Amid increasing geopolitical volatility and multiple challenges facing democratic systems, an in-depth dialogue focusing on the “security boundaries of open societies” was held in Vancouver last month.
The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APF Canada), in collaboration with the Georgetown Center for Asian Law, hosted a symposium on March 19 titled “Foreign Interference in Open Societies: Risks, Limits, and Safeguards.”
The conference brought together leading legal scholars, political scientists, and frontline researchers, and for the first time systematically analyzed the “full lifecycle” operational model of foreign interference and transnational repression. It also offered policy recommendations for Canada and its allies on building “whole-of-society safeguards.”
Seeing the ‘real picture’ of the world: national mission and security values
Transnational interference is a pertinent issue facing the free world and the experts at the conference said security boundaries are essential.
“Our role is to prepare Canadians,” said Jeff Nankivell, the President and CEO of APF Canada. “We must learn to see the world ‘as it is,’ even as we continue working toward the world ‘as it should be.’”
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The moderator of the seminar, Elizabeth Donkervoort, Senior Advisor on China Programs at the Asia Pacific Foundation, stated clearly that while the discussion focused heavily on China—which is widely regarded as one of the most mature and pervasive sources of foreign interference globally—this does not mean ignoring potential interference from other countries.
This approach to objectivity is intended to ensure rigor and comprehensiveness in policy discussions.
Invisible scars: the state of transnational repression in diaspora communities
Lynette Ong, a distinguished professor of Chinese politics at the University of Toronto and senior fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation, shared findings from the latest public opinion survey conducted by the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy. The data reveals a troubling reality: most Canadians now view foreign interference as a serious threat to the health of democracy.
The survey highlights that within Chinese, Hong Kong, Tibetan, Uyghur, and Taiwanese communities, a significant number of respondents have personally experienced transnational repression. These experiences range from online harassment and intimidating phone calls to indirect threats targeting relatives in their home countries.
Ong warned that there is currently a significant “policy gap”: most victims are unaware of existing official reporting channels, and some even believe there is nowhere to seek help. This sense of isolation greatly weakens community resilience.
The boundaries of law and the weight of diplomacy
Thomas Kellogg, Executive Director of the Georgetown Center for Asian Law, discussed the limitations (“ceiling”) of law in addressing transnational repression. He stated bluntly that because the perpetrators of such repression are often located outside U.S. and Canadian jurisdictions, traditional domestic legal tools are unable to effectively counter them.
Using the Hong Kong diaspora community as an example, Kellogg noted that as Hong Kong has drifted toward authoritarianism, overseas Hong Kongers have become a key force in pro-democracy advocacy. However, they have also faced severe pressure, including “bounties” and threats, as well as the imprisonment of relatives in Hong Kong.
He argued that government responses must be anchored in diplomacy, linking trade relations, diplomatic engagement, and human rights considerations more closely together. He also called for stronger immigration and resettlement protection programs for vulnerable groups.
Exposing the ‘tactical playbook:’ the multi-stage operation of foreign interference
Independent researcher Sze-Fung Lee presented a disruptive perspective, arguing that the public often only recognizes foreign interference when “visible harm” occurs—such as harassment or the arrest of family members. In reality, these actions are part of a highly organized, multi-stage system of operations.
Sze-Fung Lee presented a “full tactical framework” for interference methods, analyzing the evolution of such operations:
Reconnaissance and surveillance stage: Using technological means or community infiltration to precisely identify targets.
Tactical implementation stage:
- Outsourced suppression: Recruiting or coercing legitimate hometown associations or chambers of commerce to act as proxies.
- Shadow policing: Using unauthorized overseas “police service stations” or agents to conduct surveillance.
- Lawfare: Abusing the legal systems of host countries to file frivolous lawsuits, draining targets’ energy and financial resources.
- AI-enabled disinformation: Using deepfake technology to launch large-scale defamation campaigns against dissidents.
One specific case cited was a coordinated smear campaign against Canadian Member of Parliament Michael Chong, in which actors spread false narratives about his family background and political views on social media, aiming to undermine his credibility within Chinese diaspora communities.
The shadow of policy escalation: from ‘ethnic unity’ to cross-border enforcement
Eric Lai, Senior Research Fellow at the Georgetown Center for Asian Law, analyzed the potential impact of recent policy developments on overseas security. He cited two key documents: Hong Kong’s white paper on “safeguarding national security” and a new law passed by China’s National People’s Congress on “ethnic unity.”
Lai warned that these laws frame overseas activities as security threats that “flow back” into China, thereby granting administrative authorities broader justification for cross-border enforcement. This means that Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Hong Kong activists living in Canada may face long-term psychological pressure, cognitive manipulation, and legal risks.
Canada’s response: current assessment and three major challenges
Although Canada has made progress in addressing foreign interference—such as the public inquiry led by Justice Hogue and newly introduced legislation on foreign influence—the experts at the seminar agreed that systemic challenges remain severe. These include:
Institutional fragmentation: There is a lack of coordination among foreign affairs, law enforcement, human rights, and victim support agencies. Information cannot be shared in real time, leaving victims in a state of “disorientation.”
Trust crisis: Affected communities are often treated as “sources of information” rather than partners. When community members report interference but receive no effective response—or are even told to “reduce public activities to stay safe”—this further deepens their sense of alienation.
Pressure from economic leverage: During periods of economic volatility, certain interest groups may invoke the need to “maintain trade relations” to pressure governments into compromising on human rights and security issues.
Building a ‘whole-of-society safeguard:’ five policy recommendations
In response to the identified risks, the panel proposed a roadmap for policymakers:
Strengthening early warning mechanisms: Drawing on cybersecurity models, empower communities to identify early signs of interference (such as reconnaissance and infiltration) and intervene before harm materializes.
Targeted protection, avoiding stigmatization: Policies should focus on “state-directed actors” rather than entire ethnic communities. Legal tools should be used to address immigration and safety concerns of community members, removing their sense of insecurity.
Bridging gaps in frontline response: Improve information sharing among government, civil society, and affected communities. Incorporate victim perspectives into law enforcement training and build trust-based response mechanisms.
Using democratic values as strategic leverage: Experts emphasized that open societies are not powerless in engaging with China. Canada, together with allies, should clearly state that harassment and repression of residents within democratic countries constitute a non-negotiable red line in bilateral relations.
Fixing technical security vulnerabilities: In the face of AI-accelerated disinformation attacks, Canada needs to invest heavily in democratic infrastructure. This includes establishing independent third-party fact-checking institutions, as well as technological systems capable of rapidly detecting and flagging AI-generated content.
The seminar hosted by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and the Georgetown Center for Asian Law is not only a warning about the current situation, but also a profound reflection on future governance pathways. Experts unanimously agreed that foreign interference is essentially a test of “institutional resilience.”
In the process of seeing the world “as it truly is,” Canada must demonstrate that the openness of democratic systems is not a weakness, but a source of strength. Only through the collective efforts of society, and by building transparent, fair, and resilient safeguards, can Canada both protect the basic human rights of diaspora communities and safeguard the democratic foundations of an open society.
By Li Ting
