On Feb. 12, ten Hong Kong diaspora organizations from Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe jointly issued a rare open letter expressing “deep fear and anxiety” to the Canadian government. They strongly questioned the recent law enforcement cooperation Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Prime Minister David Carney’s Liberal government and China’s Ministry of Public Security, warning that the agreement could further expose overseas Hong Kongers to threats from Chinese national security agencies.
The open letter noted that these organizations represent Hong Kong communities who had fled China’s political repression and resettled in the West. They emphasized that the Carney government formalized cooperation with the Ministry of Public Security without publishing the full text of the agreement, explaining any protective measures, or detailing oversight mechanisms—effectively introducing into Canadian territory the same security apparatus that once drove them from their homes.
These concerns are not unfounded. Canada’s independent investigative media outlet The Bureau, relying on confidential documents, federal intelligence assessments, and analysis from former RCMP senior officer Garry Clement, has repeatedly exposed related risks. Clement, with nearly fifty years of experience in policing, intelligence, and financial crime investigations, including missions in Asia, stated clearly that any cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party “is never purely technical, nor apolitical.” The party-state system does not separate criminal enforcement from intelligence gathering and political repression—they are seamlessly integrated.
The Canadian government stated that the MoU is intended to “strengthen cooperation on corruption and transnational crime,” covering areas such as cyber telecom fraud, synthetic drugs, drug trafficking, and money laundering, while continuing bilateral working-level engagement. However, Hong Kong diaspora groups argue that this description obscures the real problem. The Ministry of Public Security is not only China’s internal security machine but has also been confirmed to conduct transnational repression in Western countries, including surveillance, harassment, and intimidation of overseas Hong Kongers and their families in Hong Kong.
A serious chilling effect
The letter warned that even the mere perception of “closer engagement” could have a serious chilling effect: Hong Kongers might reduce public expression, civic participation, reporting, and political advocacy. A trust crisis is already apparent. One Hong Kong diaspora member, speaking anonymously to The Bureau, said: “I no longer dare to contact the RCMP. I’m worried my identity could be exposed or the information I provide might end up in the hands of Chinese authorities.”
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More alarmingly, a confidential June 2019 report by Canada’s National Security and Intelligence Committee (NSICOP), obtained by The Bureau, revealed that Chinese officials had employed multiple covert methods in Canada, including unauthorized entry, threats and intimidation, detaining relatives in China as leverage, recruiting Chinese-language journalists to track targets, and even dissuading victims from reporting to Canadian police. These facts are not speculation—they have been repeatedly briefed to senior government officials by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
Just last week, a major scandal erupted in the Toronto Police: multiple officers were alleged to have accessed citizens’ private information at the request of organized crime, and one officer trying to block drug inflows into prison even survived an attempted murder. Hong Kong diaspora groups argue that in such an internal governance crisis, deepening cooperation with the Ministry of Public Security is tantamount to adding insult to injury.
The open letter was co-signed by ten organizations, including Hong Kong Watch, Canadian Friends of Hong Kong, US HongKongers Club, and European Hong Kong Diaspora Alliance. They criticized the Canadian government for its lack of transparency: “The MoU has not been published in full, nor have any safeguards, limitations, or oversight mechanisms been explained, which heightens Hong Kongers’ fears that criminal cooperation may intentionally or unintentionally expose individuals or community networks to danger.”
Real cases already illustrate this risk. In the 2025 federal election, Conservative candidate and pro-democracy activist Joseph Tay became a direct victim of transnational repression. In December 2024, Hong Kong police issued a CAD $184,000 bounty on Tay—who had obtained Canadian citizenship—for “inciting secession” and “colluding with foreign forces.”
In January 2025, Liberal MP Paul Chiang publicly stated at a Chinese-language media event that “he could claim the reward by bringing Tay to the Toronto Chinese consulate.” On April 21, the federal Security and Intelligence Election Threats (SITE) task force publicly confirmed that Tay’s campaign was subject to “transnational repression,” including simulated wanted posters and coordinated suppression on Chinese-language platforms.
Tay told to halt campaign activities
The RCMP had advised Tay to halt public campaign activities. Tay later testified before the House Affairs Committee that venue owners hosting his private events were summoned twice by the Chinese consulate; volunteers and Tay himself were followed and photographed by unknown vehicles; and elderly Chinese-Canadian voters received warnings that if they voted for Tay, the consulate would know, and they could no longer obtain Chinese visas. The Bureau also learned that Tay’s campaign team filed formal complaints to police after suspecting armed individuals were tracking them.
A recent report by the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation further noted that Canada has the highest density of “united front” organizations among Western countries: 575 groups in a population of 40 million, or 14.38 per million residents—nearly five times the U.S., over twice the U.K., and more than three times Germany. These groups are accused of assisting China in technology transfer, government influence, transnational repression, and even human trafficking and money laundering.
In this security environment, the Carney government’s decision to sign a cooperation agreement with the Ministry of Public Security is seen by diaspora groups as a serious dereliction of duty. The Bureau’s commentary notes that the government has long ignored CSIS warnings while prioritizing trade agreements with Beijing. If Carney cannot publish the full agreement and demonstrate sufficient safeguards to protect diaspora safety, the only possible conclusion is either that no effective safeguards exist or that existing ones are too weak to withstand public scrutiny.
Either scenario constitutes a severe threat to Canadian values and national security. The Hong Kong diaspora’s call is not just for their own safety but serves as a warning to all Canadians who could become the next targets.
