By Meng Hao
U.S. President Donald Trump recently signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2026, authorizing approximately $901 billion in defense spending. The legislation has continued to generate debate, particularly over its implications for cross-strait security.
National Taiwan University political science emeritus professor Ming Chu-cheng said that Taiwan’s democratic system, semiconductor industry, and strategic position make it indispensable to the U.S., and Washington is unlikely to “sell out” Taipei. Ming argued that Beijing’s talk of a 2027 invasion is largely a smokescreen, with actual risks possibly shifting earlier to 2026.
Commentator Qin Peng focused on the $11.1 billion U.S. arms sales package to Taiwan, identifying two categories of weapons that he said have left Beijing deeply alarmed. Together, he argued, they significantly undermine the CCP’s long-promoted notion of a “three-day takeover of Taiwan” and shifts the strategic initiative to Taipei for the coming decade.
Building a ‘copper wall’ around Taiwan
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Overseas Chinese commentator “Jason” said one of the most consequential changes in the NDAA is a dramatic expansion of funding under the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative — from $300 million to $1 billion. He described this as a fundamental shift in Washington’s approach to Taiwan’s defense.
For decades, U.S. policy focused on selling major platforms such as F-16 fighter jets, M1A2 tanks, and Patriot missile systems. The new emphasis, Jason argued, is on ensuring Taiwan can maintain societal stability for 90 days under blockade. Heavy platforms are costly, slow to deliver, and vulnerable in an isolation scenario. What Taiwan needs, he said, is not its hundredth fighter jet, but the ability to function when cut off from the outside world.
The NDAA codifies this shift through several provisions. Funding is authorized for medical equipment, stockpiles, and battlefield casualty care — an area Jason said is strategically critical, as shortages during a blockade could rapidly erode public morale.
The law also authorizes joint U.S.–Taiwan deployment of unmanned and counter-drone systems, aligning with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s “hellscape” concept. Large numbers of expendable drones and unmanned vessels could saturate the Taiwan Strait, delaying amphibious landings and disrupting Beijing’s operational timetable while buying time for U.S. forces to mobilize.
Another provision requires assessments to protect undersea cables, cloud computing systems, and other digital infrastructure. Jason noted that disrupting communications can be more destabilizing than cutting off food supplies, as these networks form the backbone of command, control, and counter-disinformation efforts.
Taken together, Jason likened the emerging framework to a Taiwan Strait version of Israel’s Iron Dome, spanning physical defense, societal resilience, digital infrastructure, and psychological deterrence. The objective, he said, is not a static barrier but a system capable of holding for 90 days, long enough for sanctions to take effect and for Beijing’s rapid-strike plans to devolve into a costly war of attrition.
The $11.1 billion arms sale serves as the operational core of this approach. Qin Peng highlighted two weapons categories in particular. The first includes 82 HIMARS rocket systems, bringing Taiwan’s total to 111 launchers, paired with 420 ATACMS missiles — for a cumulative total of 504, each with a 300-kilometer range. These missiles could strike ports and command centers across Fujian and Zhejiang, depriving the PLA of secure rear areas.
The second category consists of nearly 4,700 anti-tank missiles, including 3,245 TOW-2B systems and 1,450 Javelins. Qin said this volume would allow Taiwan to conduct multiple precision strikes against landing armor, turning potential beachheads into zones of extreme attrition. Both Qin and Jason argued that this combination leaves little credibility in Beijing’s “three-day victory” narrative.
Professor Ming agreed, noting that while the PLA has modernized rapidly, any real military action would likely come earlier than the publicly discussed 2027 timeline. He urged Taiwan to strengthen its “porcupine strategy” and remain alert to CCP cognitive warfare aimed at sowing doubt about U.S. support.
Cutting off capital and technology lifelines
Jason said the NDAA also marks a turning point in economic pressure on Beijing. Temporary Biden-era executive orders have been elevated into the National Security Comprehensive Outbound Investment Act, transforming U.S.–China capital decoupling from a reversible policy into binding law.
The scope of scrutiny now extends beyond China and Hong Kong to include countries such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela, closing off indirect routing channels. Newly designated sensitive sectors include hypersonic systems and supercomputing, targeting areas where Beijing retains limited technological advantages.
The law defines restricted investment broadly, covering equities, bonds, joint ventures, land leases, proxy arrangements, and offshore structures. It allocates $150 million for enforcement, with penalties of up to twice the transaction value and a minimum fine of $380,000.
Jason noted a 450-day window, running through March–April 2027, for finalizing implementation rules—a concession to financial markets. He warned that once loopholes are closed, speculative capital flows into Chinese technology stocks could reverse sharply, weakening both innovation capacity and economic legitimacy.
Professor Ming said Washington’s shift reflects accumulated distrust, citing Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea, the collapse of Hong Kong’s promised autonomy, and China’s role in exacerbating the war in Ukraine. What Wall Street once viewed as a growth engine is now seen as a national security risk, he said, and economic pressure will amplify military deterrence.
Targeting the CCP’s most sensitive point
Jason described the NDAA’s transparency provisions as potentially the most destabilizing element. The law requires the Director of National Intelligence to publish, within 180 days, or by June 2026, public reports detailing the assets of senior CCP leaders, including Xi Jinping, Politburo members, and their immediate families.
Derived from Senator Rick Scott’s PICTURES Act, the requirement covers domestic and overseas property, corporate holdings, foreign accounts, proxy assets, and supporting visual evidence. Jason stressed that the impact lies in public disclosure rather than investigation. The reports would not be classified, and their intended audience, he said, is China’s 1.4 billion people.
He described the CCP as facing a prisoner’s dilemma: disclose and admit corruption, refuse and face phased revelations, retaliate and expose vulnerabilities, or remain silent and be judged complicit. The issue sparked heated discussion on X, where nationalist and dissident users alike voiced anticipation of “the U.S. acting as China’s discipline inspector.”
Qin Peng warned that Taiwan must also guard against internal instability. He cited a Dec. 19 indiscriminate attack in Taipei involving a mainland-made BD100 smoke grenade that injured four people, as well as political turmoil in the legislature, arguing that such events could be exploited by Beijing to deepen social divisions. Taiwan’s greatest danger, he said, lies not in missiles, but in a loss of unity.
Strategic convergence and implications
Jason emphasized that these measures are designed to reinforce one another across military, economic, and informational domains. Their timelines converge around Beijing’s own stated window for action. Should the CCP proceed, he argued, it would face eroding domestic legitimacy, constrained technological capital, and a Taiwan prepared to endure—at the cost of simultaneous military, economic, and political defeat.
Rejecting speculation about transactional diplomacy, Jason urged attention to the broader architecture behind the policy shift. National security strategy provides direction, the NDAA supplies resources and authority, and arms sales translate intent into capability. Together, he said, they form a comprehensive effort to constrain Beijing’s expansionist ambitions.
Professor Ming concluded that as U.S.–China rivalry deepens — potentially expanding into a trilateral or quadrilateral framework with Japan — Washington must maintain firm deterrence, while Taiwan strengthens defense, deepens alliances, and counters disinformation. Qin Peng echoed that Taiwan’s challenge is not only military, but political: preserving democratic institutions, maintaining social cohesion, and fully leveraging defensive support in the face of persistent CCP pressure.
