By Li Jingyao, Vision Times
A Chinese national has been sentenced to three years in prison after a cargo vessel with Chinese-linked ownership deliberately damaged a key undersea communications cable connecting Taiwan and Penghu. The incident has raised new concerns over so-called “gray zone” tactics targeting critical infrastructure.
According to court findings, the Togolese-flagged cargo ship Hong Tai 58 severed the Taiwan-Penghu No. 3 submarine cable in February 2025. The vessel’s Chinese captain, Wang Yuliang, was convicted of damaging telecommunications infrastructure and ordered to pay NT$18.22 million (approximately USD$570,000) in damages to Chunghwa Telecom. The ruling can still be appealed.
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Deliberate anchoring in restricted waters
The Tainan District Court found that on the night of Feb. 22, 2025, the vessel entered a restricted no-anchor zone approximately five nautical miles off the coast of Tainan’s Beimen District. Despite clear markings on electronic navigation charts indicating the location of the submarine cable, Wang instructed the crew to deploy a 160-meter anchor chain.
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The ship then maneuvered in a zigzag pattern, dragging the anchor across the seabed and ultimately severing the cable, an essential link for telephone and internet communications between Taiwan’s main island and Penghu.
At around 3 a.m., Chunghwa Telecom detected a sudden signal disruption and alerted authorities. Taiwan’s Coast Guard swiftly intercepted the vessel and escorted it to Anping Harbor for investigation. Given suspicions of potential gray zone interference linked to Beijing, the captain was detained and held incommunicado.
Prison sentence and civil damages
Prosecutors charged Wang under Taiwan’s Telecommunications Management Act. Both the initial trial and appeal upheld a three-year prison sentence.
During proceedings, Wang admitted ordering the anchor to be dropped but denied intentionally damaging the cable, claiming it was merely negligence. The court rejected this defense, ruling that his actions constituted a criminal violation. Seven additional crew members were not charged due to insufficient evidence and were deported.
In a separate civil case, Chunghwa Telecom sought compensation exceeding NT$19 million, covering repair ships, escort vessels, materials, and testing costs. The court reduced the final award to NT$18.22 million after accounting for depreciation of the cable, which had been in service for over a decade.
‘Multi-identity’ vessel raises suspicions
The vessel involved has drawn attention for its shifting identities. Previously operating under different names and flags, including Andorran and Tanzanian registrations, it has appeared in multiple ports across Taiwan and mainland China, earning it the nickname of a “multi-faced spy ship” among observers.
Analysts say the incident highlights broader concerns about infrastructure vulnerabilities. Italian scholar Alessio Patalano recently noted that repeated damage to Taiwan’s undersea cables may be part of a wider strategy to undermine public confidence in government institutions.
He warned that such actions should not be dismissed as low-level harassment. “These incidents are often labeled as ‘gray zone operations,’ but more accurately, they represent ‘hybrid threats,’” he said, adding they could serve as preparation for future escalation.
Rather than relying solely on infrastructure repairs, Patalano emphasized the importance of “strategic communication” to counter disinformation and strengthen public resilience.
Calls for stronger defensive strategy
Taiwanese military analysts have also urged a more comprehensive response. Institute for National Defense and Security Research researcher Lin Yutang noted that Taiwan relies heavily on physical infrastructure for data transmission, with 15 international submarine cables connecting it to the world.
He pointed to previous incidents, including cable disruptions near the Matsu Islands in 2023, as evidence of a pattern. According to Lin, such operations aim not only to disrupt communications during wartime but to gradually build the capability to paralyze Taiwan’s networks during peacetime through persistent interference.
He called for a dual-track defense strategy combining “hardware decentralization” and “software zero-trust” systems to enhance resilience against increasingly complex threats spanning seabed, cyberspace, and beyond.
