Jingyao, Vision Times
Nearly a week after Chinese authorities announced the downfall of Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and CMC member Liu Zhenli on Jan. 24, uncertainty and speculation continue to ripple through China’s military and political system. Several chain of commands within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as well as major military branches have remained conspicuously silent, while official military media discuss “anti-corruption” without naming Zhang or Liu.
Analysts say these anomalies suggest that Chinese President Xi Jinping may have seriously underestimated the consequences of moving against Zhang, leaving himself in a precarious position.
RELATED: Zhang Youxia’s Alleged Secret Letter Signals Deep Rift Inside Xi Jinping’s Military Leadership
Silence within the PLA
As of now, among China’s five theater commands, only the Eastern Theater Command and Western Theater Command have reposted the Ministry of National Defense’s notice on Zhang and Liu. In contrast, the Northern, Southern, and Central Theater Commands, along with official accounts of the People’s Armed Police, Rocket Force, and China Military Online, have issued no statements at all.
Success
You are now signed up for our newsletter
Success
Check your email to complete sign up
Political commentator Li Dayu described this as a form of “soft resistance,” reflecting divisions within the military over Xi’s decision to remove Zhang. Li noted that “The Wall Street Journal” previously reported Xi had dispatched a special task force to the Northern Theater Command in Shenyang. According to Li, the real purpose was not investigation but preventing unrest or mutiny. Notably, the team reportedly avoided staying at military guesthouses, choosing hotels instead, an indication, Li argued, that they “were afraid.”
Li further pointed out that when asked about allegations Zhang leaked China’s nuclear secrets to the United States, Defense Ministry spokesperson Jiang Bin responded that the public should rely only on official releases and “not engage in speculation.” Li said this amounted to an indirect denial of the claim and undercut the Wall Street Journal’s report.
U.S.-based political analyst Chen Pokong observed that many netizens concluded Xi lacks genuine authority within the PLA, given the collective silence following Zhang’s removal.
‘Near-combat readiness’ in Beijing
Multiple eyewitness accounts indicate that on Jan. 24, the same day Zhang’s purge was announced, Beijing entered a state resembling wartime security. Black-clad security personnel reportedly flooded areas around Zhongnanhai, Tiananmen Square, and Chang’an Avenue. Major highways leading into Beijing displayed messages instructing vehicles to leave immediately. Navigation data, speed alerts, and mobile signals were reportedly disrupted.
RELATED: Xi Jinping’s Military Purge: Alleged Killings, Secret Police Expansion, PLA Leaks
Witnesses described covered military vehicles moving continuously into the capital on closed highways, creating what many called an “eerie atmosphere.”
A source familiar with the matter told overseas Chinese-language media that the CMC formally activated “near-combat readiness” protocols that day to guard against internal instability. A PLA insider identified as Mr. Liu said the heightened alert was implemented before the public announcement.
“The situation was extremely sudden. We didn’t know what had happened, only that the Defense Ministry was about to release major news. But elevating security to ‘near-combat readiness’ was shocking, especially since the top leader was not traveling abroad.”
Only later, he said, did many within the military realize the true purpose. “Everyone eventually understood it was to prevent internal incidents. They were worried something might happen inside the PLA.”
Analyst Liu Zhenqiang noted that the PLA’s stability has long depended not on institutions but on personal authority and loyalty. Zhang Youxia, in particular, had served as a key stabilizing figure, balancing factions and suppressing unrest.
Recent signals from the military, including repeated emphasis on “absolute loyalty,” tightened discipline and information controls, and intensified internal security drills without any external conflict, suggest deep anxiety at the top over the military’s reliability.
Media avoids naming Zhang and Liu
On Jan. 30, the PLA’s official newspaper published an article titled “Advancing the Anti-Corruption Struggle with Greater Clarity and Resolve,” authored by a Xi Jinping Thought research body. The piece was filled with slogans such as:
- “Anti-corruption is a battle we cannot afford to lose.”
- “We must fight the decisive battle, the protracted battle, and the overall battle.”
- “There must be no hiding place for corruption in the military.”
Yet neither Zhang Youxia nor Liu Zhenli was mentioned, in what analysts are describing as a surprising omission. Commentator Li Linyi said this was abnormal. In past purges of figures like Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, state media used such articles explicitly to denounce the fallen officials and “cleanse their poisonous legacy.”
Meanwhile, units such as the 82nd Group Army and the Beijing Garrison have reportedly been engaged in political study sessions, but focused solely on “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military.” Li argued this amounted to passive resistance, substituting ideological study for engagement with documents related to Zhang’s purge.
A risky gamble for Xi
Commentator Wen Zhao argued that the anomalies following Zhang’s arrest indicate genuine panic among China’s elite. Unlike previous cases, such as He Weidong or Ma Xingrui, where announcements were delayed for months, Zhang’s case was handled with unusual haste.
The most plausible explanation, Wen said, is that Xi faced an urgent threat and chose to arrest first, formalize later, bypassing normal procedures to create a fait accompli. But this approach also meant skipping critical steps, such as securing explicit endorsement from the Politburo or convening a clearly documented emergency meeting.
“If senior officials were simply told that ‘the center has decided to investigate,’ without a clear meeting or consensus, they would naturally hesitate. They can only support ‘the center,’ but if the center itself appears procedurally vague, they will wait and watch.”
Wen warned that this hesitation may indicate Xi has not secured sufficient backing within the Politburo, calling the situation “both humiliating and dangerous.” Wen added, “Xi has purged so many people that support within the Politburo is inevitably declining. He keeps arresting those he himself promoted. In that sense, he is digging his own grave.”
Editorial note: Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Vision Times.
