The Singapore-flagged container ship “Ever Lovely,” operated by Evergreen Marine Corporation, was struck on its starboard side by a drone off the coast of Oman, south of the Strait of Hormuz on June 25, 2026. The bridge structure was damaged, but fortunately the crew, vessel, and cargo remained safe, and the ship completed its transit.
The United States attributed the attack to the naval forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy. Tehran did not formally acknowledge responsibility, but its newly established “Persian Gulf Strait Management Authority” stated: “Ships using unauthorized routes do not fall within the scope of safe passage guarantees.”
Just like in the Strait of Hormuz, a scenario is now occurring on waters 8,000 kilometers away from Taiwan around the Taiwan Strait where China has recently conducted boarding inspections under the pretext of “maritime inspections.”
It should serve as a warning to the free world as it proves that the term “authoritarian axis” is not merely an academic or media expression, but something that is already producing negative impacts in the world around Taiwan.
Taiwan’s exposure is not limited to the Strait of Hormuz
Less than a month after the signing of the U.S.-Iran memorandum, the latest crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has already affected a Taiwan-listed company and challenged interpretations of the international law principle of transit passage, effectively turning it into a de facto “permission-based” system.
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If this model of restricting passage rights continues to be tolerated, it could provide China with a new reference point for applying pressure on Taiwan in the future. Existing measures such as China’s coast guard operations around Taiwan, air defense identification zone activities, and vessel boarding inspections could be further expanded and enforced by Beijing. Moreover, given the reality that the United States has been unable to effectively restrain Iran, China may feel even fewer constraints.
For Iran or other countries that might imitate this approach, completely blockading a strait may not be the most effective deterrence strategy. Creating uncertainty and using threats with unpredictable consequences may provide greater leverage in negotiations than an outright blockade.
A total closure of a strait would amount to an open confrontation and could give adversaries justification for military action. However, if a strait is made “sometimes safe and sometimes unsafe,” turning uncertainty itself into a weapon, drones or other low-level attacks can create panic among opponents and third parties. Even insurance companies would be unable to accurately assess risks, allowing geopolitical tools to become an effective instrument of coercion.
Before the war, approximately 120 vessels passed through the Strait of Hormuz each day. After just one attack, war-risk insurance premiums jumped from 0.05 percent of a ship’s value to more than 0.7 percent. At one point, around 11,000 crew members were stranded in the Persian Gulf, effectively becoming hostages of Iran. The purpose was to pressure Western countries, and this subsequently enabled Iran to demand high passage fees.
Beware China’s ‘weaponized interdependence’
From the perspective of “weaponized interdependence,” because globalization networks bind countries together, whoever controls critical nodes can turn that dependence into a tool of coercion. The Strait of Hormuz and the Taiwan Strait are both key geopolitical chokepoints capable of affecting the normal operation of global supply chains.
Those who control such nodes gain asymmetric leverage over others, forcing countries to yield when they urgently need energy resources or strategic materials.
In Iran’s case, the approach relies on intense conflict and the possibility that drone attacks may cause casualties. For Beijing, however, China’s version of “weaponized interdependence” relies primarily on cognitive and legal methods.
China’s activities are actually taking place in waters that do not belong to its territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, any use of force could undermine the legitimacy of its own claims. However, as long as Beijing can use law enforcement powers as a form of demonstration by carrying them out against other countries, it can create the impression that these waters fall under its jurisdiction. By gradually shaping other countries’ perceptions that such enforcement is legitimate, China can incrementally expand its claimed jurisdictional authority.
At the same time, China has taken advantage of the fact that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea does not explicitly use the term “international waters” to independently designate multiple areas as “jurisdictional waters.” It then relies on its domestically enacted 2021 Coast Guard Law — which authorizes the Chinese coast guard to “take all necessary measures, including the use of weapons” — to claim the ability to enforce international law on the high seas.
Through repeated actions such as boarding vessels, conducting inspections, and ordering ships to leave — actions based on nonexistent “law enforcement authority” — China attempts to transform these incidents into established facts. It then presents them as precedents through media coverage and international law discussions.
China cannot fire the first shot
For China, there is actually a fatal constraint: it cannot truly be the first to open fire. Unlike Iran, which has already seen key sites bombed — such as the Natanz Nuclear Facility — and whose regime stability and legitimacy rely heavily on various means of retaliation and deterrence, China’s regime legitimacy and stability are built on economic development.
If Beijing were to launch an attack before the right conditions for military action emerged, or if it were to weaponize the Taiwan Strait, the damage to China itself could potentially exceed the damage inflicted on others.
Precisely because China is a stakeholder rather than a pure disruptor, Beijing has chosen an alternative path combining administrative and legal mechanisms. China already has more than 30 years of experience conducting gray-zone operations in the South China Sea and is a regional maritime power. Selective “law enforcement” can also serve as a deterrent without requiring the choice of a high-risk option.
However, Iran’s approach has provided China with a new reference model. By manipulating the conditions and uncertainty surrounding freedom of passage, Beijing could potentially obtain greater geopolitical gains — and this is exactly the model China would most prefer.
If China can normalize the manipulation of passage rights, it would avoid harming its own economic development while simultaneously eroding Taiwan’s sovereignty in practice. Vessel inspections “dressed in the clothing of law enforcement” would resemble acts of piracy without outright robbery: they could still cause shipping companies and vessel owners delays in schedules, additional risks of detention, and indirect forms of pressure.
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Similarities and differences between China’s and Iran’s models
A further comparison between Iran’s and China’s approaches shows that both are fundamentally derived from the concept of “coercive diplomacy.” Through explicit military threats, economic sanctions, or other forms of pressure, they seek to force opponents to change existing policies or stop certain actions.
First, both disregard the freedom of navigation guaranteed under international law and instead assert a unilateral system of “permission-based passage.”
Second, both rely on risk manipulation rather than complete blockades, maintaining credible deterrence through selective pressure.
Third, both seek to weaponize others’ dependence on critical geopolitical chokepoints by exploiting the need for access and navigation.
However, the two models differ in three key aspects.
The first difference concerns the position of the actors involved — their strategic circumstances are almost opposite. Iran has less to lose, while China has far more at stake. Yet precisely because Beijing faces a higher cost from self-inflicted damage, it has shifted toward a lower-conflict “administrative-legal” approach.
At the same time, because this approach remains below the threshold of open conflict, it is more difficult to trigger a forceful response. As a result, it can continue gradually through a “boiling frog” strategy, slowly normalizing incremental changes without provoking immediate confrontation.
The second and most crucial distinction lies in the objectives. Iran’s coercion is based on a “transaction”: its goal is the easing of sanctions and gaining leverage in negotiations. Control over passage rights is merely a means; the price to be extracted is the ultimate objective. If post-war Iran were to completely seize control of the Strait of Hormuz, it would provoke outrage among neighboring countries across the Middle East.
Beijing’s coercion, however, is “constitutive” in nature: its objective is the sovereignty narrative itself. Control and possession of waters surrounding Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait are the ultimate goals. Constitutive coercion has no clear endpoint; it only accumulates layer by layer — and this is precisely what makes it more dangerous than the Iranian model.
Third, attention must be paid to the hybrid nature of China’s approach. If a Taiwan Strait crisis escalates, Beijing could go beyond the legal façade and adopt Iran-style tactics: using maritime militia and unidentified drones to conduct gray-zone operations while shifting responsibility under the name of “China Coast Guard law enforcement.”
This combination of a “legal façade + gray-zone conflict” is the type of hybrid approach Taiwan must prepare against: advancing pressure under the appearance of legal normalization while retaining the ability to apply coercive force during moments of crisis.
Taiwan must push forward its defensive front line
China’s objective is to use non-military means to force countries to recognize its claims over waters surrounding Taiwan. After repeated pressure from China, affected companies may eventually transfer those pressures and costs into the political sphere.
More seriously, if China cooperates with an authoritarian axis or uses other non-state actors to create disruptions, Taiwan could face a pirate-like form of “extraterritorial jurisdiction.”
For Taiwan, this means that threats are no longer limited to its territorial waters. Expanding the defensive perimeter outward will become an unavoidable reality. The focus of Taiwan’s defense in the Taiwan Strait cannot be limited only to preventing a beach landing; it must also involve layered defense across a broader operational space.
The current problem is that Taiwan’s frontline coast guard forces may not necessarily be able to prevent the continued expansion of China’s claimed “authority” and legal narratives. Beyond limitations in vessels and personnel, Taiwan may also need to adjust its law enforcement methods, tools, and operational thresholds.
When the China Coast Guard claims jurisdiction over specific waters and demands that Taiwan-registered vessels submit to inspections, does Taiwan have enough ships to immediately provide support, with the navy positioned behind them as backup?
Every such enforcement zone represents a battle to defend Taiwan’s maritime security. Even if no shots are fired and no blood is spilled, Taiwan’s sovereignty is being gradually eroded bit by bit.
What Taiwan must rely on is preparation in the realms of law, narratives, and maritime enforcement, ensuring that China’s attempts to advance its claims cannot succeed.
