The underlying logic of a potential war with Iran lies in whether it is acceptable to allow Iran to possess nuclear weapons. War becomes a measure taken after diplomatic efforts fail. Going to war is a choice—one fraught with danger—but reaching this point is not limited to the Trump administration. In fact, the costs and risks of non-military options may be even higher.
This can be understood by looking at the history of U.S. dealings with North Korea. Forty-two years ago, in 1984, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency warned that North Korea was seeking plutonium, a key material for building atomic bombs. Under international pressure, the following year Kim Il Sung joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which at the time was seen as an olive branch from North Korea.
However, this was merely a façade by Kim Il Sung. He continued advancing his nuclear program under the guise of developing civilian nuclear power plants. In 1993, North Korea refused to allow international inspectors access to its disguised nuclear facilities, raising suspicions that Pyongyang might have already separated plutonium for weapons use. Facing intense questioning, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Clinton administration intervened and managed to persuade Kim Il Sung, but North Korea soon entered into disputes with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
In 1994, fuel rods were unloaded from the Yongbyon reactor without supervision from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Would these fuel rods be reprocessed to produce weapons-grade plutonium? No one knew. As a result, the Clinton administration threatened economic sanctions, and the Pentagon drew up plans to strike nuclear facilities. Defense Secretary William Perry proposed a large-scale troop buildup on the Korean Peninsula. Clinton also suspended negotiations and deployed Patriot missile defense systems to South Korea, while members of Congress supported taking military action.
At this critical moment, former President Jimmy Carter stepped in. He voluntarily offered to travel to Pyongyang, as North Korea had previously extended an invitation for a visit. As a result, Clinton decided to allow Carter to go in a private capacity, hoping this might give Kim Il Sung a way out of the crisis. However, Clinton soon found himself politically cornered.
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Carter did not want to see conflict and even opposed sanctions. He exceeded the scope of authority granted by Clinton, reached a preliminary agreement with Kim Il Sung, and announced it on CNN. This immediately shifted U.S. public opinion, creating a national atmosphere in which the media and diplomatic circles quickly hailed the arrival of a “nuclear peace era.” As a result, the military strike option was shelved, and Clinton accepted the agreement, which became the 1994 Agreed Framework.
Under this deal, North Korea agreed to freeze its illegal nuclear activities and eventually allow comprehensive inspections. In exchange, the United States provided billions of dollars in civilian nuclear energy assistance and oil supplies.
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Whether North Korea already possessed sufficient plutonium to build a nuclear bomb, and its past violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—these critical questions were set aside. Optimism about peaceful transformation dominated Washington and Seoul, after all, no one wanted another Korean War. The Agreed Framework lasted for two years.
However, by 1996, Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan visited Pyongyang and helped North Korea with uranium enrichment. Weapons-related research also continued covertly. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions never truly stopped.
In 2002, the George W. Bush administration confronted North Korea over its uranium enrichment program. Pyongyang immediately scrapped the Agreed Framework, expelled inspectors, withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and resumed plutonium production.
Bush used military threats, economic sanctions, and diplomatic pressure, but ultimately ruled out the use of force. North Korea’s plutonium stockpile increased fourfold, and in 2006 it conducted its first nuclear test. From that point on, North Korea became a nuclear-armed state, making any U.S. military option far more dangerous.
Meanwhile, North Korea continued to advance rapidly. Today, it is believed to possess around 50 nuclear warheads and may have intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. One clear lesson from North Korea’s nuclear rise is that successive U.S. presidents have consistently hesitated. War risks are always described as too high, and there is never a “perfect moment” for action—there is always another diplomatic option to exhaust.
In the end, North Korea obtained nuclear weapons. This reflects a pattern repeated under four U.S. presidents: negotiations, agreements, and lifted sanctions in cycles. Sanctions have always been used as a bargaining tool—carrots only, never the stick.
The United States’ approach toward Iran has been identical to its approach toward North Korea. Each time, the U.S. has offered carrots, and each time Iran has accepted agreements that do not require it to fully account for its past nuclear activities while preserving its future nuclear infrastructure. The Iranian regime has never stopped pursuing nuclear weapons.
Trump is the only president who had the courage to wield the stick and allow Israel to take action. We do not know how the current Iran conflict will end, but we do know that when it does, Iran’s radical regime will no longer possess a nuclear program, making the world safer.
World peace has never been built on paper agreements, but rather on whether there exists a powerful enforcer that can maintain order.
(This article reflects solely the author’s personal views and opinions.)
By Dongfang
