Miles Yu, a columnist for the The Washington Post, wrote on March 6 that Beijing’s major strategic gamble in the Middle East over the past decade—turning Iran into a central pillar to counter the United States—is now rapidly unraveling. As joint U.S.–Israeli military operations significantly weaken Iran’s nuclear and conventional capabilities, this “cornerstone” is losing its strategic value. The shift is not only reshaping Middle Eastern geopolitics but may also influence China’s role and choices in its broader global strategy.
Iran once the core pillar of China’s Middle East strategy
Yu notes that since the late 20th century China has gradually incorporated Iran into its Middle East strategy, seeking to use Tehran’s geopolitical advantages to construct a counterweight to the United States. In 2021, China and Iran signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in which Beijing pledged to invest $400 billion in Iranian infrastructure and energy projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to connect land and maritime routes while bypassing sea lanes controlled by the United States.
In 2023, Iran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, further integrating into the China-led security framework. The article notes that about 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports flow to China, and although this represents only about 12 percent of China’s total imports, it is crucial for Iran’s economy.
According to reporting by Reuters, China hoped that through such deep cooperation Iran would become a key strategic piece—capable of bridging Eurasia across the Persian Gulf while countering American maritime power. It was also seen as a tool to divert U.S. strategic attention and resources away from the Indo-Pacific region.
At the same time, China’s long-standing multilateral diplomacy in the Middle East emphasized balance and coordination. While maintaining good relations with Arab countries, Beijing also sought to preserve its image as a “neutral partner” in the region through economic cooperation.
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‘Operation Epic Fury’ reshapes the regional strategic balance
Yu argues that this strategic concept has now suffered a major setback following recent joint U.S.–Israeli military operations. Since Feb. 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury, Iran’s nuclear facilities and missile forces have been severely weakened, with many strategic targets destroyed or disabled.
According to data from United States Central Command, more than 2,000 targets were struck in the early phase of the operation alone, effectively suppressing Iran’s ballistic missile and drone launch capabilities.
U.S. military officials said the focus of the joint operation was to weaken Iran’s offensive military assets—including rockets, missiles, and nuclear-related facilities—rather than occupying territory or establishing a long-term military presence. Senior U.S. officials emphasized that the mission of “Epic Fury” is to reduce Iran’s ability to rebuild its nuclear program and degrade its long-range strike capabilities.
Meanwhile, Iran’s retaliation has spread across the Middle East, with thousands of drones and missiles launched toward multiple countries including Israel and the United States. Combined with earlier strikes, civil defense pressure and casualties across multiple countries have increased significantly. Official figures indicate that the death toll reported by Iran has already exceeded 900, with casualty numbers continuing to rise.
Reuters reported that despite the intensity of the conflict, when Iran came under attack its strategic partners China and Russia did not intervene militarily or in any substantive way. Instead, they offered diplomatic condemnation and political statements of support—exposing the fragility of the so-called anti-U.S. alliance.
China’s policy dilemma: balance and strategic imbalance
China, which has long pursued a policy of “balanced diplomacy” in the Middle East, now faces a difficult reality. The article notes that Beijing has attempted to maintain equilibrium between the Gulf states and Iran—sustaining economic and energy cooperation with Gulf oil producers while simultaneously offering political and economic support to Tehran.
However, as Iran suffers severe setbacks, maintaining this balance is becoming increasingly difficult and may even lead regional followers to question China’s strategic intentions.
Analysts say China’s principled diplomatic response to Iran—such as condemning external attacks and emphasizing overall peace and stability—reflects its attempt to avoid being drawn into a full-scale military confrontation while preserving relations with both the United States and its Gulf partners. While this restrained diplomatic posture reduces risks, it also diminishes China’s practical influence as a key strategic supporter.
In addition, the conflict has significantly disrupted global energy supply chains. Security concerns in the Strait of Hormuz have caused international oil price volatility and threaten stability in global energy markets—posing a long-term challenge for China, which is highly dependent on Middle Eastern energy imports.
What the ‘failed bet’ means for China’s global strategy
Yu concludes that China’s decision to treat Iran as a central strategic bet to counter the United States has now failed. The collapse of this gamble not only weakens China’s direct influence in the Middle East but also raises new questions about its broader global strategic planning.
The previously envisioned strategy—using Iran to divert American strategic attention—has been disrupted by reality, forcing a reassessment of China’s relative position in the Indo-Pacific and the wider global strategic landscape.
The United States and China are scheduled to hold leadership talks later this month. Washington’s recent actions have demonstrated its determination and capability to prevent nuclear proliferation and defend allied security—potentially becoming a new reference point in the strategic competition between the two powers.
Yu warns that any grand strategy built upon “fragile proxy states” carries inherent risks, and Iran’s strategic decline is now a reality Beijing must confront.
China will therefore have to reassess its network of strategic partners, its energy security policies, and its ability to project global influence. The long-term impact of this conflict will extend far beyond the Middle East itself and is likely to shape the future structure of great-power competition.
