By Chen Pokong, Commentary
During China’s reform and opening era, Jiang Zemin was rarely credited with the economic reforms associated with leaders such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. Yet when it came to political maneuvering, Jiang proved far more adept.
After rising to power following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, Jiang gradually consolidated influence by promoting a network of allies from his political base in Shanghai. This faction, later widely known as the “Shanghai clique,” included figures such as Zeng Qinghong, Wu Bangguo, Huang Ju, Chen Liangyu, and Chen Zhili. Retired diplomat Wang Daohan, whom Jiang regarded as a mentor, also remained an influential figure.
Though Zhu Rongji had worked in Shanghai and later became premier, he was widely seen as a technocrat elevated by Deng Xiaoping rather than a loyal member of Jiang’s faction.
With the Shanghai clique gaining prominence, factional politics intensified within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Political insiders joked that during one Politburo meeting, someone asked then–Premier Li Peng what had been discussed. Li reportedly replied, “I didn’t understand anything—they were all speaking Shanghainese.”
Consolidating power
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Jiang’s leadership era became synonymous with factional competition. Regional groupings, sometimes dubbed the Beijing clique, Guangdong clique, or Fujian clique, gained influence as political patronage networks spread across the system. One of Jiang’s most decisive political moves involved sidelining powerful military leaders Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing.
In 1992, after Deng Xiaoping expressed dissatisfaction with Jiang’s leadership during his famous southern tour, Jiang reportedly offered a self-critical apology to Deng while simultaneously warning that the Yang brothers, who wielded significant military influence, harbored political ambitions.
According to accounts circulating among political observers, Jiang also suggested that the Yang brothers favored revisiting the official verdict on the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, a possibility that deeply alarmed Deng.
Faced with what he saw as competing risks, Deng ultimately removed the Yang brothers from power ahead of the CCP’s 14th Party Congress in 1992. The move stabilized Jiang’s position and allowed him to consolidate control.
A complex relationship with Hu Jintao
Jiang’s position strengthened further as influential CCP elders gradually passed away during the 1990s. Figures such as Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao, Peng Zhen, and Yang Shangkun died during this period, leaving fewer power brokers capable of challenging Jiang’s authority.
With the old guard fading from the political scene, Jiang’s leadership era gradually took shape. But even after formally stepping down, Jiang remained deeply involved in Chinese politics. In 2006, the CCP published “Jiang Zemin’s Diplomatic Record” and later “Selected Works of Jiang Zemin.” The publications raised speculation that Jiang might be seeking to reinforce his historical legacy.
Soon afterward, Hu Jintao’s administration moved against Chen Liangyu, the powerful Shanghai party chief and a key Jiang ally. Chen’s arrest was widely interpreted as Hu’s attempt to assert authority over Jiang’s political network. Despite these developments, Jiang’s influence within the CCP leadership remained substantial.
Engineering a leadership transition
The struggle between factions became particularly visible during preparations for the 17th Party Congress in 2007. In the years leading up to the congress, leadership succession planning became a major source of internal debate. At the time, Li Keqiang was widely viewed as Hu Jintao’s preferred successor.
However, political insiders later suggested that Jiang’s influence played a decisive role in altering the succession arrangement. Instead of a clear single successor, both Li Keqiang and Xi Jinping were elevated simultaneously within the leadership structure. This arrangement ultimately positioned Xi Jinping to rise ahead of Li in the CCP hierarchy.
Observers noted that the final unveiling of the new Politburo Standing Committee was delayed by more than half an hour, an unusual occurrence in the tightly choreographed proceedings of CCP congresses, fueling speculation that intense negotiations had continued until the final moments.
Continuing influence post-retirement
Even after formally retiring from key positions, Jiang retained considerable influence through allies across the party, government, and military. When Jiang stepped down as CCP general secretary and state president in 2002, he initially remained chairman of the Central Military Commission, following a precedent set by Deng Xiaoping.
Though he eventually relinquished that role in 2004, analysts noted that Jiang’s political network continued to shape decision-making within the leadership. But the lingering influence of Jiang’s faction became visible during major national events.
At the 2009 military parade marking the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China, Jiang appeared prominently at Tiananmen Square despite having long retired from formal office. For many observers, the moment symbolized the enduring influence Jiang retained within China’s political system, even years after his official departure from power.
Editorial note: Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Vision Times.
