By Li Jingyao
Editor’s Note:
This article draws on official notices from China’s military procurement platform, reporting by Hong Kong media, commentary from analysts and former PLA personnel, and unverified disclosures circulating on social media. Claims regarding deaths, disappearances, or internal power struggles within China’s military have not been officially confirmed and are presented as analysis or allegations attributed to their respective sources.
On December 15, China’s military procurement platform issued a public notice soliciting reports of irregularities in Air Force procurement. The announcement immediately drew attention from observers, some of whom interpreted it as a signal of intensifying internal tensions within the Chinese military—and potentially the opening move in a broader purge of the Air Force.
According to Hong Kong’s Ming Pao, the notice calls for information related to procurement of goods and services, including bid evaluations, contract execution, supplier penalties, the selection of tendering agencies, and online procurement procedures. Submissions are required to be factual and objective, with a reporting deadline set for June 30 of next year.
Success
You are now signed up for our newsletter
Success
Check your email to complete sign up
Analysts note that such a public call, explicitly targeting a single service branch, is unusual. Since 2023, China’s military has been engulfed in a sustained anti-corruption campaign that has brought down numerous senior officers across multiple theaters. Procurement practices have consistently been identified as a central focus of these investigations.
In July 2023, the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department launched a nationwide review of procurement and bidding practices, inviting reports of violations dating back to October 2017. A series of high-ranking officers subsequently fell from power, developments widely believed to be linked to procurement-related corruption.
The Military’s Growing Role in China’s Internal Power Struggles
Veteran media commentator Wang Jian argued on his self-media channel that the Air Force procurement probe points to what he described as “a coming bloodbath” within the service. In his view, the internal struggle surrounding the military is not subsiding but accelerating.
Wang contended that the most dangerous variable in China’s future political trajectory may not be economic slowdown or social unrest, but the military itself. Citing Mao Zedong’s dictum that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” he emphasized that the Chinese Communist Party’s authority has historically rested on firm control of the armed forces.
According to Wang, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution only after securing military loyalty, and Deng Xiaoping was able to govern from behind the scenes for similar reasons. By contrast, Wang argued, Xi Jinping may be gradually losing his grip on the military—turning it into a source of structural risk rather than institutional stability.
Wang identified two principal drivers of this risk. The first is military spending. Despite three consecutive years of economic decline, China’s defense budget has continued to grow, increasing by roughly 7 percent this year. Officially, defense spending stands at approximately 1.8 trillion yuan (about USD 250 billion). Wang argued, however, that actual expenditures may be significantly higher, as major costs—such as those associated with the 500,000-member armed police—are excluded.
If total military-related spending reaches an estimated 3.6 trillion yuan (about USD 500 billion), Wang said, it would consume roughly 15 percent of China’s fiscal revenue. In a weakening economy, this could intensify competition over resources and crowd out spending on social security, healthcare, and education.
The second source of risk, Wang argued, is entrenched corruption. “Military corruption runs from top to bottom,” he said, adding that the issue is not whether corruption can be uncovered, but whether there is sufficient political will to pursue it. Once the military develops interests of its own, Wang warned, it ceases to function solely as an instrument of the party and becomes an active—and potentially decisive—actor in elite power struggles.
Rumors of Deaths and Disappearances Inside China’s Air Force
Against this backdrop, the procurement probe has renewed attention to widely circulated reports of sudden deaths and disappearances among senior Air Force figures, including Air Force commander Chang Dingqiu, former Central Military Commission vice chairman Xu Qiliang, and former Air Force commander Ma Xiaotian.
On December 11, political scholar Liu Junning wrote on X that Chang, 58, had died of a sudden heart attack during a period of what he described as “detention-style questioning” by military discipline authorities. Liu emphasized that the information had not been officially confirmed and invited independent verification.
Some analysts have suggested that Chang may have been detained following the Fourth Plenum and died under unclear circumstances. Others have speculated that his case could be linked to intense internal power struggles involving sensitive, high-level issues.
Independent producer Li Jun, speaking on the Elite Forum program, said that reports of Chang’s death inevitably recalled Xu Qiliang, another senior figure who rose through the Air Force. “When you put these two names together,” Li said, “the immediate impression is that something is wrong inside the Air Force.”
Li noted that Chang, born in 1967, belonged to a younger generation of generals who would ordinarily undergo rigorous health screening. As a result, he argued, a sudden fatal medical episode was difficult to accept without further explanation.
Li outlined three possible scenarios: an acute medical emergency, suicide under extreme pressure, or deliberate silencing. In the context of sustained purges within the PLA, he argued, some cases may center less on corruption than on power itself. “Questions of who commands whom,” he said, “can become matters of life and death.”
Evidence Mounts of Targeted Removals Among Xi-Aligned Air Force Officers
Former PLA Navy lieutenant colonel Yao Cheng stated that, based on personal contacts, not only Chang but also Air Force political commissar Guo Puxiao had disappeared from public view. Yao argued that the absence of official confirmation does not necessarily invalidate such reports, claiming that Chang “knew too much.”
Observers have also noted that entries for Chang, Guo, and Air Force deputy commander Yu Qingjiang have been removed from Baidu Baike, a development often interpreted as a sign of political trouble in China’s opaque system.
Separately, journalist Zhao Lanjian wrote on X in October that former Air Force commander Ma Xiaotian had been arrested. Zhao described the claim as his twelfth advance disclosure since 2023 of senior political or military purges later confirmed by authorities. To date, however, there has been no official reporting on Ma’s status, nor any public appearance to refute the allegation.
Commentator Wang Youqun argued that, given the current climate of military purges, it would not be surprising if Ma had also fallen under investigation.
Another figure drawing scrutiny is Xu Xueqiang, an Air Force general and head of the CMC Equipment Development Department. Xu did not attend the Central Economic Work Conference held in Beijing on December 10–11. Commentator Cai Shenkun has claimed that Xu has already been removed from his post.
Analyst Jiang Feng suggested that these developments may reflect a broader effort by rival power centers within the military leadership to dismantle networks associated with Xi Jinping. Acting in coordination with senior party elders, Jiang argued, CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia may be systematically targeting officers personally promoted by Xi. As a prominent Air Force figure closely aligned with the current leader, Xu would fit that pattern.
Is a Rival Power Center Consolidating Control of China’s Military?
Yao Cheng argued that the Air Force occupies a uniquely decisive position within China’s military structure, surpassing both the Navy and the Rocket Force—China’s strategic missile arm—in its capacity for rapid, autonomous action. “If you want to turn the guns around,” Yao said, “the Navy and Rocket Force cannot do it, but the Air Force can.”
He added that in any future conflict involving Taiwan or Japan, the Air Force would likely be the first to respond, as naval forces would face more limited immediate reach. Given these dynamics, Yao argued, any serious attempt to restructure or assert control over the military would logically begin with the Air Force.
Some analysts believe that such a process may already be underway. In this view, Zhang Youxia—working in concert with party elders and members of China’s so-called “red aristocracy”—has effectively assumed operational control over the military, using anti-corruption mechanisms to dismantle rival factions. The public solicitation of reports on Air Force procurement irregularities is therefore interpreted not merely as a disciplinary measure, but as a signal that a far-reaching purge of the Air Force may be unfolding.
