By Lu Yixin
Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) said on Jan. 11 that it had completed an internal report titled Analysis of the Chinese Communist Party’s Cognitive Warfare Operations Against Taiwan in 2025, detailing how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has coordinated political, military, and technological resources to conduct influence operations targeting Taiwanese society.
In a statement released that morning, the NSB said the CCP has continued to intensify cognitive warfare against Taiwan by exploiting major domestic events. The bureau said the goal was to inflame internal divisions, weaken public resolve to resist external threats, undermine international support for Taiwan, and steer public opinion toward the CCP’s political narratives.
According to the NSB, the report was compiled to help the public better understand the risks posed by CCP influence operations to democratic societies.
Coordinated party-state-military operations
The NSB said that after the CCP’s party, government, and military systems set the themes and tone of disputed narratives, the CCP mobilized technology firms, public relations companies, and online influence groups to disseminate contested content to Taiwanese audiences through five primary operational fronts.
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1. Data-driven analysis of public opinion
On the first front, the NSB said the CCP’s Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of State Security, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Political Work Department worked with technology firms including Zhongke Tianji, Meiya Pico, and Wolong Hi-Tech.
Using web-crawling technologies, these firms collected personal data, social networks, and official positions associated with Taiwanese politicians, elected representatives, and opinion leaders. They also aggregated polling data and online engagement metrics during Taiwan’s election periods to enable what the NSB described as “precision” propaganda and targeted attacks on specific individuals.
2. Multi-channel dissemination of controversial narratives
On the second front, the NSB said the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department and Ministry of Public Security worked through public relations companies such as Haixun Agency, Haimai, and Huya to create websites impersonating international media outlets.
Examples cited included fabricated outlets named Asia Korea and Austria Weekly, which were used to amplify official CCP narratives. The bureau also said the CCP supported the public relations firm Wubianjie Group in building Facebook fan pages functioning as content farms that posted inflammatory articles to attract clicks.
In addition, accounts posing as lifestyle or soft-interest pages were created on platforms such as Threads and X, which later pivoted to political messaging aimed at shaping public perceptions in Taiwan.
3. Use of coordinated inauthentic accounts
On the third front, the NSB said the CCP’s Ministry of Public Security deployed the Longqiao online influence network, operating in more than 20 languages across over 180 social media platforms worldwide.
Separately, the CCP’s Cyberspace Administration of China, United Front Work Department, and PLA cyber units directed technology firms including Zhongke Click, Beijing Starlight, and Yiwan Huitong to build large-scale user databases and develop automated account-control software.
These systems were used to manage more than 10,000 fake accounts, which coordinated the dissemination of disputed narratives and manufactured public opinion among targeted audiences.
4. AI-generated synthetic audio and video content
On the fourth front, the NSB said CCP-controlled state-owned enterprises, including China North Industries Group, have actively developed AI models and intelligent guidance systems capable of simultaneously collecting public sentiment data, automatically generating audio and video content, and delivering it to selected audiences.
The bureau said the CCP also commissioned companies such as QingShu Intelligent Technology and iFlytek to develop voice-synthesis systems. Advertisements placed on Taiwanese websites were used to lure unsuspecting users into recording their voices, which could then be used to create synthetic voice replicas to enhance the realism of AI-generated disinformation.
5. Cyber intrusions and account hijacking
On the fifth front, the NSB said that during PLA military exercises directed by the CCP against Taiwan in April 2025, operators linked to the CCP hijacked more than 10 user accounts on the Taiwanese online forum PTT.
The bureau said attackers also exploited compromised Internet-of-Things devices and rented foreign servers as relay points to spread false claims, including assertions that the PLA had blocked Taiwan’s natural gas shipments and that Chinese warships had crossed into Taiwan’s 24-nautical-mile zone.
Scope of operations in 2025
According to the NSB, Taiwan’s national security intelligence teams identified more than 45,000 abnormal accounts in 2025 and collected over 2.3 million pieces of disputed or misleading content.
Throughout the year, more than 3,200 cases of such content were reported to relevant government agencies to support timely responses to CCP cognitive warfare operations.
The bureau said major government agencies and think tanks in the United States, the European Union, Australia, and France have also released reports warning about the CCP’s information-manipulation tactics and associated threats.
As a frontline democracy confronting cognitive warfare, Taiwan held more than 80 security dialogues and joint working meetings with international partners in 2025, aiming to expand global cooperation to counter such operations.
Military exercises and composite threats
The NSB said that written materials submitted to Taiwan’s legislature on Jan. 8 analyzed the CCP’s motives for conducting military exercises against Taiwan. These included countering international democratic support for Taiwan, diverting public attention from domestic problems inside China, and projecting an image that PLA combat readiness had not been affected by internal anti-corruption campaigns.
On the issue of diversion, the bureau said targeted military drills directed by the CCP were used to redirect public dissatisfaction over economic setbacks and social instability inside China toward nationalist narratives framed as resistance to “external interference.”
The NSB also outlined composite threats observed during CCP-directed military exercises, including military and gray-zone coercion, coordinated cognitive warfare operations, and cyber intrusions targeting government networks.
Surge in disinformation and cyberattacks
During the exercises, the bureau said the CCP amplified disputed narratives through state media framing, video manipulation, AI-generated forgeries, account hijacking, academic endorsements, and online influence campaigns.
Between Dec. 29, 2025, and Jan. 2, 2026, more than 19,000 disputed narratives were disseminated across social media platforms, involving 799 abnormal accounts. These activities were concentrated on TikTok, Facebook, Threads, and X, promoting themes casting doubt on the United States, Taiwan’s military, and President Lai Ching-te.
Compared with previous exercises, the NSB said the latest operations made greater use of AI-generated content and international external propaganda in an effort to weaken public confidence in Taiwan’s self-defense and erode international support.
The bureau added that the CCP’s cyber forces intensified attacks on government network services during the drills. On the first day, intrusion attempts reached approximately 2.08 million, up from about 1.54 million the previous day. On the second day, attempts rose further to approximately 2.09 million.
Groups identified as PLA-linked cyber units APT24 and BlackTech were among the most active, highlighting a pattern in which military exercises are paired with large-scale cyber intrusion campaigns targeting Taiwan.
